A selection of answers to questions posed by readers of AskHistorians. Refreshed most weeks, with the latest postings at the top.
Or go here for more answers from Mike.
Short index to questions (the lower the number, the further down the column the answer will be found)
 What should we think of the early medieval stories of sky-ships, crewed by sky- sailors, appearing in the air over monasteries and towns?
 Does anyone know, for real, which the oldest pub in England actually is?
 During the 9th century, a Tang Dynasty author wrote a story about a Black Person (“Negrito”) active during the 8th century in the Tang Dynasty. How many Black People were in Tang China, how did they get there, and what were their lives like?
 Were there links between William the Conqueror’s banning of the slave trade in England, and England’s later invasion of Ireland?
 Do we know what Joan or Arc looked like?
 Warning: NSFW. Did Wu Zetian really demand that foreign diplomats perform cunnilingus on her in in open court as a show of obedience–or is this a myth?
 Why did Fine Gael run a candidate in Inverness, Scotland, in the February 1974 and 1979 UK General elections? They’re an Irish party, so I have no idea why they would run there. It was the same candidate (U. Bell) both times. Any ideas?
 Is it true that a portrait of Cleopatra, painted in about 30 BCE by someone who had met her, was unearthed in Italy in 1818? What happened to the image?
 Did anyone really say “Her Majesty takes a bath once a month whether she need it or no” about Elizabeth I? Where did this come from? Why is it always referenced in quasi-academic literature without sources?
 What do we know about the history of the True Cross after the 1st Century?
 Every once in a while, a website will claim that teeth extracted from dead soldiers at Waterloo supplied dentures across Europe for years. Is this a myth?
 In 1765, a chimney sweep was exiled from Edinburgh for five years for assisting in a public hanging. Why?
 The medieval legend of the Dry Tree.
 Did the NYTimes run the headline “The Apostle of Hate is Dead” in response to Malcolm X’s assassination?
 There where many types of guilds in the middle ages. Did any of them focus ONLY on illegal activities (smuggler guilds, thieves guild etc) ? Or does this only happen in fantasy novels?
 How did the ancient White Horse, a huge hill-figure carved into a chalky down in the south of England in about 1,000 BCE, survive all the political, social and military changes that took place in the area for thousands of years without growing over?
 Is it possible that an Islamic city-state, rather like Venice, might have flourished on the desert coast of Somalia in the medieval period, sent envoys all the way to Beijing, and evolved a stable form of republican government that lasted well into the nineteenth century?
 How did the general public in England regard Halley’s Comet in 1066? Was universally seen as an ill portent?
 How did the sack of Guangzhou (Canton) in 879, at the end of the Tang dynasty, affect transoceanic trade between the Tang empire and Abbasid caliphate?
 I was reading about the history of the stapler and found that the first stapler was made for King Louis XV. “The ornate staples it used were forged from gold, encrusted with precious stones, and bore his Royal Court’s insignia.” Is this true? Does the stapler still exist?
 Why can’t I find very much information about the 14th Century Black Death in Asia?
 In Les Misérables, Victor Hugo claims that children were kidnapped during the reign of Louis XV, and rumours were whispered of the King’s ‘purple baths’. What is Hugo referring to here, and would the rumours have been common knowledge to a reader at the time?
 Do we know of any cases in the Catholic Church when the Advocatus Diaboli (or Devil’s Advocate) successfully argued against someone becoming a saint?
 Did Britain fund and direct the 1801 assassination of Tsar Paul?
 Did Coca-Cola produce a clear version of Coke for General Zhukov that could be disguised as vodka? If so, for how long was this going on?
 Why did Poland have lower rates of Black Death than other European countries during the 1300s?
 What is the truth about “getting shanghaied”? Was there such a thing as a bar in 19th-century San Francisco with a chair that dumped drugged people down a trapdoor to kidnap them and force them into the sailing life?
 During the New York Draft Riots (1863), supposedly the New York Times defended their office from the mob with 2 Gatling guns. Where did they obtain these guns and ammunition and how did they turn away the mob?
 Is it true that Henry VIII feared being attacked so much he had himself bricked into his bedroom every night?
 On the giants of Patagonia.
 Whatever happened to the hotel detective?
 At any point between the end of WWI and the end of WWII was there ever a rise of supernatural beliefs in Japan?
 Why did Hatshepsut’s successors attempt to proscribe her memory?
 What was the murder rate during the medieval period?
 I am a hot-blooded young British woman in the Victorian era, hitting the streets of Manchester for a night out with my fellow ladies and I’ve got a shilling burning a hole in my purse. What kind of vice and wanton pleasures are available to me?
 Did British criminals in the 1700s and 1800s really worship a deity called the Tawny Prince? If so, what were the origins of this deity?
 How bad would it have smelled in a medieval city?
 What exactly were the relics on which Harold Godwinson swore his oath to William of Normandy?
 What prompted the first emperor of Qin to have hundreds of scholars buried alive and their works burned?
1] Were the pyramids still kept in repair at the time of Cleopatra?
Q: What should we think of the early medieval stories of sky-ships, crewed by sky- sailors, appearing in the air over monasteries and towns?
Was the idea of sky sailors a common superstition of the time or is Abogard’s reference the only evidence of this belief?
A: For those who aren’t familiar with the early medieval idea of “sky sailors”, or the account that you are asking about, it may help to give the original story you refer to and put it in some sort of context before going on to actually answer your question.
Abogard (c.779-840) was Archbishop of Lyon during the reign of Louis the Pious, who was the son of Charlemagne. This was a period in which the Christianisation of the Frankish kingdoms had been ongoing for more than three centuries, but Abogard remained concerned that some peasants retained non-Christian superstitions and beliefs, and some of his writings were devoted to efforts to counter these beliefs. The one that we’re concerned with is Contra Insulam Vulgi Opinionem de Grandine et Tonitruis, or “Against Absurd Notions of the Common People on Hail and Thunder,” which was written some time after 810, and – as Jean-Louis Brodu points out – very probably after 829, when an ecclesiastical council meeting in Paris denounced the belief that sorcerers could “disturb the air, send hail, remove the fruit and the milk from their rightful owners and give them to others, and make numerous prodigies.”
In this treatise, Abogard complained of travelling through a district in which
almost all persons, noble and plebeian, townsmen and rustics, old and young, believe that hail and thunder may be produced at the will of man – that is, by the incantations of certain men called tempestarii … We have seen and heard many who are sunk in such folly and stupidity, as to believe and assert that there is a certain country which they call Magonia, whence ships come in the clouds for the purpose of carrying back the corn which is beaten off by the hail and storms; and which aerial sailors purchase of the said tempestarii.
So Agobard is telling us that the people of this region believed in a “country in the sky”, Magonia. These people seem to be in league with earthbound sorcerers – weather wizards – who are capable of raising storms that knock down peasant crops. Once the crops have been destroyed, Magonians appear and purchase them from the wizards.
Exactly what Agobard himself believed about all this is of some relevance. He lived at a time when large-scale battles were being fought, sometimes fairly literally, over competing interpretations of the core Christian texts – the dispute between those who approved of the veneration of religious images, and the iconoclasts who opposed the practice, was coming close to tearing Byzantium apart during this period – and his modern biographer, Allen Cabaniss, points out that he “was an opponent of the reactionary elements of the time, the judicial ordeal, weather magic, relic worship, pilgrimages, the excessive veneration of the saints, the use of images, Biblical obscurantism, [and] unrestrained ritualistic aberrations.” The flip side of all this, however, was that Agobard was also a sincere Christian. The Bible makes no mention of any such place as Magonia, and so Agobard had no compunction in suggesting that belief in such a place was the product of nothing but superstition. On the other hand, there was Biblical authority – as we will see – for the idea that God had created waters of heaven as well as creating waters of earth, and it seems far less certain that he would have denied that such regions actually existed.
Agobard’s account is especially interesting for the apparent eyewitness account it offers of an encounter with this belief:
We have even seen several of these senseless fools who, believing in the reality of such absurd things, brought in front of an assembly of men four persons in chains, three men and one woman, who they said had fallen from these ships. They retained them in irons for some days, before they brought them before me, followed by the crowd, to have them stoned to death as they had been condemned, but after a long discussion, the truth finally triumphed after the many reasonings which I opposed to them, and those who had shown them to the people were found, as a proverb has it, ‘as much confused as a thief when he is surprised.'”
Brodu makes the important point that Agobard is not simply concerned to attack peasant “superstition” in his account of the Magonians; he is part of a broader ecclesiastical discourse, prominent in this period, designed to “suppress any form of pagan activities” and which “had already acted against much more visible magical methods of defence against hail.” This effort certainly dated as far back and the 780s, when Charlemagne had prohibited the peasant practice of attempting to guard against hailstorms by planting large sticks covered with pieces of parchment in the fields. It has been suggested, quite plausibly in my view, that these parchments would have been covered with magical symbols of some sort. The Archbishop was also concerned to prevent what he saw as a form of racketeering which was going on to the detriment of the local peasantry – if the hail-damaged crops he referred to were not being sold to the Magonians, then presumably they were being traded to someone else.
Brodu comments usefully on possible meanings of the word “Magonia”. He cites Jean-Claude Bologne, in his Du Flambeau au Bûcher: Magie et Superstition au Moyan Age (1993), as suggesting the word may refer to the Minorcan port of Port-Mahon, which was known during the Roman period as Portus Magonis, or Magona, and was supposed, in legend, to have been founded by Hannibal’s brother Mago, whose family was known as the Magonides. Bologne notes that the inscription “Magonianus” meant “from Port-Mahon” in this period. This seems to make it not entirely certain that Magonia itself was conceived of as a “country” located in the celestial sphere. It may be that the superstition Abogard encountered was that the inhabitants of Minorca had acquired the ability to navigate sky-ships.
The beliefs that Agobard describes seem to have been pretty widespread in this period and although he is the only writer that we know of to refer explicitly to ‘Magonia,’ the earliest accounts of this sort were certainly not invented by him; in fact, they can be traced in material from early medieval Ireland that Meyer has concluded were “entirely based on oral information obtained in Ireland itself.” Very similar stories were later told in England, and continued to appear as late at 18th century Canada and even in 1890s Texas (the last being what was probably an example of the wide-eyed newspaper hoaxes common in this period). At least one of these accounts, and probably several of them, dates to before Agobard and the first half of the ninth century, and there are traces of what appear to be the same set of beliefs in sources that originated in earlier periods still.
The first ‘sky sailor’ accounts that have come down to us are Irish, and are found in the Annals of the Four Masters for 743 and in the Annals of Ulster for 749. Versions of the same account(s) can also be found in the annals of Tigernach and Clonmacnoise and in two recensions of the Lebar Gabála (“Book of Invasions”), which was compiled in the 11th century. It’s important to point out that the first two of these annals, which seem to preserve the earliest versions of the basic story, have survived only in, respectively, a compilation dating to the 1630s, and an MS dating to the late 15th century. However, scholars of Irish historical writing seem satisfied that the Ulster version, at least, contains material that was written contemporaneously from around the 550s, and as such it is probably reasonable to presume that the sky-ship story it contains predates Agobard’s.
The two entries are both extremely brief, and read as follows. First, the Annals of the Four Masters notes that in “the Age of Christ 743, ships with their crews were plainly seen in the sky this year.” According to the Ulster account, meanwhile, monks at the major ecclesiastical centre of Clonmacnoise, in the centre of Ireland, reported that “ships (naues) with their crews were seen in the air” over their monastery. The two versions are so similar that it may well be that, as McCaughan suggests, that despite the apparent six-year gap between the two entries, they actually refer to the same event, or story.
A third account from the same period is equally brief and gnomic: “According to the Book of Leinster, when King Domnall mac Murchada was at Tailtiu [Teltown] fair in 763, three ships appeared above him in the air.” Tailtiu (Tailteann in modern Irish) was an important market town noted for the Lughnasa Assembly which was held there on the first Monday of August, and which marked one of the quarterly feasts of the old pagan year. These celebrations had traditionally been marked by funeral games, and the fair of Tailteann coincided with what were then the best-known athletic games and horse and chariot races held anywhere in Ireland. As we will have cause to note, it may be that the Tailtiu story, too, is related to the first two.
So much for the earliest accounts of sky-ships – which, it will be noted, already feature sky-sailors, but no real other detail of any sort. One characteristic of these Irish stories, however, is that they tend to reappear in later texts in substantially elaborated versions – sometimes with revised dates attached to them. Thus we find an expanded version of the Tailtiu account, which Kuno Meyer attributes to an – unidentified – MS originating in Paris, and the American Celticist John Carey to De mirabilibus Hiberniae, a poem composed by Patrick, a late 11th century Bishop of Dublin. Meyer offers it in (Latin) verse and seems to confirm that the event occurred during King Domnall mac Murchada’s visit to the fair in 763:
The king of the Irish was in the open-air exercise ground [for martial games] at a certain time with diverse crowds, with soldiers admirable in their arrangement. Lo! suddenly they see a ship racing through the air from which, at that moment, a man had thrown a spear after a fish which [spear] rushed to the earth, but the man swimming [after it] drew it back.
As Carey points out, this revision of the story is notable for the addition of a very specific detail: “a fishing-spear falls from air to earth, briefly establishing some kind of physical link between the amazing ship and its mortal witnesses.”
According to the late 14th century Book of Ballymote – basing itself on a lost Latin tract, De Ingantaib Érenn [‘Concerning the Wonders of Ireland’], by Nennius – however, the Tailtiu incident actually occurred about two centuries later, in the reign of quite a different king:
Congalach, son of Maelmithig (A.D. 956) was at the fair of Teltown on a certain day, when he saw a ship [sailing] along in the air. One of the crew cast a dart at a salmon. The dart fell down in the presence of the gathering, and a man came out of the ship after it. When he seized its end from above, a man from below seized it from below. Upon which the man from above said: “I am being drowned, ” said he. “Let him go,” said Congalach; and he is allowed to go up, and then he goes from them swimming.
Carey discusses the transposition of the story, pointing out that it is much safer to associate it with the reign of Domnall mac Murchada’s that it is with that of Congalach, not least because the tradition of holding assemblies at Tailtiu had lapsed before the latter became king, and arguing that “it is… textually derived from De Ingantaib Érenn: various parallels in the wording appear to establish this relationship beyond reasonable doubt.”
In much the same way, the very early, very brief, Clonmacnoise incident is significantly elaborated on in the Norse Speculum Regale (“Royal Mirror”) of about 1250, which reports a much more dramatic version of events, and also introduces what Carey points out is “an authority figure” paralleling the one represented by Congalach: a man who “prevents bystanders from detaining the man from the air ship”:
There is yet another thing that will seem most wonderful, which happened in the city that is called Cloena [Clonmacnoise]. In that city is a church which is sacred to the memory of the holy man Kiranus. And there it thus befell on a Sunday, when people were at church and were hearing Mass, there came dropping from the air above an anchor, as if it were cast from a ship, for there was a rope attached to it. And the fluke of the anchor got hooked in an arch at the church door, and all the people went out of the church and wondered, and looked upwards after the rope. They saw a ship float on the rope and men in it. And next they saw a man leap overboard from the ship, and dive down towards the anchor, wanting to loosen it. His exertion seemed to them, by the movement of his hands and feet, like that of a man swimming in the sea. And when he came down to the anchor, he endeavoured to loosen it. And then some men ran towards him and wanted to seize him. But in the church, to which the anchor was fastened, there is a bishop’s chair. The bishop was by chance on the spot, and he forbade the men to hold that man, for he said that he would die as if he were held in water. And as soon as he was free he hastened his way up again to the ship; and as soon as he came up, they cut the rope, and then sailed on their way out of the sight of men. And the anchor has ever since lain as a witness of the event in that church.
McCaughan draws some interesting conclusions from all this. He suggests the “central theme of the “airship” mirabilia is that, not only is an inversion of the natural order of things possible, but that the natural order of things can be perceived from complementary perspectives and that simultaneously the marvellous is both in the world and out of the world.” On that basis, he makes a series of points about these reports, arguing that
- extraordinary happenings are regarded as actual historical events and are transmitted during the Middle Ages as fact, not fiction, despite their supernatural dimension
- the events are witnessed by numerous people, both secular (Teltown) and religious (Clonmacnoise)
- seen from the ground, vessels are floating in the air above
- seen from the vessels, the air between them and the ground below is perceived as water in which fish swim and which enables the vessels to float above a submarine world
- this air/water is life-giving oxygen to the people on the ground, but is life-threatening water to the swimming aircrew, who almost drown
- air/water is the common element, which envelopes both ground people and sky people, as the heights above and the depths below
McCaughan’s analysis of Irish sky-ship accounts also usefully places them in some broader contexts. First, he points out, “early Christian and medieval Ireland,” in particular, was filled with reports of miracles and wonders, many of which “were sky-related… including a steeple of fire in the air, across raised up in the air, [and] showed of blood and honey”. This is no exaggeration; Tom Peete Cross’s Motif-Index of Early Irish Literature contains the category ‘Magic object affords miraculous transportation,’ and this incorporates about 30 distinct sub-sections, ranging from “self-propelling boat (ship)” to “Saint’s bachall [staff or crozier] permits him to walk on water.” McCaughan notes that the same motifs are common in accounts from other parts of Europe. For example, in Norse mythology, the dwarf Dvalin builds a marvellous ship, Skidbladnir, for the weather god Freyr, who belongs to a race of divinities that have power over both the water and the air. Skidbladnir could sail both in the sky and on the sea, always enjoying fair winds.
McCaughan also notes that further evidence for contemporary belief in sky-ships and sky-sailors can be traced on an Irish monument that has been dated to the 8th century. The Kilnaruane pillar stone, located in Bantry, outside Cork, shows an Irish boat with a crew of five. A cross is mounted on the stern of the boat, and three larger crosses have been carved beside it. As the French art historian Françoise Henry was the first to point out about this stone ship, “the unexpected thing about it is that it shoots straight upwards amidst a sea of crosses…The little cross over the rudder can leave little doubt that we have a representation of the boat of the Church… here it seems to be very literally portrayed as sailing to Heaven.”
Ross, meanwhile, combines with Carey to offer a rather different focus: both scholars look at sky-ship tales featuring anchors that appear in accounts by the 12th century French cleric Geoffrey de Breuil of Vigeois – whose Chronica Gaufredi, completed before 1184, reports that an air-ship had appeared in the skies over London in 1122 and cast down an anchor into the centre of the city – and the chronicles of that noted wonder-merchant Gervase of Tilbury (who also wrote one of the ur-accounts of the famous Green Children of Woolpit). Gervase’s Otia Imperialia incorporates a chapter on the sea, completed in about 1211. This includes a commentary on Genesis in which the monk points out something very significant to the understanding of all sky-ship stories – that the Bible refers, quite clearly and explicitly, to God’s division of the waters he had created into the waters of heaven, and the waters of earth. Thus, in Genesis 1, verses 6-10:
 And God said, Let there be a firmament in the midst of the waters, and let it divide the waters from the waters. And God made the firmament, and divided the waters which were under the firmament from the waters which were above the firmament: and it was so. And God called the firmament Heaven. And the evening and the morning were the second day. And God said, Let the waters under the heaven be gathered together unto one place, and let the dry land appear: and it was so. And God called the dry land Earth; and the gathering together of the waters called he Seas: and God saw that it was good.
The two sky-ship stories that Gervase offers are introduced in support of the idea that there are “heavenly waters” in which vessels may sail. It seems very notable that the second of these is attributed to Bristol, which was, in the 12th century and earlier, by far the most important English port trading with Ireland.
Gervase’s first account has clear parallels with the anchor-story that the near-contemporary Norwegian Speculum Regale attributes to Clonmacnoise, although, once again, it introduces a rather interesting variant – the death of one of the sky-sailors:
As people were coming out of church in Britain, on a dark cloudy day, they saw a ship’s anchor fastened in a heap of stones, with its cable reaching up from it into the clouds. Presently they saw the cable strained, as if the crew were trying to pull it up, but it still stuck fast. Voices were then heard above the clouds, apparently in clamorous debate, and a sailor came down the cable. As soon as he touched the ground the crowd gathered around him, and he died, like a man drowned at sea, suffocated by our damp thick atmosphere. An hour afterwards, his shipmates cut the cable and sailed away; and the anchor they left behind was made into fastenings and ornaments for the church door, in memory of this wondrous event.
Gervase continues with his Bristol account, explicitly linking it to Ireland, and offering some implicit suggestions as to the ways in which the waters of heaven and earth might still be connected:
This port is the one used by the most of those who travel to Ireland. On one occasion a native of that place set sail from that port for Ireland, leaving his wife and family at home. His ship was driven far out of its course to the remote parts of the ocean and there it chanced that his knife fell overboard, as he was cleaning it one day after dinner. At that very moment his wife was seated at table with their children in the house at Bristol, and, behold, the knife fell through the open skylight, and stuck in the table before her. She recognised it immediately, and when her husband came home long afterwards, they compared notes, and found that the time when the knife had fallen from his hands corresponded exactly with that in which it had been so strangely recovered.
Much of the work of unpicking what these tales might mean has been done by Carey, who now teaches at University College Cork and whose research frequently focuses on folklore and the supernatural – his works include papers on Irish werewolves, otherworld traditions and origin myths. He concludes that we are not dealing with several independent accounts, but with variations on a single basic tale. He has traced the various embellishments and additions that have been made to the basic story, noting touches such as the introduction of an anchor in place of the spear mentioned in earlier versions of the tale, which has to be cut to allow the sky-ship to escape, and suggests that the switch in the story’s location to Clonmacnoise was a product of the “heady atmosphere” created by monkish “mirabilia-collecting” at that site. Carey has also suggested that the anchor motif that appears in most late versions of the story is probably related to another well-known Irish legend of the period, this one relating the various efforts of St Brigid to send to Rome to “learn the Rule of Peter and Paul” – a ‘Rule’ in this case being a code of behaviour by which members of a religious community agree to live. None of her embassies came back with worthwhile learnings, so at last she sent several men to escort a “blind youth” who had a such a superb brain that “whatever he heard he stored up in his memory on the spot.” When this group
got as far as [Plea, a city on] the Ictian Sea, a great storm came upon them, so that they let down the anchor. It caught on the dome of an oratory, so that they cast lots among themselves about diving down and it was on the blind youth that it fell to go down. He took off and released the anchor but he stayed there to the end of a year, learning the Rule, until the rest of the party got back to him from the East. And a great storm overtook them again in the same place so that they cast anchor once more. Then the blind youth came up to them from below with the Rule of celebration of that congregation with him. He brought along with himself a bell to give them. The bell, which belongs to the congregation of Brigid today, is the same bell brought by the blind youth, and the Rule they have is the Rule the blind youth brought from Plea.
As both Ross and Carey point out, the life of Brigid of Kildare significantly antedates any of the versions of the sky-sailor story we have encountered so far. She is one of the patron saints of Ireland and is usually assigned the dates of c.450-525. While the story of the blind youth and the anchor first appears in the 17th century version of the Annals of the Four Masters, therefore, it is possible that it dates to earlier than the 730s and provided a model for all of the later sky-ship stories.
Ross, meanwhile, introduces some other useful parallels. He points out that Bernhardinus of Siena, a noted early 15th century Franciscan writer whose works feature extensive criticism of the usual suspects featuring in contemporary Christian sermons – sorcery, gambling, infanticide, witchcraft, sodomy, usury and Jews – also refers to evil weather-wizards in the course of recounting a version of the legend now known as “The ship-sinking witch,” and suggests that vessels that are sunk by magic on the oceans of the earth are destined to serve as transports for the crops sold to sky-sailors who traverse the waters of heaven.
Bernhardinus’s Latin is rather obscure, but as Brodu points out, his original MS in the Bibliotheque Nationale rather intriguingly contains what appears to be the word “magonez” – one that has no meaning in Latin. Brodu comments: “I transcribe [in] ‘z’ a letter in the word ‘magonez’ that I have not been able to identify and which must be the abbreviation of a Latin termination.”
Spooner, in an article on what appears to be some closely-related Cornish lore, suggests that writers such as Gervase of Tilbury are actually drawing on a very much older idea, one that explains the strange story of the Bristol sailor’s lost knife, and which was “based on the Babylonian [notion], that the sea arched right over the sky’s vault, and well underneath the earth.”
Ross explains that
“the ocean was believed to curve somewhat like a Moebius strip. This latter curiosity resembles the fanbelt of a car, except that it has twists in it which impart to it the property that a resolute movement forward from any point inside the lower belt will bring the traveller over the starting point outside the belt and ultimately back to the original position. Put on a cosmic scale, ships sailing westward before the European discovery of America could, by this process, it was believed, ‘shoot the gulf’ and sail across the sky.”
This seems to explain how, in Irish mythology, Maeldún sails over a sea “like a cloud,” and looks down on fields and forests; indeed, Carey asks whether “he is really on water as he thinks, or is he gliding through the sky like the sailors above Tailtiu.”
We can probably best conclude by reporting the conclusions that Carey arrives at in his paper.
We can I think outline the most probable scenario for the air ship’s development as follows:
(a) In the mid-eighth century, a notice that ships had been seen in the air was included in the annals. The apparition was subsequently localized at the assembly of Tailtiu, and said to have been witnessed by the then reigning king of Tara.
(b) By the late eleventh century the story had been transferred to the reign of the tenth-century king Congalach Cnogba, and embellished with the detail of the lost and recovered fishing-spear; there was now only one air ship,
(c) By the end of the twelfth century the story was shifted to the monastic milieu of Clonmacnoise, and an anchor took the place of the fishing-spear.
Carey goes on to argue that there may be connections between Clonmacnoise, and the story of the sky-ship which sent down a sailor, and the tale of St Brigid’s ‘blind youth’:
A few suggestions occur to me. Clonmacnoise in the later Middle Irish period seems to have been greedy for marvels: quite a number of little tales, drawn in all likelihood from many disparate sources, associate the monastery with fantastic occurrences of all kinds. So far as I know this material has never been considered as a corpus, although such an exercise would probably be rewarding. It may be worth mentioning in passing that one of these remarkable events, the discovery of the corpse of a blond giant, is said to have taken place in the reign of the same Congalach alleged to have seen the air ship in De Ingantaib Érenn? Did other marvels connected with Congalach find their way to Clonmacnoise?
Other forces may have been at work… the mention of Domnall son of Murchad having seen the flying ships at Tailtiu appears in the Book of Leinster as a pendant to the story of St. Ciarán and the headless Ambacuc [a man who lived for seven years after his head was cut off], a story which ends in all versions with the assertion that Ambacuc was “one of the wonders of Tailtiu.” But although that story begins in Tailtiu, it ends in Clonmacnoise, where Ciarán takes Ambacuc to spend the last years of his life; and in fact in De Ingantaib Érenn Ambacuc is included among “the three wonders of Clonmacnoise.” I am inclined to believe that a version of the air ship story similar to that in De Ingantaib Érenn was transferred from Tailtiu to Clonmacnoise – riding piggyback, so to speak, on the story of Ambacuc.
There are other indications that the Plea story too was naturalized beside the Shannon. Another of the “wonders of Clonmacnoise” was a blind man who used to plunge into the river, consistently emerging with eels clutched in both hands and both feet; this sightless diver fetching booty from the waters seems strikingly reminiscent of the ‘blind lad’ who brought the bell and ordo back from Plea to Kildare. We have also the tale, preserved in the Book of Lismore, of how a bishop of Clonmacnoise made the acquaintance of a monastic community residing beneath Loch Rí – for, as one of its members matter-of-factly observes, “it is not more difficult for God that people should live under water than anywhere else.” As in the Plea story, one of the treasures of the church comes from the underwater community: in this case a psalter which had belonged to a young man who was willed while transformed into a pig. All in all, it seems likeliest that it was in the heady atmosphere of Clonmacnoise mirabilia-collecting that the Tailtiu air ship and the monks of Plea were fused into a single tale.”
So to summarise: there are a number of accounts of sky-sailors and sky-ships on record. Superficially, they appear to come from a number of different sources – Irish, English, French – but in reality most, including those told by Gervase of Tilbury several centuries later, appear have a common source in 8th century Ireland, and specifically in the wealthy, wonder-seeking monastic community of Clonmacnoise.
It’s important to remember that while the early middle ages seem very alien to us, being a period in which transportation was relatively slow and limited, and in which numerous very different and difficult languages were spoken, that is not the way they looked to the people who were alive at the time. This was a period in which there was a common religion in Europe, and a common language – Latin – was spoken by all those sufficiently educated to read and write. Monks travelled fairly frequently from house to house, and country to country, and the manuscripts they wrote were copied and circulated too. The ideas and the commentaries that these manuscripts contained were based on a relatively small and well-known corpus of works, centred on the Bible, whose ideas and allusions may be barely remembered among most of those reading this post, but would have been very familiar indeed to the educated people of the day. In these circumstances, it is easy to see how stories such as those told of sky-ships and sky-sailors could circulate easily and widely within the Christian communities of Europe. The very idea that sky-ships might exist, and might sail in the air, for instance, would have seemed fairly unremarkable to the religious minds of the day, even if actual reports of such craft were sufficiently rare to be classed as “marvels”; it was one that followed naturally from the idea that God had created waters of heaven alongside the known waters of earth.
With all that said, the Magonian version of the story that you are interested in is sufficiently different from the Irish ur-account to be potentially independent of it, and Agobard’s first hand account of his encounter with it is without precedent elsewhere in the literature. It’s worth noting, though, that even Agobard – a rationalist by the standards of the day – disputed only a part of the story that he heard. He denied that it was possible for weather-wizards to control storms and hail, and on that basis he denied the possibility that the three men and a woman he encountered could have been guilty of colluding with sorcerers to destroy and steal crops. He did not believe in the existence of Magonia. But, read carefully, his account doesn’t seem to absolutely rule out the possibility that sky-ships and sky-sailors might exist.
Jean-Louis Brodu, “Magonia: a re-evaluation,” Fortean Studies 2 (1995)
John Carey, “Aerial ships and underwater monasteries: The evolution of a monastic marvel,” Proceedings of the Harvard Celtic Colloquium 12 (1992)
Michael McCaughan, “Voyagers in the vault of heaven: the phenomenon of ships in the sky in medieval Ireland and beyond,” Material Culture Review 48 (1998)
Kuno Meyer, “The Irish mirabilia in the Norse Speculum Regale,” Ériu 4 (1910)
Miceal Ross, “Anchors in a three-decker world,” Folklore 109 (1998)
B.C. Spooner, “Cloud ships over Cornwall,” Folklore 72 (1961)
Q: Does anyone know, for real, which the oldest pub in England actually is?
I used to live in Nottingham, and sometimes had a pint or 5 in a pub called “Ye Old Trip To Jerusalem” which claims it dates back to 1189. It also claims to be the oldest pub in England, a claim it shares with (I think) about 100 other pubs in England.
A: Simply speaking – no. Confusion exists, and always will exist, because no continuous, officially-maintained listing – such as might be provided by, for example, licensing records – exists so far back as the medieval period, and because the claim to be “the oldest” pub offers status and, more importantly, a reason for customers to visit the premises.
In the case of ancient English pubs, there are typically several distinct problems lurking behind the claims that are made for both age and continuity of purpose.
In some cases, a pub makes the claim on the basis of a single old record that shows a public house of some sort existed on the spot occupied by the current pub. The assumption is made that the locale has offered the same services continuously ever since, but there is no documentary chain to prove it, and in pretty much every case that I’m familiar with, the building currently trading as a pub was constructed at a significantly later date, as well. This is certainly the case with the Ye Olde Trip to Jerusalem; the building occupied by the pub today dates to only the 1650s, though in this case there is also no documentary record of a public house existing on the spot at the specific date of 1189. The 1189 date seems to have been selected because it is the date of the accession of Richard I, one of the leaders of the Third Crusade, whose purpose was to retake Jerusalem from the Seljuk Turks. I suspect that Nottingham’s close association with the Robin Hood legend – which is also commonly associated with Richard’s reign – offers another reason why a pub in this town would claim an 1189 founding date. The idea that the pub has always had the name it bears today is also implausible; in addition to the “Ye Olde” prefix, which is typically one applied no earlier than the Victorian period, the earliest known use of the word “trip” to mean a journey dates only to 1691 [Oxford English Dictionary].
In other cases, a claim is made based on a perceived similarity in purpose between the current establishment and some much older one that can be shown to have existed at a certain date. For example, buildings located on the same spot as one once occupied by monasteries or other religious establishments sometimes make claims to have been continuously engaged in the hospitality business, on the basis that monasteries used to put up and feed travellers
- Claims are also sometimes made on behalf of a very old building which has been a pub for a long time. It’s assumed that continuity of purpose extends back to the construction date, though investigation of the building’s history is often enough to show otherwise. A good example is the Brazen Head, an old Dublin drinking house whose claims to significant age is based on tradition rather than documentation. The pub claims to have been established in 1198, but Timothy Dawson, in his “The Brazen Head re-visited,” Dublin Historical Record 26 (1973), notes that the earliest confirmed references to the property have it in the possession of a prominent Dublin merchant named Richard Fagan in 1613. By 1703 the same property was described as a large timber house, with an attached warehouse, which was used as a centre of operations by a prominent Dublin wool merchant. The earliest certain reference to the location as the site of an inn, a lease, dates only to 1754.
Finally, claims are sometimes made based on the existence of dated archaeological remains. Ye Olde Fighting Cocks in St Albans claims a history going back to 743 on this basis, although the building’s history as a licensed premised can be traced only to 1756
The reality is that it is very difficult indeed to trace the history of any public house so completely that we can be confident it has been a drinking establishment continuously for more than a couple of hundred years. There are several reasons why searches of surviving records are inherently problematic: inns were not required to bear names until 1393, in the reign of Richard II, and licences were first required only by the Alehouse Act of 1552. Some of the latter do survive among quarter sessions records in county record offices; similarly, bonds from purveyors of victuals, including innkeepers, 1578-1672 have been collected in the National Archives. However, records are very incomplete, and only a few are sufficiently precise to offer the names of inns. For more complete records we have to wait till 1753 and an order that licensed victuallers’ recognizances were supposed to be entered in annual registers, some of which note the inn sign; newspapers and street directories, which become fairly commonplace from the second half of the eighteenth century, provide another way of tracing the continuity of use of an establishment from this time. See J. Gibson and J. Hunter, Victuallers’ Licences: Records for Family and Local Historians (1997) for more detail of the quantities and types of records that survive. All in all, I’d expect any effort to trace the continuous history of a single pub would find it hard to push the timeline back much further than 1750 or so. I’d be fairly surprised if it proved possible to do so securely for any one establishment for as far back as the mid-sixteenth century, and certainly it is now essentially impossible to do so for any date earlier than 1552.
In terms of the exotic claims, though, the most extreme appears to be that made by the Old Ferryboat Inn in Holywell, Cambridgeshire, which boasts a foundation date of 560. The exact basis of this claim is hard to pin down – it’s not mentioned on the inn’s own website, for example – but, online at least, it is commonly suggested this refers to the earliest date ascribed to the site by an archaeological dig – no date or details given. The inn is not mentioned in the relevant volume of the Victoria County History, which I would expect it to be if this reference was accurate (although quite possibly any excavation occurred after publication, which was in 1932); there’s no evidence that whatever structure might have stood on the site in Saxon times was an inn; and the present structure dates only to the C17th. The pub’s claim to be the oldest in the country appeared in the Guinness Book of Records for 1993, but it was merely recorded, not investigated, by the Guinness team.
The Porch House, Stow-on-the-Wold, claims to have been founded in 947. Its claim is one of the recognisable types I outlined above, that of “similarity of purpose”:
There is a long-held tradition that part of this building was once a hospice built by order of Æthelmar, Duke of Cornwall in 947AD, on land belonging to Evesham Abbey.
Once again there is a lot of bad history in the Porch House’s claim. 947 is about 40 years before the historical Æthelmar is known to have been active; his flourit can be dated to c.987-1005. Ealdorman (not “duke”) Æthelmar is known to have founded the abbeys at Cerne and Eynsham, and given land to Mulcheney Abbey, but the only known connection of anyone of that name with Evesham that I can find occurs in 1016/23 with the grant by the abbey to one “Æthelmaer” (who may or may not be the same person) of the lease of an estate at Norton in Worcestershire, which is about 30 miles from Stow-on-the-Wold. No Evesham charter of 947 exists, although there is record of grants in Evesham made by King Eadred to “Æthelgeard, his faithful minister” in 955/9, and I can find nothing to evidence the “tradition” that the Porch House’s claim rests on.
The Bingley Arms, in Leeds, claims a foundation date of between 905 and 953. The evidential basis of this claim is, as usual, extremely hazy, but several online sites suggest it is based on the idea that the spot was a rest stop for monks travelling between the abbeys of Kirkstall and St Mary’s York. This cannot be true, as St Mary’s was not founded until 1088, and Kirkstall not until 1152.
The Old Ferryboat Inn, the Bingley Arms and another old pub, the Royal Standard of England in Beaconsfield, all claim to have been mentioned in Domesday Book (1086). These claims are also spurious. Domesday did not record inns. The entry for the area that is now Leeds mentions a mill, a church, and a number of plough teams. Beaconsfield is not mentioned at all in the Domesday survey, but it is not too surprising, given all the commentary offered so far, to find that the land that the town (and the pub) stand on was in the possession of Burnham Abbey at that time.
Much the same problem exists elsewhere. It is very common, for example, for British public schools to make claims to extreme antiquity – cathedral schools often claim very early foundation dates on the basis that it was one of the functions of cathedral clergy to educate their choristers; hence it’s assumed that a school must have existed on the spot from the date of the foundation of the cathedral. Wells Cathedral School, for example, claims to have been founded in 909 on this basis, but there is no documentation proving the existence of a school associated with the cathedral at anything like this early date (and, in addition, the school definitely closed for a period in the 1880s and was then refounded).
In the case of another claim often encountered online – that of the Japanese construction company Kongo Gumi to have been founded in 578 CE – there is the same lack of both contemporary documentation and proof of continuity of existence. The claim made by this company is actually based on genealogical charts of unknown reliability that were drawn up in the 17th century, and which purport to trace the history of the controlling family back through 40 generations to the firm’s supposed founder.
Q: During the 9th century, a Tang Dynasty author wrote a story about a Black Person (“Negrito”) active during the 8th century in the Tang Dynasty. How many Black People were in Tang China, how did they get there, and what were their lives like?
A: You are asking about a pretty contentious topic, and it is probably best to start, in fact, by pointing out that there is little to no consensus on the question of whether or not people of African origin reached and lived in China at all during the Tang period, nor – if they did – whether they arrived in the east as free people, or enslaved. With that said, however, it’s certainly interesting to look both at the evidence that does exist for African encounters with China and at the ways in which the Chinese appear to have thought about “blackness”.
To begin with, there is no doubt that a number of Chinese sources do refer to people who were usually described as kunlun, a term denoting, from the fourth century CE, non-Chinese peoples who possessed noticeably darker skin than the typical person of Han heritage, or sometimes as heiren (“black person”). Heiren is a term that, to further muddy things, originally described, in the period BCE, a sort of semi-bestial spirit, but which Don Wyatt, in his controversial book The Blacks of Premodern China (2010), asserts had evolved by the 8th century to refer to a person who possessed dark skin, an inability to acquire culture, and an inherent savagery. Other similar words were also sometimes used – sengchi and gulun, for example. Finally, the term that you mention in your question, “negrito“, was definitely used to described people of Malay ethnicity, and it’s questionable whether this word can be accurately translated to mean “black” in the current sense the term is used, or to refer to people of African heritage.
It should be fairly obvious, given these difficulties, that it is far from certain what sort of people the Chinese writers of the period are referring to when they describe people living in Tang China as “negrito“, as “kunlun” (崑崙) or as “heiren” (黑人). Before Wyatt published his book, it was usually assumed that all three terms referred to Malay and Khmer peoples or to peoples from the broader bounds of what is now Indonesia. Nonetheless, there are good reasons to doubt that things were really anything like this simple. For example, it is certainly true that there are references to kunlun in China significantly before we have any evidence that the empire had made any contact with the peoples of south-east Asia, much less those of Africa. The Empress Li, for instance, who was a concubine of the Jin emperor Xiao Wuwen (373-97 CE), is described, in a passage in The History of the Jin that has long puzzled historians, as “tall and her colouring was black. All the people in the palace used to call her kunlun.” And while some Tang-era references explicitly locate the kunlun in south-east Asia – for example, the Jiu Tangshu, or Old Tang History notes that “the people living to the south of Linyi [present-day Vietnam] have curly hair and black bodies and are commonly called kunlun,” while “the country of Zhenla [in present-day Cambodia] is northwest of Linyi… It is of the kunlun type” – Wyatt contends that, by the Tang era at least, some of the kunlun actually were people from Africa.
Wyatt’s thesis echoes one proposed a few years earlier by Julie Wilensky. Both writers argue that at least some kunlun reached China via the seaborne trade routes that existed in this period between the southern Tang port of Guangzhou (Canton) and the port cities of the Ummayad and, later, Abbasid caliphates, beginning perhaps as early as the 680s and ending after 879. (I have written in detail on this remarkable trade in an earlier response here at AH that you can read here.) And both suppose that, because the Arab seafarers of this period did engage extensively in a slave trade that shipped “Zanj” – an Arabic word meaning “dark” that was used in this period to refer to people of eastern African origin who came from the area that is now Kenya and Uganda – back for sale as enslaved people in the markets of the Abbasid Empire, it is possible, even likely, that some members of this group were shipped to China alongside other African produce, such as gold and ivory, and traded there for porcelain, silks and other Chinese luxury goods.
Wyatt cites an entry from the Old Tang History, which observes that
the territories of Guangzhou border the Southern Sea. Every year, the kunlun merchants arrive in [their ships], laden with valuable goods to trade with the Chinese.
In 684, the same passage notes, one of these kunlun assassinated Lu Yuanrui, the governor of Guangzhou, stabbing him in a dispute over payments and successfully escaping by sea. Wyatt contends that the year 684 thus represents the first definite point of contact between people from China and visitors from Africa.
It should, I hope, be pretty obvious from the above that there are issues with Wyatt’s identification of these Tang-era kunlun with Africa, and with his suggestion that the person who murdered the governor of Guangzhou in 684 was a black African slave. To begin with, it is easier to read the passage he cites as referring to merchants who were ethnically kunlun than it is to suggest that the port was visited by “kunlun merchants” – meaning merchants who sold kunlun slaves – and much easier to suppose that people who had the status and the wealth of merchants, and who visited southern Chinese ports in this period, were likely to be Malays or Khmer than they were to have hailed all the way from Africa. Finally, it seems almost impossible to suggest that anyone who bore the status of slave would have been received as the emissary of the kunlun merchants who were in dispute with Lu Yuanrui, much less to have been permitted to get close enough to him to stab him to death.
With all this said, however, it’s still possible to take the main evidence that Wyatt and Wilensky offer for the presence of Zanj in Tang China – which I should point out actually dates almost entirely to documents written no earlier than the 12th century – and suggest that, while there certainly are accounts of kunlun being enslaved by Chinese people (one, from Zhu Yu’s Pingzhou Ketan [“Pingzhou Chats on Things Worthwhile”] of c.1115 CE, notes that “they eat raw food. But once they are acquired as slaves, they are fed cooked food. They thereupon endure days of diarrhea, which is referred to as ‘converting the bowels'”), there is no reason to suppose that all of them were necessarily enslaved people. When we first get to hear detailed contemporary accounts of the Indian Ocean trading world in the ninth and tenth centuries, in fact, we find that black African merchants and sailors were certainly active in the trade that flourished in the region, both competing and collaborating with Arab traders from further north. A few hundred years later again, as one product of the celebrated 14th century voyages of the Chinese eunuch Zheng He, merchants from the Swahili-speaking port of Barawa, on the southern Somali coast, are known to have travelled to Beijing via Hormuz and to have returned home some time later. (I wrote about the history of Barawa, again at inordinate length, in this earlier response, which might also be of interest.) And a third possible source of African kunlun in medieval China might conceivably have been the trade that existed in this period between Madagascar and Indonesia. So some, even many, of the kunlun referred to in Chinese sources may perhaps have been free African seafarers who travelled as crew on Arab-owned dhows, or African merchants working in partnership with Arabs, or travelling as passengers on their dhows, or Malagasy peoples who had travelled first to Indonesia, and later on to Chinese ports – not enslaved people at all.
Whatever the truth, and despite the evidence that Wyatt provides that most references to kunlun come from Guangzhou, and hence probably were in some way involved in international commerce – a point that is a major plank in his argument for a seventh-, eighth- and ninth-century Chinese slave trade with East Africa – we do have some references to the lives of the kunlun in Tang and Song China that will hopefully be of interest to you – if little to no evidence of their numbers.
Wyatt writes that most kunlun lived limited lives within the “closed system” of the fanfang, or trade quarter, of Guangzhou, mixing only rarely with native Chinese, and thus having very limited impacts on Chinese society and culture. But Wilensky counters that
by the ninth century, a sizeable community of Arabs lived in Guangzhou, and the local residents could have seen African slaves on trading ships and in Arab homes. Some wealthy Chinese people even owned African slaves, whom they used as doorkeepers.
Wyatt also discusses the ways in which the Tang conceived of “blackness” – as a quality rather than as a skin colour or a denoter of “race” – and perceived the members of this group as culturally deficient. His discussion broadly follows that of Abramson, who in his earlier book on ethnicity in Tang China proposed that perceptions of ethnic difference were sieved through four core “themes” during this period, those of culture, ancestry, the body, and politics.
Wilensky draws attention to a key source from the Tang era, the Buddhist lexicographer Huilin’s dictionary Yiqie Jing Yinyi, which tells us a little more about perceptions of the kunlun while further muddling the question of exactly where they came from – he refers to them both as Zanj and as hailing from the east:
Kunlun can also be written as gulun. They are the non-Chinese peoples from the east, those from the island states of the Southern Seas. Their bodies are black…. There are many types of them, including the zanj, the turmi, the kurdang, and the khmer. They are all base peoples. These countries lack ritual and propriety. They steal in order to live, and love to feed on humans for food, as if they were some sort of rakshas or a kind of evil ghost. The words they speak do not have any correct meaning at all…. They do extremely well when they enter the water, since they can stay there for a day without dying.
This final point – that the kunlun were excellent swimmers – crops up again and again in Tang-era sources. For example, the fictional tales in the Taiping Guangji (which date broadly to the Tang, but were only published under the Song) includes several tales that tell of wealthy Chinese men who force their kunlun slaves to recover treasures from the bottom of the sea.
There are a few other accounts from Tang China, however, which point to broader and better-integrated lives than the sources we have looked at so far. Wilensky mentions another Tang tale, The Kunlun Slave, which
depicts the adventures of the valiant and powerful kunlun slave Mo Le, who helps his irresolute young master Cui successfully pursue a love interest. When the old slave observes Cui’s distraught expression and offers his help, Cui replies, “How could someone like you know my private feelings?” Undaunted, Mo says, “Tell me anyway, and I will certainly be able to fix your past or present problems.” Astonished that the slave might be able to help him, Cui tells Mo about a singing concubine and her mysterious hand signals. Mo Le exclaims, “How could this be difficult to understand?” and proceeds to help his master interpret the signals, which makes Cui “so happy he was unable to control himself.” Mo Le immediately takes charge and devises a plan for Cui to enter the girl’s chambers.
Throughout the story, Mo Le acts with cunning and strength, successfully solving everyone’s problems, while Cui passively watches. Mo Le must physically carry Cui over the high wall to the girl’s courtyard. The girl begs Cui to save her from captivity as a singing concubine, “Since you have a servant with great claws and great teeth who has divine powers, why don’t you help me escape from this prison?” While Cui stands there silently, “looking anxious,” Mo Le plans the escape, scoops up Cui and the girl, and carries them both back over the high wall to freedom, where they live in Cui’s compound. Mo Le’s speed and skill have no limits, for when the official eventually discovers Mo Le’s role in the concubine’s escape and sends fifty heavily armed soldiers, the old slave successfully eludes his would-be captors. The narrative concludes when one of Cui’s servants encounters Mo Le ten years later, selling medicinal drugs on the streets of Luoyang [the eastern capital of Tang, then a city with a population of half a million to a million people]. The old slave’s appearance “had not changed a bit.”
Some other accounts, finally, are summarised by Ptak (whose views on the realities of life as an enslaved person could frankly do with serious reconsideration) as follows:
Black “slaves” … of African, Timorese or other descent were essentially employed in urban households. On average, their living conditions were better… than the ones encountered in parts of early modern Europe. By and large – and in the absence of proper statistics – it should be clear that [those kept in] the foreign quarters in Guangzhou, under the Tang and Song, did equally well, perhaps even better. Here, some black migrants were serving in cultured households, embedded in material wealth and opulence, at least in conditions better than those found in the slums of modern US megacities. Some kunlun servants also reached the Tang capital, where many of them became happy members in cosmopolitan gentry families, while only some would be ill treated and dream of returning to their native countries.
To sum up: while there is significant evidence, both written and visual, that people designated kunlun and characterised by skins that were darker than those of the Han Chinese did live in Tang-era China, is is far from clear how many of them, if any, came from Africa. Similarly, though Wyatt can point to contemporary sources that identify some kunlun as enslaved people living in Tang Guangzhou, we cannot be certain that many, indeed any, of these were African. Other authorities, such as Philip Snow and Adams Bodorno, insist that the earliest clear evidence of contact between Africa and China dates only to the voyages of Zheng He in the first three decades of the 15th century. So, many, and perhaps all of the kunlun – and the “negrito” that you refer to – who lived in China during the Tang period were probably Malay or Khmer. But it is possible that some were African, and that they had travelled to China as free people, and made lives of their own when they got there.
Marc S. Abramson, Ethnicity in Tang China (2008); Adams Bodorno, Africans in China (2012); Roderich Ptak, review of Wyatt in Monumenta Serica 58 (2010); Philip Snow, The Star Raft: China’s Encounter With Africa (1988); Paul Wheatley “The Land of Zanj: Exegetical Notes on Chinese Knowledge of East Africa Prior to A.D. 150,” in Robert W. Steel and R. Mansell Prothero [eds.], Geographers and the Tropics (1964); Julie Wilensky, “The magical Kunlun and ‘Devil Slaves’: Chinese Perceptions of Dark-Skinned People and Africa Before 1500,” Sino-Platonic Papers 122 (2002); Don Wyatt, The Blacks of Premodern China (2010).
Q: Were there links between William the Conqueror’s banning of the slave trade in England, and England’s later invasion of Ireland?
A: Briefly: no. There’s no discernible connection whatsoever between the decline of slavery in England in the late 11th century England and the Angevin invasion of Ireland which took place a century later, in the period from 1169-75, for reasons that had nothing at all to do with William I. In fact, there’s so little evidence of any connection that I’m actually rather confused as to why you think there might have been; if you could possibly expand on your question a little, I could probably offer you a more detailed response.
For now, though, I can offer some further details that might help you to understand the contexts of this period. To begin with the practice of slavery in England: it is certainly true that slavery was commonplace in the Anglo-Saxon world. To be realistic, the institution has not been much studied by earlier generations of historians; we have very little evidence from surviving texts as to exactly how it worked, and, perhaps just as importantly, the very idea that the Saxons were enthusiastic slave-holders did not fit too well with the preconceptions of the earliest generations of historians to study the period professionally, in the late 19th and early 20th centuries – many of whom preferred the romanticised idea that Saxon England was a freedom-loving society that already contained the seeds of liberty, democracy and sturdy individualism that were so valued in the Victorian era. So most histories of the period treat the issue of slavery very much in passing.
The reality appears to have been that the institution was actually pretty important to the Saxons and their economy, and that the lot of slaves in Saxon England was not nearly as mild, even pleasant, as earlier generations of historians tend to suggest that it was. As Marc Morris points out,
to be a slave was to be held in the most abject of conditions. As Old English law codes make clear, slaves could be treated like animals: branded or castrated as a matter of routine and punished by mutilation or death; stoned to death by other slaves if they were male, burned to death if they were female.
The one surviving passage written by an Anglo-Saxon that attempts to see the world through the eyes of a slave paints an equally bleak picture: ‘I go out at daybreak, goading the oxen to the field, and I join them to the plough; there is not a winter so harsh that I dare lurk at home for fear of my master,’ Ælfric, the abbot of Eynsham, wrote in the late 10th century. ‘Throughout the whole day I must plough a full acre or more … I must fill the stall of the oxen with hay and supply them with water and carry their dung outside. Oh, oh, the work is hard. Yes, the work is hard, because I am not free.’
From the few references we have, it seems that the main source of slaves in the Saxon kingdoms was prisoners of war. The majority of these were probably originally Welsh or Scots, but a good number were the products of civil war between the Saxons themselves – thus, for example, as late as 1065, when a force of Northumbrians travelled south to meet Edward the Confessor in Northamptonshire and ask him to recognise a local man, Morcar, as their earl, even this supposedly peaceful party could not resist the opportunity of enslaving some of the people of the places that they passed through; as the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle points out, they ‘captured many hundreds of people and took them north with them, so that that shire and other neighbouring shires were the worse for it for many years.’ Of course, this trade was by no means only one-way – Welsh princes made slaves of Saxons whom they captured on raids into English territory as well, as Gruffydd ap Llywelyn did in Hereford in 1055, and as late as 1138 the Irish Annals of Loch Cé record that a raiding party went into ‘the north of Saxan’ (Pelteret suggests this means Westmorland) where it took ‘countless persons captive,’ and presumably shipped them back to Ireland. Similarly, writing well into the 12th century, Hermann the Monk mentions that when he and his party visited Bristol, he was warned that it was a practice of Irish traders at the port to raise anchor unexpectedly, and depart with any incautious men that had come on board their ships; these unfortunates were then sold abroad.
Overall, anyway, it can be calculated that at least 10 percent of the population of England at the time of the Norman Conquest were slaves, and estimates have run higher than that – up to 30 percent, in fact. Their number varied quite dramatically from shire to shire, apparently depending on how settled or unsettled the area had been over the previous few centuries – thus 21% of the inhabitants of Cornwall – which was peopled almost entirely by Britons, and which had been an independent kingdom until some time in the early 10th century – were slaves in 1066, but only 5% of the people of Middlesex, in the heartland of the Saxon state, shared the same status.
These men, women and children fulfilled many roles, but a good number of these were domestic, and the majority of the slaves themselves appear to have been women. We also know that this group fairly rapidly declined in numbers after 1066: Domesday Book tells us that the number of slaves in the shire of Essex, for instance, fell by 25% between the conquest and 1086. Similar patterns appear to have occurred elsewhere, and Loyn has suggested that the sharp decline in slavery was actually ‘the most vivid feature of change’ revealed in the Domesday survey. For the most part, historians seem to be agreed that the major reason for this was pressure from the church, the senior leadership of which became significantly less Saxon and more continental in terms of both its origins and ideas from the time of William I, who brought in the Italian-educated Lanfranc of Bec as his archbishop of Canterbury.
Nonetheless, it is clear there were still may thousands of slaves in England in 1086, and these numbers ought to give pause to those who believe that William I ‘banned’ slavery. It is certainly true that slavery had declined in Normandy well before it did so in England, something that specialists in the study of the duchy have suggested was probably a product of its contact with the Frankish societies further to the east. And it is also true that the Conqueror issued a law code (based, it is worth pointing out, on three Saxon and one Danish precursors – V Æthelred 2, VI Æthelred 9, VII Æthelred 3, and II Cnut 3 – that date back to the time of Archbishop Wulfstan in the first half of the 11th century) which stated:
I prohibit the sale of any man by another outside of the country on pain of a fine to be paid in full to me.
But this, read properly, is in no sense a law literally prohibiting of slavery, which had clearly continued to flourish in the face of Wulfstan’s attempts to restrict it, and which appears, in fact, never to have been abolished by the Norman state, but rather to have withered away gradually over the course of half a century or so, finally more or less vanishing during the reign of Henry I. Rather, the practice was increasingly condemned by the church, and it was this condemnation that appears to have underpinned its ultimate decline – Eadmer tells us that the Westminster Council of 1102 ruled that ‘no one is henceforth to presume to carry on that shameful trading whereby heretofore men used in England to be sold like brute beasts,’ while it is possible to suggest that the state, in the shape of the king, remained ambivalent about the trade, was not all that interested in taking firm action to suppress it, and if anything was happy to get its hands on some of the profits of the slave trade of this period.
We know that this trade was principally comprised of Bristol merchants who sold what were probably Welsh slaves, taken captive during the incessant border wars fought in the Marches, into bondage in Ireland. We also know that it had a very long history – Ireland’s patron saint, Patrick, who was the son of a Romano-British family of significant means and was enslaved by Irish raiders sometime in the fifth century, is the best-known example.
Both William of Malmesbury and the Vita Wulfstani offer us windows onto this Bristol trade. Thus the Vita mentions that it was a custom of some standing for captives taken all over the country to be transported to Bristol for sale, and Malmesbury agrees that the merchants of that city
would purchase people from all over England and sell them off to Ireland in the hope of profit… you would have groaned to see the files of the wretches of people roped together, young people of both sexes, whose youth and beauty would have aroused the pity of barbarians, being put up for sale every day.
The chronicler, adds Morris,
believed that the slave-traders of Bristol fornicated with their female captives before selling them on and it is probably significant in this regard that he emphasises their youth and beauty. Elsewhere he wrote about [Gytha], the wife of Earl Godwine (d.1053), [who was a Danish noblewoman and] was said ‘to buy parties of slaves in England and ship them back to Denmark, young girls especially, whose beauty and youth would enhance their price’.
All this is not really all that unexpected. Over the past few years, we’ve begun to recover quite a bit of new evidence concerning the extent to which Ireland was integrated into the broader trading community of western Europe in this period. It is increasingly clear that Dublin, at least – which was still ruled by a Scandinavian dynasty at this time – traded extensively with England and points east; excavations at Wood Quay, a major archaeological site in the city, reveal considerable evidence of participation both in trade that came from Scandinavia around the coasts of Scotland and that originating in western Europe and passing through or around England. The artistic styles of artefacts recovered in these digs – mostly pewter, bronze and earthenware – are predominantly French; Richter concludes that ‘there are many indications that the Irish element in Dublin was quite prominent and that the town had become part of the Anglo-Norman trading world.’
What I’m not too sure about, given your question, is whether you think that attempts to restrict the trade of slaves to Ireland in the period c.1080-1100 was linked to the eventual invasion of Ireland by some of Henry II’s nobles in the 1160s, and eventually to the invasion led in 1170 by the king himself. There seems to me to be absolutely no evidence it was, although it is certainly true that contemporaries writing in the 1160s and 1170s did associate the continuation of the Anglo-Irish slave trade with the events of that period.
In fact, it’s generally accepted that the proximate cause of the Angevin invasion of this period was the attempt of Diarmait Mac Murchada, the exiled King of Leinster, to establish himself as high-king of Ireland. Diarmait sought English aid, offering himself as vassal to Henry II to obtain it, and that it was this that prompted the first English incursions into Ireland in the period 1167-69. With this said, it certainly is noteworthy that in 1170 the Synod of Armagh decreed that any Englishman who was then enslaved in Ireland was to be freed – this action might be read, as Giraldus Cambrensis read it at the time, as recognition on the part of the Irish church that the English invasions were God’s punishment for Irish willingness to buy and keep slaves. Giraldus added, nonetheless, that the English themselves were just as as much at fault as the Irish were, because they used to sell their children and relatives into slavery when they were suffering from penury and hunger; and of course, the far greater lures of land and money loomed large when it comes to understanding why Henry and his barons were really interested in helping Diarmait Mac Murchada to become High King.
David Carpenter, The Search for Mastery: Britain 1066-1284 (2003); David Douglas, William the Conqueror (1990); English Historical Documents, 1042-1189; Henry Loyn, Anglo-Saxon England and the Norman Conquest (1962); Marc Morris, “Normans and slavery: breaking the bonds,” History Today March 2013; David Pelteret, “Slave raiding and slave trading in early England,” Anglo-Saxon England 9 (1980); Michael Richter, Medieval Ireland (2005)
Q: Do we know what Joan of Arc looked like?
Joan’s fame, during her lifetime, was such that some of the contemporaries who met her did comment on her physical appearance, albeit not in nearly such detail as we might wish for. We also have some information about the clothing that was made for her. As a result we know that Joan stood about 5 feet 2 inches [157cm], a fairly typical height for her time, and had dark hair, which she wore cropped short like a man’s “in a circle above her ears”. A letter written by Perceval de Boulainvilliers, who was chamberlain to the French king Charles VII, and who would have seen Joan at his court, describes her as “of satisfying grace” – that is, reasonably good-looking, rather than beautiful – and “of a virile bearing,” adding that “her voice has a womanly charm” and that while she “sheds tears freely, her expression is cheerful.”
Two of the men who accompanied Joan, saw her change her clothes and, in one case, helped to dress wounds incurred in battle, commented more favourably on her physical attractiveness, noting, for example, the pleasing size and shape of her breasts. And Eugelide, Princess of Hungary – who did not meet her – revealed in a contemporary letter that she had heard that the maid had a short neck and a red birthmark beneath one ear. But the above is really all the even vaguely reliable information that we have about Joan’s physical appearance.
What’s perhaps more interesting (and what has certainly exercised historians of this period) is not so much what Joan looked like, but the ways in which she attempted to manage her appearance and her reputation in order to better carry out the mission she believed that God intended for her – to lead a military force to defeat the English and restore the powers and dignity of the King of France. She consistently referred to herself, for instance, as a “pucelle,” a French term inferring both youth and virginity in a way that allowed her to differentiate herself from a woman occupying one of the other possible female roles of the day – those of daughter, wife, mother, widow or nun – while also claiming for herself a vitally important spiritual purity. Joan’s self-identification as a pucelle is the origin of the familiar English description of Joan as “the Maid of Orléans”.
Most notable, in this respect, however, and most commented on by contemporaries, was not Joan’s looks or even her virginity, but her decision to wear male clothing, which she insisted on doing even when well away from the field of battle. This was extremely surprising and remarkable to her contemporaries; it’s very telling of the usual assumptions of the day, for instance, that the one image of her that was drawn during her lifetime (a crude sketch in the margin of the parliamentary register of Burgundian-controlled Paris, made by someone who had never seen her) unthinkingly depicted her as a girl with long hair, wearing a dress. But Joan’s decision was a very important one, as things turned out, since cross-dressing is something explicitly condemned in the Bible (while, for example, women fighting was not), and as such became a charge that could be made to stick against Jean in the eventual religious trial that she was subjected to after her capture by the English. Indeed, her refusal to disavow the practice before the tribunal that examined her became one of the main reasons that she was executed.
Historians have debated why Joan was so adamant from the very beginning of her mission that she should wear male clothing. There may well have been practical elements to the decision. The theology of the day was quite explicit that only a pucelle had the moral and religious right to defy male authority, and for this reason, it was absolutely critical to Joan’s mission that she retained her virginity. In consequence, it’s been suggested that her determination to dress like a man, and wear her hair in a male style, was an attempt to redirect male attention away from her sex and so reduce the likelihood of sexual assault in the all-male and highly violent militarised community that she became a part of. But there was very clearly a spiritual aspect to the decision as well; St Jerome, who was one of the main canonical authorities who stressed divine approval of female virginity, had written that
while a woman serves for birth and children, she is different from a man as body is from soul. But when she wants to serve Christ more than the world, then she shall cease to be called a woman, and shall be a man.
Nonetheless, Joan’s determination to dress as a man did create difficulties for her that make it hard to understand why she so adamantly refused to appear as a woman, even when she was on trial for her life. Most obviously, it set her outside the expectations that contemporaries had of female religious figures, and it was her claim to be acting, as a mystic would do, on a “sign” (frustratingly undefined in our sources) that she had received from heaven that was the other critical aspect of her ability to achieve what she did. It was, for example, only because Joan was able to present herself as an important female mystic that she was able, despite her peasant birth, to secure what would otherwise have been out of the question: the audience with Charles VII that resulted in her being provided with military equipment and a commission to lead a force in relief of the besieged city of Orléans. Dressing as a man emphatically did not help Joan to present herself as a female religious figure who fitted neatly into one of permissible categories of mystic that existed in this period, and this has to suggest that her decision to do so was of critical importance to her.
We can’t be certain why, and historians have interpreted the decision in a number of ways; for instance, Susan Crane has suggested it may have been a reflection of Joan’s sexuality, something that might possibly be true, but which certainly can’t be proven. She herself, at her trial, insisted that it was “pleasing to God” that she dress in this way, and that it was in fact a crucial element of her divine mission. But without any clear idea of what the “sign” that Joan believed she had seen consisted of, it’s really not possible to understand what precisely she meant by the comment.
What’s certain is that, as Taylor notes, Joan’s disguise was “only partial” – that is, she did not attempt to pass herself off as a man, or fool the men who followed her into believing that she was not a woman. In consequence, her cross-dressing was “far more threatening” to the male hegemony and gender roles of the day, and hence far more interesting to historians, than her mere physical appearance.
Deborah A. Fraioli, Joan of Arc: the Early Debate (2000); Régine Pernoud, Joan of Arc by Herself and Her Witnesses (1994); Craig Taylor (ed.), Joan of Arc: La Pucelle (2006)
Q: Did Wu Zetian really demand that foreign diplomats perform cunnilingus on her in in open court as a show of obedience–or is this a myth?
The only ‘sources’ for this story I’ve been able to find are blog posts, reddit posts, and an ebook. This fact is so ludicrous and entertaining that I feel like confirmation from some reliable source would be great. An oft-cited Reddit post claims that “Wu Zetian of China made people eat her out if they wanted to talk to her. Even when menstruating. If they couldn’t make her cum, she wouldn’t listen to him. She called it ‘Paying homage to the Lotus Stamen’.”
A: Wu Zhao (624?-705) – to give her the name that she herself wished to be known by – was the only woman in the history of China to rule in her own name. This, in itself, was sufficient to ensure that her name has been blackened since her death by generations of Chinese, since female rule was considered an outrage to the natural order. Official histories, and, later, less formal writings on her and her reign combine to convey the impression of a ruthless, selfish, sexually wanton woman – and they do so precisely because these are characteristics that best damned Wu in the eyes of posterity, and acted to ensure that no other empress could ever rule the country. So, no – what you are encountering online is not material sourced in reliable accounts that date to Wu’s reign; rather, it is calumny designed (consciously or not) to denigrate the very idea that a woman should hold political power, or that an empress could be considered in any sense a competent ruler.
I should probably pause before going on to observe that, because the vast majority of the detail that we possess for Wu’s reign dates to the period after her death, it is extraordinarily difficult to recover anything of the real woman behind the various legends that are told of her. We can, I think, conclude that Wu was not only intelligent and highly competent, but also self-willed and significantly ruthless – nobody who lacked such qualities could possibly have risen, as she did, from the position of fifth-rank palace concubine to become the consort of a reigning emperor, much less seize power for herself. But it is certainly very arguable that she was no more violent, or more ruthless, than some of the men acclaimed among the greatest of all emperors of China. On the other hand, while both dynastic histories and a later rather ripe vein of erotica, written during the Ming and Qing dynasties and alluding to the empress as a sort of metaphor for unbridled female lust, combine to give us the impression of a woman who remained – disgracefully – sexually active into her eighties, I think we can be pretty confident that nothing remotely resembling the scenario you set out ever actually occurred.
There are enough of these stories, admittedly, for Wu’s most recent scholarly biographer, N. Harry Rothschild, to devote an entire chapter of his book on the empress to addressing the topic of “Wu Zhao as lover.” Rothschild explains that male writers felt it imperative to portray Wu as a woman “in thrall to her senses” in order to put her down, and thus “restore her to her proper station” – one of subservience. In these stories, her body is described as flawless, like jade, even in old age, and her appetites as “incandescent… excelling the nymphomaniacs and most lustful prostitutes of the day.” But this Wu, it can be argued, was written to call to mind a well-known Daoist immortal, the Plain Girl, who was said to lure and seduce lonely peasant men in her lakeside hut. “Through her consummate skill in the boudoir arts,” the Plain Girl “goaded men to extremes of passion” – and, in doing so, was able to absorb “all of their spent male essence.” This was significant not merely because the immortal left her lovers “withered, enervated husks,” but because she also robbed them of the Daoist ideal of masculine self-control. In this reading, the perfect skin that Wu boasted into advanced old age was not some genetic gift, or even a literary metaphor: it was clear evidence she was a sorceress capable of rejuvenating herself by draining the maleness from her younger lovers.
All this was extremely unbecoming in a ruler. As Rothschild points out,
a man, particularly an emperor… needed to carefully regulate his emissions and avoid frequent ejaculation. Otherwise, he would lose his male yang energy and become both sexually depleted and, without [that] to sustain him, politically emasculated and thus less effective in the public, administrative, arena.
The unbridled Wu, then, in this reading, was displaying her unfitness to rule in every sexual act, and if one reads the official histories of her reign in date order, it becomes quite clear that the writers are drawing a parallel between Wu’s ascendant political power – which she has deliberately drained from the men who ought to possess it – and her moral and sexual descent. The sort of woman who, as a concubine, could ruin the emperor Gaozong by encouraging him to submit to his most shameless appetites, and “contort herself into a wide range of gymnastic positions to cater to the Emperor’s peculiar tastes,” became a ruler whose inadequacy was made all too apparent by her willingness to openly take numerous young lovers from the peasant class – including, in many of the most widely-retold myths about her, Xue Aocao, a man renowned for possessing the largest “meaty instrument” in the whole of China.
Read this way, stories of the type that you have encountered online perhaps make greater sense. Wu was a woman who took things that she should never have had by using explicitly female arts, and an explicitly female body, to undermine and then seize for herself what should have been explicitly male power. And (while I rather doubt the story you have cited is contemporary) this could certainly extend to whatever power male envoys – and the foreign powers they represented – brought to court. As the contemporary poet Liu Binwang put it, she used her sexual glamour to destroy the men who surrounded her:
”All fell before her moth brows. She whispered slander from behind her sleeves, and swayed her master with vixen flirting.”
Mike Dash, “The Demonization of Empress Wu,” mikedashhistory.com
Dora Shu-Fang Dien, Empress Wu Zetian in Fiction and in History: Female Defiance in Confucian China (2003)
N. Harry Rothschild, Wu Zhao: China’s Only Woman Emperor (2005)
Q: Why did Fine Gael run a candidate in Inverness, Scotland, in the February 1974 and 1979 UK General elections? They’re an Irish party, so I have no idea why they would run there. It was the same candidate (U. Bell) both times. Any ideas?
A: How fascinating. Your query – an apparently minor and eccentric one, if you’ll forgive me for saying so – leads us down one of the most remarkable rabbit holes I’ve ever investigated for AskHistorians, and leaves us confronting what may actually be one of the larger unopened cans of worms currently lurking in the recesses of the British body politic. Not that one would realise that any of this was likely from a merely cursory glance at the eccentric, but apparently harmless, figure at the centre of the story, with whom we really ought to begin.
William Bell (b.1940/1), an Inverness architect who preferred to go by “Uilleam”, the Gaelic version of his name, was (and perhaps still is) a vociferous opponent of the British government, a man noted in his home town for his habit of going dressed in a full kilt, armed “with a foot-long dirk hanging from his broad-buckled belt” which he had designed and made himself. He was the sole candidate of the “Fine Gael Party” that he himself created, following his expulsion from the Scottish National Party for “trying to foist unpalatable anti-English ideas” on its members, and put himself forward for election to parliament in both the October 1974 and the 1979 general elections. (He missed standing in the February 1974 ballot thanks to his inability to fill in the registration forms correctly.) Bell came in last place in both polls, notching only 155 votes in the first of them and 112 in the second.
What’s not so apparent from this brief summary is that “Fine Gael”, in Bell’s usage, means “family of Gaels,” and was intended to refer to the people of Scotland. Certainly the Scottish newspapers of the day make it very clear that his organisation had no connection to the centre-right Irish party of the same name. Instead it identified itself as “the political wing of the Army of the Provisional Government,” a contemporary Scottish terrorist group modelled on the IRA which sought independence for Scotland. Speaking in 1975, Bell acknowledged that he had marched in parades alongside men from the “Provisional Army”, but insisted he was a politician and no supporter of violence. In other words, he aspired to create, and lead, a Scottish equivalent to Sinn Féin.
Viewed strictly in the context of the times, Bell’s political career seems to have been a mere irrelevance. Interestingly enough, he was not born in Scotland – one press account suggests that he was actually Australian by birth, and returned “home” to the country from which his family had emigrated some years earlier – and he fails to make an appearance in the main academic studies of Scottish republicanism and Scottish terrorism. His election manifesto was chiefly concerned with putting an end to what he saw as the “English invasion” of Scotland and with the creation a sovereign Scottish parliament, but the policy most associated with him at the time – opposition to Britain’s membership of the Common Market, that is, the European Economic Community, precursor to the EU – is one that would raise few eyebrows today. Read more deeply, however, and it becomes clear that Bell’s politics were considerably more radical than the rather bland coverage of his campaigns offered by the psephologist Fred Craig makes them appear; he claimed that he would “support an armed uprising” against the government, and what he saw as English rule in Scotland, “if it came to the bit.”
All this leads us to the events of February 1975, four months after the first of Fine Gael’s general elections, and the appearance of a group of half a dozen police officers armed with a battering ram outside Bell’s flat in the early hours of the morning. These men broke down the door and searched the premises, claiming that they were acting “as a result of information received” in connection with the armed robbery of a branch of the Royal Bank of Scotland in Glasgow the previous month. Only about £3,000 of the robbers’ haul had been recovered, and a contemporary press account reported that the authorities suspected that “a subversive organisation” might have been behind this crime, and had “credible evidence” that Bell was harbouring the remaining £5,000 from the total of £8,040 stolen in the raid.
Press reports of these events were couched in humorous terms at the time, though the tone of the coverage subsequently became much more serious. A reporter from the Aberdeen Press & Journal, for example, wrote that Bell “indicated a claymore lying against the shield and targe-festooned wall of his flat” and commented:
“I was about to pick up a weapon to defend myself – I thought I was about to be attacked by maniacs. It’s a good job I saw a uniformed sergeant or I’d have taken up a sword.”
The police, added the Press & Journal, confiscated banners, flags and a variety of pamphlets and fliers in the raid, among them
“SNP literature, Gaelic literature, and An Commun Gàidhealach [an organisation promoting Gaelic language and culture] literature”; Bell added that “they even searched my sporran. They were taking stuff down the stairs in relays.”
A similarly colorful Uilleam Bell was recalled at the beginning of this year by Murdo Fraser, a Conservative Member of the Scottish Parliament, in The Scotsman. Fraser had grown up in the Inverness of the 1970s and remembered Bell as
a tall, broad man, always seen attired in full Highland garb. We would often see him striding along the country road outside my parents’ house, Gandalf-like with staff in hand. Bell had an acquaintance, Granville Paterson, a man as small as Bell was large, and always similarly attired in kilt, jacket and bonnet. Granville, as everyone in town knew him, would hang around outside Inverness Castle and pose for pictures for tourists in exchange for drink money. He would give chase to local school kids who taunted him with shouts of “sheep-shagger”, an insult which in his case was not unjustified: he was well-known in the Inverness courts and had numerous convictions for both shoplifting and bestiality.
I note, finally, that Bell’s later life does not seem to be well documented, though I would expect that if and when the files of the local Inverness Courier newspaper are digitised past the current cut-off date of 1909, a good deal more could be discovered about his politics and activities. In 1984, his wife was murdered by a teenage boy who had taken her back to his flat for a party.
While all this seems at first glance to be merely eccentric and unpleasant, however, and more than a little bit marginal when it comes to the history of the time, I suspect that there may well be more to it than is discoverable from the few sources currently available to me.
To begin with, there is clearly an interesting question mark over the identity of the mysterious-but-“credible” informants who supplied the Inverness police with the – as it transpired quite untrue – suggestion that Bell was harbouring the proceeds of a bank robbery, and thus led them to the discovery of a large cache of APG documents that actually was present in Bell’s flat. Then there is the problem of what, exactly, Bell knew about some of these items, most notably the contents of a “bulky notebook” which he denied was his. This apparently contained “an amazing ‘blueprint’ for Scotland’s future under the rule of the Army of the Provisional Government,” including the creation of an “assassination corps”, death sentences for “traitors and informers”, a ban on all “foreign” ownership of business interests in Scotland, and the imposition of Gaelic as the national language on a nation almost entirely made up of English-speaking monoglots. Next, we have to note that Bell was not only “well-known in Inverness for his anti-English views” during the 1970s – his aversion to the British government and its policies continued into the Thatcher era. In March 1980 he applied for permission to organise a protest march in support of Sinn Féin through the streets of Inverness. An action of that sort, coming in the midst of the IRA’s British mainland bombing campaign (1972-2001), is unlikely to have been considered either harmless or humorous by the government of the time.
So the question, really, is which of the two Uilleam Bells that we have met thus far – the would-be freedom fighter, and the comedy Scot described by the Aberdeen Press and Journal of 24 May 1975 as a man seen by his neighbours “more as a music hall caricature of a ‘cheuchter’ [“Highlander”] than a tartan terrorist” – is closer to the real man. It is certainly true that Bell himself was known in the mid-1970s mostly for his tendency to “startle strangers with his diatribes against Sassenachs [the English] and foreigners” and for the hopeless campaign he waged protesting the presence of a Chinese takeaway that had opened on his street. Similarly, the APG with which he was so proud to associate himself has typically been depicted as a bunch of incompetent malcontents which posed a threat lesser, by several orders of magnitude, to that represented by the IRA. Kemp, for instance, notes that the team “sent to rob a bank found it [permanently] closed”, before deciding on the branch that they actually robbed, while Brooke concludes that “to call the APG a terrorist organisation would diminish the term somewhat.” With all this said, however, recent press coverage of decisions made to withhold some 1970s political files from release at the British National Archives rather strongly hints that there is quite a bit more to this fragment of Scottish history than meets the eye.
I summarise from the Scottish Herald newspaper, which reported in August 2005 that the British government had taken the unusual step of sealing a set of files dating from the mid-1970s, which would then have been due for release to the National Archives under the government’s “30-year rule”, instead ordering that they be sealed – to the vocal outrage of senior members of the SNP – “for 50 years”. There was speculation at that time (which I hope is admissible under our own 20 year rule, since it relates to events that occurred c.1975) that the reason why the government was so reluctant to release the files was that they contain evidence that the APG had been either infiltrated, or actually set up, by London-backed provocateurs who were out to discredit both the SNP and the cause of Scottish nationalism.
In this connection, it’s certainly worth noting that the SNP vote did indeed suffer a spectacular electoral collapse after 1974, in some small part as a result of stories that appeared in the newspapers at the time that linked members of the party to attempts by the novice Scottish terrorist groups of the period (not only the APG, but also a second organisation known as the Tartan Army) to bomb the Glasgow suburban railway, a North Sea oil pipeline, the Glasgow offices of the Bank of England, and the Clyde Tunnel in September 1975. These efforts, it seems possible to suggest, might have been funded in part by the unrecovered £5,000 proceeds of the preceding January’s bank heist, for which seven members of the APG stood trial – and for which five, including Uilleam Bell, were convicted that May. When all the dust had settled, anyway, Bell had been given a one-year jail sentence for conspiracy and intent to obtain firearms and explosives (other members of his group received sentences of as much as 12 years), and an SNP that had secured 30% of the vote in Scotland in October 1974, and returned 11 MPs to the House of Commons, held on to only 17% of the vote, and two of those seats, in 1979.
According to the Herald:
Nationalist MSP Christine Grahame, who has been an SNP member for 35 years and whose office discovered the sealed files, said: “It is frankly outrageous that the state is withholding these documents. I am certain their reasons for doing so will be connected to a long suspected dirty tricks campaign which was waged against the party by British unionists who were frankly in a panic about the rise of the SNP.”
Rumours about agent provocateurs within nationalist ranks in the 1970s have raged for decades. It has been claimed that one such figure was Major Frederick Boothby, an ultranationalist who set up the 1320 Club – named after the date of the Declaration of Arbroath [a Scottish declaration of independence from England that was promulgated by supporters of Robert the Bruce].
Boothby, who began recruiting young men to the extremist cause in the 1970s, published a magazine which contained instructions for bomb-making and began a terror group called the Army of Provisional Government, giving himself the code number 01 and the nom de guerre, Clydesdale.
Adam Busby, the founder of the Scottish National Liberation Army, was another recruited by Boothby in the 1970s. Busby, too, it is claimed, was working for Special Branch [the unit of the British police responsible for political intelligence and protection of the state from threats of subversion].
All in all, then, we can conclude that the loose thread represented by your enquiry as to why an “Irish” political party had stood at two British parliamentary elections in the 1970s, when pulled, unravels a very different, and much more complex story in which Uilleam Bell appears, in fact, to have been a potential dupe, and perhaps even victim of British security state dirty tricks aimed at suppressing support for Scottish independence. Let’s not forget, after all, that the mid-70s were an especially turbulent and difficult time in British politics – without going into possibly excessive detail, this was a period in which “secret armies” of several different political stripes were widely believed to be making plans and building support ahead of what can credibly be deemed planned coups d’etat, and by the end of which the British Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, had come to firmly believe that he was the target of plots organised by elements within the British security service, MI5.
Aberdeen Evening Express 7 February + 10 March 1975 & 27 June 1984; Aberdeen Press & Journal 6 + 7 February & 11 March & 9 + 24 May 1975 & 14 March 1980; Birmingham Daily Post 19 April 1975 & 6 January 1976; Nick Brooke, Terrorism and Nationalism in the United Kingdom: The Absence of Noise (2018); F.W.S. Craig, British Parliamentary Election Results 1974-1983 (1984); Herald 21 August 2005; Arnold Kemp, The Hollow Drum: Scotland Since the War (1993); “Pair jailed over Highland drugs,” BBC News 29 August 2007, accessed 22 February 2020; Reading Evening Post, 22 September 1975; The Scotsman, 7 January 2020; James Young, The Very Bastards of Creation: Scottish International Radicalism – A Biographical Study, 1707-1995 (1996)
Q: Is it true that a portrait of Cleopatra, painted in about 30 BCE by someone who had met her, was unearthed in Italy in 1818? What happened to the image?
A: The painting you are interested in is certainly a remarkably obscure one, given what it is claimed to be, and while I think it is perhaps more accurate that it has been “lost track of” rather than definitively “lost”, the short version of an answer to the problem of why it has not attracted much more interest seems to be the strong suspicion that it was a fake.
But this is AskHistorians, which means that you are here for the long and more complicated answer, so let me contextualise and explain.
As you note, the painting was supposedly “discovered” in 1818. Our main source for its appearance and existence is a short work by John Sartain, an Anglo-American engraver, publisher, and friend of Edgar Allen Poe, who saw it on display in Sorrento, Italy, in about 1884 and went on to write a book entitled On the Antique Painting in Encaustic of Cleopatra Discovered in 1818 about it. Sartain notes that it was “life-size, though… only half length,” measuring 79 by 57 centimetres, and gives the circumstances of the discovery as follows:
It was discovered by [Luigi] Micheli, the well-known antiquary, under the cella of the temple of Serapis, at Hadrian’s Villa… When found it was in sixteen fragments, which on being laid together showed that scarcely any part was missing. The disjointed pieces were taken to Florence, and submitted to the critical examination of the eminent advocate, Giov. Batt. Tannucci, of the Royal Academy of Pisa, who wrote an elaborate report on the subject, showing how profoundly he was impressed with the value of the discovery. This report was printed in the “Autologia di Firenze,” vol. 7… The broken pieces were fitted together and united in a bed of cement.
Hadrian’s Villa, we should note, is a well known site in Tivoli, central Italy, which was constructed in 117 CE, and this in itself introduces some interesting problems of provenance to the whole story, since – as will shortly become clear – it has been claimed that the painting was executed about 150 years earlier than that. According to Sartain, anyway, Micheli and his brother first attempted to sell the image in Florence, but “the large price demanded was refused, at a time so little removed from the political convulsions and great wars of the first French Empire, the finances of the Duchy requiring yet many years of economy for their re-establishment.” Undeterred, they next took it to France, apparently in 1822, and it is at this point that the earliest printed reference to the painting that I know of appeared. News was published in the Museum; or, Record of Literature, Fine Arts, Science, Antiquities, the Drama &c., a short-lived weekly that appeared in London between April and December 1822, and the Museum had it from an anonymous correspondent, writing from Paris.
This man’s account reported that “I have really seen a very strange thing today,” and described accepting an invitation to “apartments occupied by two Florentine gentlemen, in the Grand Hotel, Rue de Bac,” where he was shown the image and heard the claim that “it is actually supposed, imagined, or conjectured (I am afraid I use too positive a term) to be a real portrait, painted by a Greek artist patronized by Octavius Cæsar!!!” This claim would, if true, date the image to c.30 BCE-14 CE, and suggest it might have been an image painted by an artist who had seen the queen. The work, the Museum‘s correspondent added, was “done on a blue slate” and its “colouring is remarkably fresh, very like life.”
So, the very earliest known published description of the image casts some doubt over its authenticity– and a possible motive for faking it, and for claiming a provenance that would associate with work with Octavian (who was later to become, of course, Augustus, the first Roman emperor) emerges from the considerable efforts made by Micheli and his brother to sell it. Several different attempts were made. The article published by the Museum noted that “I have heard it whispered that it has been offered to the king” – that would be Louis XVIII, the restored Bourbon King of France – “for the sum of 30,000 francs.” This sale did not go through, and Micheli brought the image to London in 1834, where it was again put on display and claimed to have been valued at £10,000. An engraving of the painting (not the same one, apparently as the one you have linked to) was made at this time by R.R. Reinagle, an artist – and known forger – whose description of the image and of its discovery elaborates on, but only partially matches, that given by Sartain. Despite these problems, however, Reinagle’s account at least gives us a fairly clear idea of the claims that were being made for the image at this time.
This version of events was written in a letter that was preserved by Simon Wilkin, writing in the 1880s as editor of a seventeenth century work, Browne’s Pseudodoxia Epidemica, or Vulgar Errors. Browne had mentioned another claimed painting of Cleopatra, and Wilkin’s commentary on this part of his work incorporated a missive, written by Reinagle on 2 December 1834, which noted that:
the painting was done on a species of black slaty marble — was broken in two or three places. It was said by the Chev. Micheli, the proprietor, who brought it from Florence to this country, that it had been found in the recesses of a great wine cellar, where other fragments of antiquity had been deposited. That it was in a very thick case of wood nearly mouldered away. That it got into a broker’s hands, by the major domo of the house or palace where it was discovered, having sold a parcel of insignificant lumber, so called, in which this painting was found. It was generally incrusted with a sort of tartar and decomposed varnish, which was cleared off by certain eminent chemists of Florence.
Note here that Reinagle’s revised provenance seems to rather undermine the idea that Micheli made any claim to have personally unearthed image at Hadrian’s Villa. Perhaps the most interesting part of Reinagle’s account, therefore, is the information he offers about the claims that Micheli was apparently making at this time about the origins of the image. Thus, while Reinagle notes that “the whole picture presented the strongest signs of antiquity; but whether it is a real antique, remains still a doubt in many minds,” he also records that at this point it was being
attributed to Timomachus, an artist of great eminence and a traveller, who lived at the court of Augustus Cæsar. He followed the encaustic style of Apelles, and with him died or faded away that difficult art. The picture was painted (as is surmised) by the above-named Greek artist, from memory (for he had seen Cleopatra often,) to supply her place in the triumph of Augustus, when he celebrated his Egyptian victories over Anthony and Cleopatra.
I have to say that this provenance – at least, so it appears from the accounts that I have read – seems very highly dubious; there is no suggestion that any serious study was done of the image’s style, that it was “signed” in any way by the artist, or that its “finding” revealed any other traces that might reasonably allow such an association was made, and it seems much more probable that the nineteenth century owners deliberately associated with a renowned Roman-era artist of the appropriate period, known to have painted in encaustic, who could be shown to have had links with Cleopatra – hence allowing maximum value to be placed on the painting. Certainly that interpretation best matches another passage in Sartian’s work, in which the author notes that another appraiser had attempted to attribute the same work to Leonardo da Vinci!
Claiming that the object supposedly found in Hadrian’s Villa was a “true image” of the famous queen, painted by someone who had seen her, would substantially inflate any sale price, and it seems quite possible that Micheli would also have known about, and pointed to, some contemporary Roman accounts that do attest to the existence of portraits of Cleopatra. James Eason, a University of Chicago classicist who hosts a site that makes available a digital edition of Vulgar Errors, summarises what we know in this respect as follows – and in doing so helps us to understand where the attribution to Timomachus may have come from:
Appian (Civil Wars II.102) says that Cæsar (Julius) caused a “beautiful image of Cleopatra” to be placed next to the image of the goddess in the temple of Venus Genetrix in the forum of Rome, which portrait he remarks was still there in his day (2nd century AD). Cass-Dio says this image was of gold. Pliny (XXXV. 136 & 145), on the other hand, makes no mention of any such portrait. He does say that Cæsar bought (at great price) two masterful paintings by Timomachus, a Medea and an Ajax, which he had placed on either side of the goddess in the temple of Venus Genetrix. (The Loeb edition states baldly that copies of the Medea are still in existence, end of note. While this is hardly helpful, there it is, for what it’s worth.) The Medea he lists (in XXXV.145) among paintings whose great beauty is in part a result of their unfinished state. It seems most unlikely that anyone could possibly mistake even an unfinished picture of Medea for a portrait of Cleopatra, but that is one possible solution.
Whatever the truth, it certainly seems that Micheli went to some considerable efforts to offer proof of “authentication” of his image to potential buyers. According to Reinagle,
parts of the colouring were scraped off and analysed by three or four persons. Formal attestations were made by them before the constituted authorities, and the documents had the stamps of authorized bodies and signatures.
Hanson, an art historian writing in the 1970s, offers further information about one aspect of this analysis, noting that work on the image was carried out in 1822 by a “learned chemist,” the Marquis Cosimo Ridolfi or Ridolphi – so without the benefit of modern advances in forensic techniques – and that this revealed merely that the paint consisted of “one-third wax and two-thirds resin” … which scarcely adds much to any attempt to determine whether it had been painted in the first century BCE, or in the nineteenth CE. The European Magazine for 1823, finally, adds the detail that the identification of the work as possibly that of “Tymomacus” was made by Ridolfi.
In any case, it would appear that the high price, and dubious provenance, of the image prevented any sale being made in London, either, and the Cleopatra remained in Micheli’s hands. The ownership and location of the painting between 1834 and Sartain’s encounter with it in the 1880s is traced, in Sartain’s book, in the following passage (which I should point out incorporates some unpleasant notes of anti-semitism):
Some years later, the business of the Micheli brothers falling into a decline, they realized funds by pledging the picture with some Jews, and soon after both died. The charges went on increasing with time, and the heirs finding themselves unable to redeem it, sold it to an acquaintance of the Baron de Benneval, subject to these accumulated charges, and he rescued it from the hands of the usurers at serious sacrifice.
Sartain then completes the chain of provenance by observing that the painting next passed into the hands of the baron himself: “subsequently the new owner also found he could not afford to keep it, and the present owner purchased it from him in the year 1860”.
Since that date, the picture has been exhibited in London, Paris, Munich and Rome. At Munich, M. Plater, the well-known restorer of King Ludwig’s collection of Greek and Etruscan vases purchased from the Prince of Casino, being very enthusiastic over the picture, undertook to place it on an underbed of a peculiar cement, which has rendered it so secure that since then it can be transported from place to place without risk.
In 1869 the Emperor Louis Napoleon made an offer to purchase, which was reluctantly agreed to, and the picture was transported to Paris with a view to the fulfilment of the arrangement; but the war with Germany began, and just on the arrival of the picture in Paris there occurred the battle of Forbach, which caused hesitation as to risking its delivery. During the German siege of Paris and the Commune following, the painting was under the protection of the Prince Czartoryski, and after the liberation of the city the picture was returned to Sorrento, where it has remained ever since.
So it was in Benneval’s property, the Piano di Sorrento, that Sartain viewed the image and made a mezzotint of it. This is the image that you have found on WikiCommons, and it appears as the frontispiece of his book.
Sartain was apparently satisfied that the image was genuine, and doubts about the remarkable “freshness” of the colours in the image were addressed at about this time by a German authority, and reported in Frank Leslie’s Popular Monthly in 1889:
Marvelous as it may seem, the authenticity of the Encaustic Cleopatra was questioned chiefly on account of the freshness of the colors, says Dr R. Schoener, the great German expert. Fragments from the slate have been ground up, however, and the age of the wax and resin colors verified.
Some writers do still consider it possible that the 1818 Cleopatra was, and maybe still is, the real deal. (It seems fair to say these have not investigated the history of the image very closely.) On the whole, however, modern commentators seriously dispute that conclusion, and not only because of the clearly mercenary motives of the painting’s original owner.
There seem to be three main lines to pursue here. Firstly – at least as noted by Jarves, writing (unfortunately without attribution) in 1875, in an account found and reported by Meadows,
certain critics, however, considered it to be one of the experiments made in the last century by Count de Caylus to resuscitate the lost Art [sc. encaustic].
Anne Claude de Caylus (1692-1765) was a French antiquarian, and a cousin of Madame de Maintenon, the mistress of Louis XIV. He was a considerable artist in his own right, known for copying many works by noted painters, and his work on recovering the lost skill of painting in encaustic (a wax-based medium) was covered in some considerable detail by Müntz, writing in the 1760s. Whether he ever attempted a painting of Cleopatra remains obscure, but certainly his experiments were cited when the Hadrian’s Villa Cleopatra was first discussed in the 1820s.
A second possible reason for doubting the age of the Cleopatra is that its appearance did not match that of other known examples of antique encaustic, such as the well-known Fayum mummy portraits, at all well. Here a contemporary piece that appeared in the European Magazine (January 1823) notes that encaustic images were typically painted on wood, not slate. The same source cites a Signor Zannoni, “a well known antiquary of Florence”, as insisting that the Cleopatra was of “a very modern date” – both on this basis, and because the woman depicted in the painting has “features that bear no resemblance to those of Cleopatra on the ancient Latin and Greek medals.”
Finally, and more usefully, perhaps, since it comes from a more modern and better-informed source, Meadows – a classicist who runs the popular rogueclassicism blog – also points out, albeit only in passing, that the engraving made by Sartain, certified to accurately represent the original encaustic image found in 1818, and hence supposed to reproduce an image painted some time around 30 BCE, actually depicts ” that ‘upward gaze’ … belonging to a later time in Roman art [which] doesn’t seem to be the norm in wax encaustic paintings which we have.” In other words, the painting would appear not to match the artistic styles that prevailed when Cleopatra was alive.
It strikes me that we seem to have sufficient information here to make a more detailed examination of the Cleopatra image and its status possible, but the job certainly appears to be one best left to an art historian with a good knowledge of Roman-era styles. As for the Cleopatra itself – I am afraid that its current whereabouts appear to be unknown, and my attempts to at least begin the process of tracking it down foundered when it became clear that the “Baron” [my researches suggest that the original Italian version may actually have been “Conte”] de Bonneval’s obit remains uncertain, and no trace can be found of any estate sale associated with him. I’m afraid that any further enquiries would probably take someone with much better Italian than I can boast.
Anon., “Intelligence relating to the fine arts, foreign and domestic,” The European Magazine, January 1823; John Paul Bocock, “Some artistic conceptions of Cleopatra,” Frank Leslie’s Popular Monthly 27 (1889); Harold Hanson, “The development of new vehicle recipes for encaustic paints, Leonardo 10 (1977); David Meadows, “An image of Cleopatra,” rogueclassicism, 7 June 2010 (accessed 18 March 2020); James Jackson Jarves, “An Assumed Example of Greek Easel-Painting of the Best Period of Antiquity,” The Art Journal NS1, (1875); JH Müntz, Encaustic: or, Count Caylus’s Method of Painting in the Manner of the Ancients (London, 1760); New York Times, 12 October 1884; Notes & Queries 2S., 6, 28 August 1858; John Sartain, On the Antique Painting in Encaustic of Cleopatra Discovered in 1818 (Philadelphia, 1885); Simon Wilkin [ed.], The Works of Sir Thomas Browne (London, 3 vols, 1888), hosted by the University of Chicago
Did anyone really say “her majesty takes a bath once a month whether she need it or no” about Elizabeth I? Where did this come from? Why is it always referenced in quasi-academic literature without sources?
A: I have done my best to trace this quote back to its source. To begin with, and unlike some potentially apocryphal quotations, this one does at least date back to the pre-internet age. It is cited in Constance Classen’s Aroma: The Cultural History of Smell (1994) with a footnote that references Lawrence Wright’s Clean and Decent: the Fascinating History of the Bathroom, which was originally published in 1960.
Although a popular history (based, in fact, on material collected by the author for the 1957 Building Exhibition held in London) – and one described by a reviewer in The Antiquaries’ Journal (1960) as “cheap and vaguely furtive” – Clean and Decent does make some claims to being authoritative; Wright was an academic (in fact, he was a member of the Royal Academy), and his introduction boasts that while the book “is meant to entertain…scholarship does keep breaking through”. Nonetheless, he was an architect, not an historian, and his book is unfortunately not referenced. And while the quotation you give does appear in it (p.75), it does not do so in its full form. Rather, discussing bathing arrangements at Windsor Castle, Wright mentions one location that was
perhaps the room where Queen Elizabeth took a bath once a month “whether she need it or no”.
My attempts to trace even this fragment further back than Wright have been unsuccessful. The earliest references I have found, by date, come from the Northants Evening Telegraph, 22 November 1957, and The Gas Journal vols.291-292 (1957) p.76, and both cite the quote in a review of Wright’s Building Exhibition installation – in other words, the earliest versions that I can find come direct from Wright himself. Furthermore, no secondary source written since 1960 shows any sign of having found the information, or the quote, independently, or reference any earlier source. And the identity of the person supposed to have originally written, or said, the words, is never given, though several more recent writers take what can reasonably be supposed to be a guess at its origin – one suggests “a courtier”, another “a diarist”.
So the question of where Wright got the quote from remains obscure. I can find no evidence that he exhumed it from some earlier work on Elizabeth I, or on the architecture of Elizabethan buildings, but I don’t think he literally made it up himself. Rather, it seems that he (or someone he is quoting from) has adapted an existing saying, and applied it to Elizabeth. I say this because further research reveals a critical additional problem with the claimed quote: it exists in an early 20th century, anti-semitic, variant. This “gag” was analysed by Sigmund Freud, no less, in his rather heavy-handed 1905 book Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious. Freud cites it this way:
Two Jews were discussing baths. “I have a bath every year”, said one of them, “whether I need one or not.”
and goes on to point out the blindingly obvious – “that this boastful insistence on his cleanliness only serves to convict him of uncleanliness.”
On this basis, we can surely conclude that (as is quite common, of course), a relatively old, generic joke has been applied somewhere, by someone (quite possibly by Wright himself), to a famous person in order to buff it and add to its interest and its currency.
What do we know about the history of the True Cross after the 1st Century?
A: The history of the True Cross and the innumerable fragments supposed to originate from it is long, complex, filled with vast chronological and narrative gaps, and also very heavily disputed – so much so that it is scarcely possible to reconstruct it in its entirety. This response will focus on what are arguably the two most significant – and problematic – incidents in the early history of the relic: its supposed rediscovery shortly before 330 by the Empress Helena (mother of the same Emperor Constantine whose conversion to Christianity was such an important turning-point in the history of the religion) and the supposed recovery of the relic from the hands of the Persians by Heraclius in the early seventh century.
Let’s begin with a look at the story of the discovery of the True Cross at it is usually told, and move on to consideration of how likely that account is to be accurate. Helena visited the Holy Land in 327, and – according to some significantly later sources – the True Cross, the Crown of Thorns, and the nails that had been used to place Christ on the cross were all discovered during her time in Jerusalem. Drijvers refers to these events as comprising ‘one of the most important and best-known myths from Late Antiquity,’ but it is important to bear in mind, at this point, that the fairly straightforward story of these events which often appears in secondary sources was not only not written at the time of this journey, but does not align especially well with the handful of near-contemporary sources that survive – most especially with that of Eusebius of Caesarea, whose Life of Constantine, written before 339, discusses the rediscovery of Christ’s tomb, under a temple to Venus at the site of what became the Church of the Holy Sepulchure, but makes no mention of the finding of the True Cross. Moreover, although often presented as a single narrative, the version that appears in these secondary sources has also been pieced together from several variant accounts.
By far the fullest account of the various versions of events is that collated by Borgehammar during the 1980s for what was originally his PhD thesis. There are at least three basic versions, only one of which dates to the fourth century. Scholars of this period of ecclesiastical history suggest that an account of the discovery must have appeared in the Church History of Gelasius of Caesarea, compiled around 390, but that work is now lost to us, and the earliest surviving report comes from a funeral oration delivered for the Emperor Theodosius by St Ambrose of Milan in 395, or almost 70 years after the supposed events that it describes. According to Ambrose, while Helena was in Jerusalem, she was moved by the Holy Spirit to search for the cross, and so ‘opened up the earth, scattered the dust, and found three crosses in disarray.’ These were the crosses that had displayed Christ and the two thieves alongside whom he was crucified; the True Cross was distinguished from the other two because it still bore the inscription ‘Jesus of Nazareth, King of the Jews’ that Pilate had affixed to it, according to the Gospels.
A fuller account of the same events was given by Rufinus of Aquileia in 397. Rufinus, although a long-time resident of Jerusalem, was again no eye-witness, and he dates Helena’s journey to 325, two years earlier than did Ambrose. Once again, moreover, the story is presented framed by some distinctly miraculous events. Birley summarises this account as follows:
Inspired by divine visions she came to Jerusalem and made enquiries from the inhabitants about the site of the Crucifixion. It was, she learned, under the pagan temple of Venus, which she ordered to be demolished. When the three crosses were excavated, the bishop of Jerusalem, Macarius, proposed a sure means of confirming which was the True one. They were taken to the bedside of a distinguished lady who was dangerously ill. As the bishop prayed for a revelation, the touch of the True Cross immediately cured her. Helena at once ordered the construction of a magnificent basilica above the spot where the cross had been found.
Helena sets off for Jerusalem at the request of her son [the Emperor Constantine], to search for the cross of Christ. The Jew Judas Cyriacus is selected, against his will, to accompany the queen to Golgotha. After suffering seven days of starvation in a dried-out well, Judas leads Helena to the spot. In answer to his prayer, sweet-smelling dust and a flash of lightning point to the place where Judas should start digging. They find three crosses, and the true one is revealed when a dead youth is brought back to life by its touch.
There is little doubt that wood considered to be the cross of Christ was discovered, although we do not know how and by whom. A probable scenario is that during the excavation and construction work for the church, which started around 326, pieces of wood turned up which were considered as belonging to Christ’s cross and were authenticated as such by the Jerusalem clergy. It is not likely that three complete crosses were found, as the later legends tell us, but rather a small chunk or chunks of wood. This discovery probably took place during the reign of Constantine, if we consider Cyril’s words in his letter to Constantius, that the cross was found in the days of Constantine to be trustworthy (and there is no reason not to), which makes Constantine’s death at 22 May 337 the terminus ante quem for the discovery. Shortly after the relics were found, a cult of the cross started in Jerusalem and this was already quite developed by the mid fourth century, as we may conclude from Cyril’s remarks in his Catechetical Lectures.
There is a consensus that the legend came into being in Jerusalem in the second half of the fourth century. Its original language was Greek… Although it has been argued that the legend originated in response to questions of pilgrims about how the cross came to be present in Jerusalem, it was probably the competition between the sees of Caesarea and Jerusalem about primacy in the church province of Palestine, which gave cause to the origin of the story. Its origin had therefore in the first place a political background rather than the curiosity of pilgrims. Cyril, bishop of Jerusalem in 350–387, may have been responsible for the invention of the narrative, although this cannot be proved. In Cyril’s theological system the symbol of the cross was of extreme importance and he therefore encouraged the cult of the cross to a great extent. However, apart from theological reasons, Cyril also brought the cross and its veneration to prominence for political reasons and he greatly stressed the connection between Jerusalem and the cross.
Here we face the same problem of an absence of absolutely contemporary evidence that we have already noticed in the case of the initial discovery of the True Cross. The precise circumstances under which this occurred are reported only in the Syriac Chronicle of 1234, but the consensus seems to be that the relevant portions probably originate in the now-lost chronicle of Dionysios of Tel-Mahre, which dates to about 850. According to this account, the True Cross was not recaptured or discovered by the Byzantines, but rather returned to them by the Persian general Shahvaraz almost immediately after death of Shah Kavadh II Shiroe in 628, at a time when Shahvaraz was making a bid to seize the Persian throne. In these circumstances, it is clear, the general had good reason to desire peace on his western front, and hence a motive to cultivate Heraclius. The end result of this diplomacy, Zuckerman says, was the formal return of ‘the Holy Cross, wood and reliquary, in mint condition… one of the elements in the strategic alliance that Heraclius and Shahrvaraz had many reasons to forge.’
What, though, of the reliquary itself, and its contents? Were they sufficiently unique and identifiable to make it likely that the relic returned to Jerusalem in c.629 was the same as the one removed in 614? Zuckerman has argued that it is actually more likely that the relic did go missing during the chaos of the Byzantine-Sasanian wars of 602-28, and that the artefact returned to the Church of the Holy Sepulchure was a fake. I would counter that, really, much depends on two things: whether or not the reliquary and the wood inside it were sufficiently visually unique to be readily identifiable, and whether or not the account we have of the return of the True Cross is dependable.
Then a chair is placed for the bishop in Golgotha behind the Cross, which is now standing; the bishop duly takes his seat in the chair, and a table covered with a linen cloth is placed before him; the deacons stand round the table, and a silver-gilt casket is brought in which is the holy wood of the Cross. The casket is opened and [the wood] is taken out, and both the wood of the Cross and the title [apparently the inscription supposedly made by Pilate] are placed upon the table. Now, when it has been put upon the table, the bishop, as he sits, holds the extremities of the sacred wood firmly in his hands, while the deacons who stand around guard it. It is guarded thus because the custom is that the people, both faithful and catechumens, come one by one and, bowing down at the table, kiss the sacred wood and pass through. And because, I know not when, some one is said to have bitten off and stolen a portion of the sacred wood, it is thus guarded by the deacons who stand around, lest any one approaching should venture to do so again. And as all the people pass by one by one, all bowing themselves, they touch the Cross and the title, first with their foreheads and then with their eyes; then they kiss the Cross and pass through, but none lays his hand upon it to touch it. When they have kissed the Cross and have passed through, a deacon stands holding the ring of Solomon and the horn from which the kings were anointed; they kiss the horn also and gaze at the ring.
…all the people are passing through up to the sixth hour, entering by one door and going out by another; for this is done in the same place where, on the preceding day, that is, on the fifth weekday, the oblation was offered…
[Strategios] describes the scene when the Persians place the Cross on a doorstep and force their Christian captives to trample on it under the threat of death; in another scene, King Khosrau II and his dignitaries deride the Cross set in front of them “as Christ stood before Pilate.” Finally, a queen ex haeresi Nestorii (Shirin) obtains the Cross from the king and has it resealed in its reliquary (accepit lignum sanctae crucis eodem modo sigillatum). This data stands in no contradiction to the indication of the somewhat later Khuzistan Chronicle (alias Anonymus Guidi), according to which the leading Persian Nestorian Jazdin, with the king’s permission, took for himself a part of the Cross.
exhibited them to the archpriest Modestos and his clergy. They acknowledged the seal to be intact, and since [the woodpieces] had been preserved untouched and unseen by the profane and murderous hands of the barbarians, they offered to God a hymn of thanksgiving. The bishop produced the key that belonged to them [i.e. to the reliquary containing the fragments of the Cross] and that remained in his possession, and when they were unlocked, everyone worshiped them.
Everything depends, then, on how one interprets the two accounts set out above – one that describes the relic being desecrated, if not actually destroyed, in 614, and another that describes its return in an apparently undamaged casket that could still be unlocked with a key that had never left Jerusalem.
There are really only two possibilities here. One is that Shahvaraz – who was based, in 628/9, in Alexandria – would have been in no position to locate and return the True Cross from some hiding-place in Persia, and that the entirety of what occurred in 629/30 was a piece of political theatre, which would certainly have been considered vital by Heraclius, given the significance that the Byzantines placed on the True Cross. The other is that the Cross was of such significance that not even an emperor and a bishop would have dared to foist a fake onto the clergy and the people of the empire.
The latter argument does possess some merit – Zuckerman acknowledges that the True Cross was something so holy that even the emperor himself would have been considered by contemporaries as of no importance when compared to it, and he uses this point to suggest that there must have been two distinct ceremonies in Jerusalem, one on the occasion of the return of the cross, and the other on Heraclius’s – separate – entry into the city: ‘the heroic emperor with the Holy Cross in hands would have appeared as a meaningless pale figure, a simple carrier of the precious relic.’ On the other hand, it seems clear that the political and religious situation in 629/30 was such that imperial morale required the restoration of the relic, no matter how that restoration was achieved.
Zuckerman proposes a solution to this problem:
Of the crowd that stood in the Holy Sepulchre on March 21, 629, watching Modestos take out the original key of the inviolate reliquary—which he, since he was not a cleric of the Holy Sepulchre in 614, had no reason to hold—quite a few came back from Persian captivity and had witnessed the abuse of the Cross fifteen years earlier. They knew at first hand that heretics at Ctesiphon had venerated the Cross outside its reliquary. Did they all believe in a miracle?
This question would remain rhetorical if not for one neglected testimony. One of the ancient miracles of St Anastasios begins in Jerusalem, where, in 631, the saint’s relics were brought first, and terminates in Caesarea, where they were later deposited in a sanctuary built at the Tetrapylon. The connecting link between the two cities is a lady from a distinguished family of Caesarea, improperly named Virtue (Aretê), who makes an irreverent remark in Jerusalem, and then is punished and pardoned in her native city. In describing the people waiting for the martyr’s relics at the Nea Church of the Mother of God in Jerusalem, with the holy woodpieces of the Cross put on display (τά τε ἱερὰ ξύλα σημάναντες), the writer addresses to this whole crowd an unexpected reproach, accusing it of “lack of faith” (ὀλιγοπιστία).
Virtue, in a striking exhibition of this spiritual failing (δυσπιστία), makes the sudden remark: “I would not venerate a relic coming from Persia” (ἐγὼ λείψανον πὸ Περσίδος ἐρχόμενον οὐ προσκυνῶ). Why this sweeping censure, as if dubious relics arrived to Jerusalem from Persia every couple of months? The question has never been asked, and yet the answer is obvious. Only two relics are known to have ever arrived from Persia, in swift succession: the Holy Cross and the body of saint Anastasios. The crowd that gathered specially in the latter’s honor could not be accused of “lack of faith” in his respect. Virtue’s skepticism and the writer’s reproach clearly concern the other relic, prominently displayed in the crowd.
In short, that is, Zuckerman produces a near-contemporary anecdote, which was certainly set down before 640, to suggest that plenty of people in Palestine doubted that the True Cross of 629/30 was the Cross of 614. And he adds one more piece of evidence to this at least suggestive investigation:
When, c. 638, the Cross was discretely smuggled from Jerusalem to Constantinople, we do not hear a single voice regretting the great loss.
In contrast, and as Zuckerman points out, the version of events later approved by the Byzantine state – in which Shahrvaraz returned the original relic after becoming king of Persia – dates only from the mid- to late 650s.
Speaking personally, I think the evidence here remains inconclusive. For example, it is perfectly possible to interpret Strategios’s description of the ‘trampling’ of 614 as having involved only the – potentially less easily damaged – wood of the True Cross itself, and not the silver reliquary; the object that was trampled, after all, is explicitly identified as ‘the Cross’. Any damage to the original wood might or might not have been considerable, but it is at least not absolutely obvious that the silver reliquary would have been damaged in such a way as to have been visible to all in 629/30. And Zuckerman’s other objections strike me as a good deal less convincing. Might not Modestos simply have inherited an object as obviously important as the key to the reliquary from his predecessor? And might not many voices have spoken out against the removal of the Cross in 638, without the clamour necessarily being noted in a source that has come down to us? Or, rather more pertinently, might not the smuggling out of the True Cross to Constantinople in that year have been considered entirely wise, given that 638 was one year after Jerusalem fell to its Islamic conquerors?
Whether you accept Zuckerman’s version really depends, I think, on how much stress you want to place on what exactly happened in Jerusalem in 614, on the anecdote of Virtue, on the sliver of evidence that suggests the relic was actually lost at some point before 628, and on the possibility that the clergy of Jerusalem would have willingly gone along with the creation of a false relic in the circumstances that pertained in 629/30. For me, while Zuckerman makes a decent case, it is still one rooted in a modern scepticism that makes it easy to assume that bishops and priests alive in the 630s would have participated in an imposture that involved what they would truly have believed was a relic of the Passion of Christ – an unholy fraud that, furthermore, must have been quite obvious to at least some of their contemporaries. Everything, ultimately, depends on how safe you consider that assumption. Taken as a whole, however, it does seem plain that the history of the True Cross is a lot more murky than most secondary accounts allow, and than the church still, today, insists.
Barbara Baert, ‘New Observations on the Genesis of Girona (1050-1100). The Iconography of the Legend of the True Cross,’ Gesta 38 (1999)
Anthony Birley, ‘St Helena, discoverer of the True Cross (250-330)’, unpublished paper available from the Brown research website
Stephan Borgehammar, How the Holy Cross was Found: From Event to Medieval Legend (1991)
Jan Willem Drijvers, ‘Helena Augusta: the Cross and the Myth: some new reflections,’ Millennium 8 (2011)
Cyril Mango, ‘The Brevarium of the patriarch Nikephorus,’ in Nia Stratos, Byzance: Hommage à André N. Stratos (1986)
J. Gordon Melton, ‘Elevation of the True Cross,’ in Religious Celebrations: An Encyclopedia of Holidays, Festivals, Solemn Observances, and Spiritual Commemorations (2011)
Marcus Milwright, ‘Central and southern Jordan in the Ayyubid period: historical and archaeological perspectives,’ Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, 3rd series 16 (2006)
Jonathan Phillips, The Life and Legend of Sultan Saladin (2019)
J. Charles Wall, Relics of the Passion (1910)
Constantin Zuckerman, ‘Heraclius and the return of the Holy Cross,’ in Zuckerman (ed.), Constructing the Seventh Century (2013)
Every once in a while a website will claim that teeth extracted from dead soldiers at Waterloo supplied dentures across Europe for years. Is this a myth?
A: Human teeth were very much ‘state of the art’ dental supplies in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. Dentistry had made some significant advanced during the Georgian period, and it was by this time relatively commonplace for the wealthy to experiment with tooth transplants or to sport dentures. The latter were most often made of either carved from ivory or cast in gold, silver, or porcelain, then bolted into ivory bases that were often sourced from the hippopotamus. Human teeth, however, offered a more naturalistic look, and dentures that made use of them were generally preferred by discerning customers who could afford them. There was, therefore, a significant demand for teeth not only in 1815, but for many years afterwards.
With all this said, however, it is very difficult to find contemporary accounts of teeth that were specifically sourced from the battlefield of Waterloo, and while the evidence suggests that large quantities certainly were removed from the dead after the battle, I can find no evidence that they were sold to customers as such. In fact, while the term “Waterloo teeth” is now applied fairly indiscriminately to all sets of human false teeth made during the first half of the 19th century, it seems extremely unlikely that it was used either at the time or in the decades after the battle took place. The several hundreds of thousands of pages of digitised newspapers available via the British Newspaper Archive contain no references to the phrase throughout the whole of the 19th century, and Google Books yields only a single citation from the same period, which is American and dates to no earlier than 1858.
In short, the phrase “Waterloo teeth” appears to be essentially an invention of the 20th century, and in fact Ngram viewer suggests that it was not popularised until after 1955.
This discovery might be taken to suggest that the widely-accepted idea that British (and presumably Belgian) mouths were adorned for decades with “Waterloo teeth” is essentially a myth. In fact, however, the evidence rather strongly suggests that teeth extracted from the Napoleonic Wars dead actually were available and used in some quantity after 1815 – it was just that they were not known by this name, and were not sourced solely from Waterloo.
In order to better understand what happened, let’s start with a look at contemporary dentistry; move on to evidence suggesting that looting and desecration of the bodies of the dead did take place at Waterloo and on other battlefields during the Napoleonic period and afterwards; and conclude with what can actually be said in regard to the evidence that teeth extracted on the battlefield really were used by dentists in Regency England.
Dentistry, at least in Europe, was an innovation of the 18th century. Loss of teeth and poor dental health had been taken largely for granted before that date; Colin Jones’s recent The Smile Revolution in Eighteenth Century Paris points out that, prior to c.1780, portraits typically show sitters with a “snooty, aggressive, close-mouth smile,” and that this was done to hide the deplorable state of their teeth – studied closely, a portrait of Louis XIV dating to 1701, when the Sun King was in his mid-60s, “reveals a ruler with not a tooth in his head.” The 18th century, in contrast, witnessed the introduction of toothbrushes, toothpicks, mouthwash, tongue-scrapers and lipsticks (the latter first developed to contrast with the whiteness of the teeth). Jones argues that these and other improvements in dentistry helped to make possible a “smile revolution” that made it fashionable to display good teeth.
This development ran in parallel with both an enlightenment-era “culture of sensibility,” which made the display of emotions such as happiness central to a new concept of humanity, and to the popularity of the idea that teeth were also an important indicator of general health; De Chemant, in his Dissertation on Artificial Teeth (1797), lists good teeth among the signs of “perfect beauty” and writes that
If the eyes, commonly called the mirror of the soul, are justly considered holding first rank, the teeth, which may be called the index of health, appear to have a similar prerogative, and to be reckoned among the advantages which more particularly attract notice.
These fashions drove demand for replacement teeth among those no longer blessed with a perfect set of originals, and this demand was supplied in two forms: dentures, composed of artificial or real teeth, and attempts to transplant teeth into a subject’s jaw.
Perhaps surprisingly, the concept of tooth transplants has quite a long history – Ambroise Paré reported (at second hand) an account of a mid-16th century noblewoman having one of her rotten teeth pulled and replaced with a tooth take from the mouth of one of her maids. The idea really gained ground, however, in the 18th century. Le Chiurgien Dentiste, a French manual published in 1729, refers to the operation, and at least half a dozen dentists are known to have offered such transplants in the middle of the century. The operation was not only advertised by dentists such as the fashionable Pierre Le Mayeur, but also made the subject of satires; a Rowlandson cartoon of this period depicts a chimney sweep having a tooth extracted for use by a lady. (I had cause to note the odd but close contemporary association between chimney sweeps and dental health in an earlier answer, here.) All the evidence, suggests, however, that transplants were never successful, and that some dentists considered it immoral or unethical to offer such services; among other problems, diseases such as syphilis could be transmitted in this way, and the procedure is known to have proved fatal on at least one occasion. Thomas Berdmore, who was Surgeon-Dentist to George III, called it a “dangerous and immoderately expensive” operation in 1768, and it appears that it was very rarely tried after about 1790.
The most common and most cost-effective dentures of this period, meanwhile, were made from porcelain, but these were brittle, too uniformly white, and “made a horrid grating noise,” says Pain. Better-quality dentures were made with teeth carved from hippo, elephant or walrus ivory. Even a single ivory denture was extremely costly – they were priced at around £100 – and because these teeth lacked a protective covering of enamel, they deteriorated relatively quickly and emitted quite offensive smells. For this reason, it was widely considered that the best dentures comprised sets of human teeth. Summarising the literature of the period, we can say that human teeth were priced at about four times the cost of artificial ones, that front teeth were much more commonly taken than the harder-to-extract, less-likely-to be-seen molars that lay behind them, and that a set of dentures made with human teeth could take up to six weeks for a specialist craftsman to construct.
We can say, then, that there was a significant market for teeth. What needs to be added next is that teeth were more often sourced from the dead than from the living, and that the practice of taking teeth from the dead was well known. They were harvested for several reasons – sorcery was one, and Goya’s A Caza de dientes (“Out Hunting for Teeth”) (1799) shows a young woman pulling teeth from the corpse of a hanged criminal. These would have been used for magical purposes – the artist’s gloss on the etching reads: “The teeth of a hanged man are very efficacious for sorceries; without this ingredient there is not much you can do. What a pity the common people should believe such nonsense.” Most, though, do seem to have been removed for use by dentists from at least as early as the second half of the 18th century – George Washington’s dentist, John Greenwood, “was a prolific user of dead teeth,” says Craddock.
We know a fair amount about the dubious means used to obtain supplies. Teeth might be obtained by the resurrection men who exhumed corpses from graveyards on behalf of surgeons who worked at teaching hospitals, from executed criminals, or from bodies on battlefields. There were more teeth available in graveyards than anywhere else, though they might easily be infected or decayed, and the means used to obtain teeth from graves was explained by Bransby Blake Cooper in his biography of his uncle, Astley Cooper, who was one of the most fashionable surgeons and anatomists in early 19th century London. Astley Cooper was a regular customer of the capital’s resurrection men (he paid around £12 for a good quality corpse for dissection), and he encountered several specialist purveyors of teeth via his underworld contacts. Bransby Cooper explains that “every dentist in London would at that time purchase teeth from these men, and the public can have but little idea of the immense sums of money which persons thus occupied could earn.” He gives the example of a resurrection man named Murphy, who bribed his way into a burial vault and
by a few hours’ active exertion, secured possession to himself of the front teeth of all its inmates. By this night’s adventure, Murphy made a clear profit of sixty pounds.
Criminals and soldiers, on the other hand, had the advantage that they mostly died young, and with their mouths in better states, and their teeth were especially prized. This helps to explain the assiduity with which the mouths of dead soldiers were harvested in the aftermath of battles throughout this period, both by the enterprising comrades of the dead and by camp followers who moved in immediately after the fighting ceased to take what they could from the deceased – and, all too often, the still-just-alive as well.
An account by the French nobleman Jean Baptiste de Marbot, who narrowly survived the Battle of Eylau in 1807, gives a good idea of what it was like to be an injured soldier when these men made their appearance:
Stretched on the snow among the piles of dead and dying, unable to move in any way, I gradually and without pain lost consciousness… I judge that my swoon lasted four hours, and when I came to my sense, I found myself in this horrible position: I was completely naked, having nothing on but my hat and my right boot. A man of the transport corps, thinking me dead, had stripped me in the usual fashion, and wishing to pull off the only boot that remained, was dragging me by one leg with his foot against my body. The jerk which the man gave me no doubt had restored me to my senses. I succeeded in sitting up and spitting out the clots of blood from my throat. The shock caused by the wind of the ball had produced such an extravasation of blood, that my face, shoulders, and chest were black, while the rest of my body was stained red by the blood from my wound. My hat and my hair were full of bloodstained snow, and as I rolled my haggard eyes I must have been horrible to see. Anyhow, the transport man looked the other way, and went off with my property without my being able to say a single word to him, so utterly prostrate was I.
Teeth were not, of course, the only or even the principal objects of attention for such looters; they stripped men of their clothes and took jewellery and money where they could find it. “Nothing,” wrote one infantry subaltern of the Napoleonic period, with what may have been some exaggeration,
has ever astonished me more, than the celerity with which these body-strippers execute their task. A man falls by your side and the very next moment, if you chance to look around, he is as naked as he was when he first came into the world, without your being able so much as to guess by whom his garments have been taken.
While work of this sort may sometimes have taken place during a battle, it was certainly underway immediately after the fighting ceased, and was completed later by local peasants, so that by nine in the morning after Waterloo, a civilian arriving on the field “only saw one English officer who had any clothes left on.” Ultimately, and after nature had done its work, looters might even process the bones of the dead. A London paper, whose account was reprinted in Niles’s Weekly Register, 4 January 1823, noted that
It is estimated that more than a million of bushels of human and inhuman bones were imported last year from the continent of Europe into the port of Hull. The neighbourhood of Leipsic, Austerlitz, Waterloo, and of all the places where, during the late bloody war, the principal battles were fought, have been swept alike of the bones of the hero and of the horse which he rode. Thus collected from every quarter, they have been shipped to the port of Hull, and thence forwarded to the Yorkshire bone grinders, who have erected steam-engines and powerful machinery, for the purpose of reducing them to a granulary state. In this condition they are sent chiefly to Doncaster, one of the largest agricultural markets in that part of the country, and are there sold to the farmers to manure their lands. The oily substance, gradually evolving as the bone calcines, makes a more substantial manure than almost any other substance, particularly human bones. It is now ascertained beyond a doubt, by actual experiment upon an extensive scale, that a dead soldier is a most valuable article of commerce; and, for ought known to the contrary, the good farmers of Yorkshire are, in a great measure, indebted to the bones of their children for their daily bread. It is certainly a singular fact, that Great Britain should have sent out such multitudes of soldiers to fight the battles of this country upon the continent of Europe, and should then import their bones as an article of commerce to fatten her soil!
Opportunistic looters, who would take anything and everything from a dead man on a battlefield, were, however, not the only people who might strip a body of its teeth. There was also a small handful of specialists who specialised in supplying dentists at home in Britain. Bransby Blake Cooper, who served during the Peninsular War, met one battlefield looter, a low life by the name of Butler, while on campaign with Wellington. Butler was almost certainly a resurrection man, and he bore a letter of introduction from Astley Cooper himself:
Upon asking this Butler, who appeared to be in a state of great destitution, what might be his object, he said it was to get teeth… When I came to question him upon the means by which he was to obtain these teeth, he said, “Oh Sir, only let there be a battle, and there’ll be no want of teeth. I’ll draw them as fast as the men are knocked down.”
Butler subsequently wrote from England to thank Cooper for treating him for a medical complaint, confiding in the same letter that his tooth-hunting trip to Spain “had earned a clear profit of three hundred pounds.” Cooper adds that
Butler was not the first, as I have since ascertained, to make the Peninsula the scene, or the Duke [of Wellington]’s achievements the means, of such lucre; for Crouch and Harnett, two well-known Resurrectionists, had, some time prior to his visit, supplied the wealthier classes of London with teeth from similar sources.
“Crouch and Harnett” were Jack Harnett and Ben Crouch, a pair of London resurrection men who had got their start supplying corpses to the medical students at Guy’s Hospital, and who were quite well known in this period. At some point around 1812 they apparently decided that the trade in human teeth was more lucrative than that in human bodies, and worth the risk of going to war. Working nominally as suttlers – meaning they sold food and drink to the men – they served as camp followers in both Spain and France; Crouch was certainly present in the aftermath of the Battle of Salamanca, where he admitted to Bransby Cooper that he had been following the army “for the purpose of obtaining teeth for the dentists.”
We can learn a good deal more about Harnett and Crouch and their work in a remarkable document called the Diary of a Resurrectionist, 1811-12, a manuscript kept by a London member of this trade which was obtained from its author by another surgeon, Sir Thomas Longmore, Surgeon General to the British Army, and later presented by him to the Royal College of Surgeons. The pair planned “to draw the sound teeth of as many dead men as possible on the night after a battle,” but they made a point of “only drawing them from those soldiers whose youth and health rendered them peculiarly fitted for the purposes to which they were to be employed.” Harnett, who was a “stout, red-haired, ill-looking” Irishman, put the value of the teeth he brought home from the continent at £700, and left an estate worth a total of £6,000 to his family; Crouch made enough to open a hotel in Margate, although he was ruined when his former occupation became known, and eventually died “in great poverty… in the tap-room of a public house near Tower Hill.”
The trade in teeth extracted on the battlefields of Europe was apparently a competitive one – Harnett and Crouch found their profits “much diminished” as a result of competition towards the end of the war – and it was not merely international in character, but actually intercontinental. The American dentist Levi Spear Parmly – celebrated as the inventor of dental floss – boasted in 1818 of having in his possession ”thousands of teeth, extracted from bodies of all ages, that have fallen in battle,” though he used them for an extensive study of dental caries rather than to make dentures. Much of the London end of the trade was – at least according to the unthinkingly anti-Semitic contemporaries who described it – in the hands of “Polish Jews,” and a dentist with a practice in London, remembered as a Polish man nicknamed “Dr Pulltuski,” was noted for his many dealings with this group. This was almost certainly the same “Count Pulltuski, the dentist” with whom Sir Walter Scott’s father-in-law, John Gibson Lockhart, dined in Glasgow in 1815 and remembered as a “little, fat, coarse bandy fellow” who carried “personal vanity to the most daring heights I have ever witnessed.”
All in all, the evidence suggests that most battlefields, if not all, were ransacked for teeth in the immediate aftermath of the fighting between about 1800 and at least the 1860s. There are certainly accounts of scavengers at work on the field of Leipzig (1813), and tooth collectors were also commonly encountered throughout the American Civil War. A French dentist, writing later in the 19th century, recalled that Leipzig had yielded
the most precious harvest of all… The German universities turned out many youths in their very bloom, and our conscripts were so young that few of their teeth had been injured by the stain of tobacco.
Similarly, during the Civil War, the British Journal of Dental Sciencereported that
the London dentists, we are told, do not now trouble themselves to make artificial teeth. Taking advantage of the blessings which balance the horrors of war, they furnish you with a set of real ones. Among the enterprising hordes which follow the armies of the North are certain practitioners who, after a battle, may be seen stooping over the prostrate forms of the young soldiers. Veterans they leave to their repose, devoting their attention only to the raw levies… They are rifling their mouths. The teeth, when collected, are packed in boxes and sent over to the London Dentists. So if you have had a new set lately, it is highly probable that some of them were last used by their original owners in biting the dust on the banks of the Rappahannock or the Chattanooga.
The Battle of Waterloo
Waterloo was not only a battle of the first importance, ending as it did the Napoleonic wars; it was also one of the hardest-fought and bloodiest encounters of the period. It was a byword for enormous casualties throughout the 19th century until its toll was eclipsed by the even more sanguinary battles of the First World War. Estimates of the number of dead range from around 42,000 to 53,000; this was only half the number killed at Leipzig in 1813, but the killing at Waterloo was focused in a very small area of around 5 square miles. It has been calculated that the number of casualties per square mile was about 10 times as many as the British Army experienced on its bloodiest ever day, the First Day on the Somme, 1 July 1916.
Given what we’ve learned so far about the systematic way in which battlefields were looted in this period, it would be amazing if the field of Waterloo was not gone over in this way, and indeed there is evidence to suggest that a large harvest of teeth was reaped from the tens of thousands of dead. According to a family tradition, Claudius Ash, who was a surgeon at Waterloo, and later became a dentist noted for the significant advances that he made in the production of porcelain teeth in the 1830s, “actually got into dentistry as a battlefield surgeon at Waterloo” by collecting teeth from the battlefield. Similarly, and according to Hobson, Harnett and Crouch made a special visit to the battlefield early in 1816 for the same purpose.
We can conclude, then, that there is ample evidence that human teeth were harvested from battlefields throughout the Napoleonic Wars, that they fetched a good price, and that a small group of specialists actively worked in this trade. There is little to no evidence, on the other hand, that the harvest from Waterloo was especially remarkable, other than in its quantity, or that false teeth were marketed as “Waterloo teeth” at any time in the 19th century. Indeed, although writers on the subject have sometimes argued that this sort of branding would have been especially effective, in that customers would have been assured that the teeth they were buying were young (and hence probably healthy) and, in addition, “heroes’ teeth”, it can equally be argued that making such a provenance clear might have been bad for business – there would have been nothing very glorious or patriotic, for a British customer, in paying to buy the looted teeth of what might well have been a dead British soldier.
James Blake Bailey [ed], The Diary of a Resurrectionist, 1811-12; Bransby Blake Cooper, The Life of Sir Astley Cooper, Bart. (1843);; Paul W Craddock, “Your money where your mouth is: the role of consumerism in eighteenth century transplant surgery, History of Retailing and Consumption 4 (2018); Percy Fitzgerald, Chronicles of the Bow-street Police Office (1888); John South Flint, Memorials of John Flint South. Twice president of the Royal College of Surgeons, and Surgeon to St. Thomas’s Hospital (1884); John Grehan, Voices from the Past: Waterloo 1815 (2015); James Hobson, Dark Days of Georgian Britain: Rethinking the Regency(2017); Colin Jones, The Smile Revolution in Eighteenth Century Paris (2014); Paul Kerley, “The dentures made from the teeth of dead soldiers at Waterloo,” BBC News Magazine, 16 June 2015; Robert Kershaw, 24 Hours at Waterloo (2014); Andrew Lang, The Life and Letters of John Gibson Lockhart (1897); ‘Life of Sir Astley Cooper,’ Quarterly Review, March 1843; Jean-Baptiste de Marbot, The Memoirs of Baron de Marbot (1903); Adrian Miles et al, St Marylebone Church and Burial Ground in the 18th to 19th Centuries (2008); Paul O’Keeffe, Waterloo: The Aftermath (2014); Stephanie Pain, “The great tooth robbery,” New Scientist, 16 June 2001; Levi Spear Parmley, A Practical Guide to the Management of the Teeth (1818); ‘The latest intelligence!’ British Journal of Dental Science 8 (1865)
Q: In 1765, a chimney sweep was banished from for five years from Edinburgh and expelled from the local chimney sweep organisation for assisting after a hanging went awry. Were chimney sweeps notably anti-death penalty? Why was it a “grievous punishment” to be exiled to Leith?
A: Edinburgh’s Tron-men were members of an especially powerful society whose privileges included receipt of an annual allowance from the city. This fee was paid in exchange for their services in various demi-official capacities, including occasional assistance at public executions.
The offence committed by Robert Hunter, the Tron-man who suffered the punishment of professional exile to the neighbouring port town of Leith, was to accept an additional payment of five pounds for assisting the public hangman at the execution of a particularly notorious murderer, a gentleman and British Army officer named Patrick Ogilvie, on top of that standard honorarium. By accepting the money, Hunter was judged to have offended against the honour of the society, whose members were expected to freely offer their services whenever stipulated by their agreement with the town.
To understand why all this was so, we need to know a little bit more about the Tron-men themselves. Their society was formed in 1741 as a result of the passage of Edinburgh’s Burgh Act. One purpose of the Burgh Act was to regularise and professionalise sweeping in order to minimise the risk of a catastrophic fire. The so-called “Lesser Great Fire” that had destroyed large swathes of the city in February 1700 had been blamed on a chimney fire, and by creating an exclusive, uniformed society of chimney sweeps, and granting them a monopoly on work inside the town, Edinburgh’s city council sought to ensure that this vital work was carried out safely.
There were 12 Tron-men, or “Custodians of the Flues,” to do all the chimney sweeping work within Edinburgh’s Old Town (the New Town area to the north was not covered by the Burgh Act). They worked in a rather different way to the sweeps of London, who famously swept from the ground up and used boys to climb up the stacks and dislodge soot. Tron-men scaled the roofs of the houses they were working in and swept from the top down, using bundles of twigs on ropes secured with lead weights. They wore a uniform comprising a bonnet, fitted coat and buckled shoes, and acquired their name from their meeting place at the public weighing beam outside the Tron Kirk in the Old Town. Those who wished to hire their services could meet representatives of the society at that spot and make the necessary arrangements.
Each Tron-man paid a five pound initiation fee and quarterly fees to the society were 3s.8d., which – given the value of money at that time – gives some indication of how lucrative their monopoly was. In exchange for their work in ensuring all sweeping met minimum safety standards, they received a guinea (21s) a year each from the city, together with the right to sell their soot.
The tasks that the Tron-men performed for the city were not limited to assistance at public executions, which was in fact pretty uncommon for them. Their main additional service was to work as night watchmen, standing in pairs on rooftops to keep an eye out for fires, and raising the alarm where necessary. To mark their association with the city, and give them premises from which to organise their watch-work, they were given a room in Edinburgh’s City Guard House on the High Street.
Hunter’s offence makes more sense, I think, when viewed in the context of the close and mutually beneficial relationship that had grown up between the Tron-men and the city of Edinburgh between 1741 and the time of Lieutenant Ogilvie’s execution in November 1765. In addition, though, we should note that the crime that Ogilvie had committed was an especially disgraceful one, which made Hunter’s willingness to profit, in effect, from it notably dishonourable.
Ogilvie had begun an affair with his sister-in-law, Catherine or Katherine Nairn (spellings differ), who was only 19, the daughter of Sir Robert Nairn, and closely linked to the cream of Sottish society. Their relationship, in Scottish law, counted as incest. Together, the lovers conspired to get Katherine’s inconvenient husband, and Patrick’s brother, Thomas – who was considerably older than either of them, and a semi-invalid as the result of service in India – out of the way by poisoning him.
Ogilvie was sentenced not only to be hanged, but also to the additional disgrace of having his body conveyed to Edinburgh’s surgeons for dissection. Katherine was spared only because she was pregnant with her lover’s child. She was sent off to prison to await the birth, after which sentence of death would be carried out, and her behaviour after the trial was considered absolutely beyond the pale:
On her arrival at Leith in an open boat… her whole bearing betrayed so much levity, and was so different from what was expected by a somewhat pitying crowd, that a storm of just indignation was aroused, and she was with some difficulty rescued from rough treatment by the authorities.
As it turned out, Katherine Nairn had good reason to be in such high spirits. She subsequently managed to effect an escape from Edinburgh’s Tolbooth prison by conspiring with her midwife, a Mrs Shields. Shields pretended to be afflicted by severe toothache, and took to turning up at the prison groaning loudly, and with her head swathed in a shawl. After establishing this pattern of behaviour over several days, she exchanged clothes with Nairn, who exited the prison with her face concealed and managed (one presumes with the help of her friends and family) to get out of Edinburgh and make it to Dover, and thence, supposedly, eventually to the Americas. There she changed her name and disappeared but, according to James Grant, was rumoured to have “married again and died at an advanced age.”
As for Hunter, exile to Leith meant he was banished from the elite ranks of the Tron-men and deprived of the both prestige associated with them and the security of their monopoly on sweeping work. Chimney sweeping in Leith was far less lucrative, and far less prestigious, as a result.
Newcastle Chronicle 24 August 1765; Benita Cullingford, British Chimney Sweeps: Five Centuries of Chimney Sweeping (Chicago, 2000); James Grant, Old and New Edinburgh (Edinburgh, 6 vols, 1880, vol.1); John Kay, A Series of Original Portraits and Caricature Etchings (Edinburgh 1838) vol.1 part ii.
Q: The medieval legend of the Dry Tree
Can someone give me a more in depth explanation of the historical context and significance of the “dry tree”. I was reading The Well At the World’s End and assumed that it was made up by Morris, but there was a brief explanation involving Alexander the Great, Christendom, and Marco Polo. It is a very vague and uninformative entry. It alludes to a whole book that Marco Polo wrote on the subject, but I didn’t see any references to the source material in English.
A: The Dry Tree is a medieval metaphor, drawn originally from a variety of Biblical references to wastelands, withered orchards, and miraculous revivals of dead objects, perhaps most notably that in Ezekiel 17:22:
I the Lord have … dried up the green tree, and caused the dry tree to flourish. I the Lord have spoken and have done it.
A second passage, in the Gospel of Luke 23:30, returns to the same idea, but associates it with the crucifixion, and the loss that the Daughters of Jerusalem will experience when Christ is dead:
They shall begin to say to the mountains: fall upon us. And to the hills: cover us. For if in the green wood they do these things, what shall be done in the dry?
So, from a Biblical point of view, dry trees appear as both an illustration of God’s power, and as a metaphor for life without God.
Dry Trees are encountered repeatedly in the literature of the medieval period. At its most straightforward, the term can refer to any tree that is withered, dead, incapable of bearing fruit or bare of leaves – seen in this light, its metaphorical potency is fairly clear, I think, even when it is stripped of its specific religious connotations. It becomes much more potent when directly associated with concepts of the divine, and of loss, as the Bible suggests, so it is not too surprising that we begin to encounter the term during this period as a way of talking about the cross itself – the “dry tree” that Christ carried to his own crucifixion is contrasted to the “green tree”, meaning Mary, a fount of life, in the work of the fourteenth century French poet Guillaume de Digulleville.
Early references sometimes deal with dry trees in the plural. But, by the late middle ages, the term was being used to refer to just one, specific, tree, which was conceived of as located in some particularly distant place – “a destination point towards which a person might travel,” as Rosanne Gasse points out in the only major modern study of the idea. Thus the fifteenth century morality play The Castle of Perseverance discusses a location at very edge of the world which is home to a Dry Tree, while the hero of one manuscript of Piers Plowman, now in the British Library, is prepared to make an enormous effort to reach the tree:
I wole trauayle quoth I this tre to see, twenty hundrid myle [“I will travel, said I, two thousand miles to see this tree”]
So common is the Dry Tree in medieval literature, in fact, that Gasse terms it “a stock reference in travelogues and romances”. These latter do include histories of Alexander the Great and the works of both Marco Polo and Odoric of Pordenone. (For Odoric, uniquely, it was located not at the very edge of the world, but at its centre, in Jerusalem.) From there the idea was also picked up by more modern writers; the White Tree of Arnor, which crops up in The Lord of the Rings, is a Dry Tree, and so, perhaps, is the tree under which Vladimir and Estragon wait for Godot in Beckett’s celebrated play.
To address the specific of your question – what Marco Polo had to say about the Dry Tree – the Travels mention a distant province of Persia which is home to a tree that is fairly clearly a variation on the theme, but which carries with it some historical associations, too. Travellers encounter it, Polo says, in the far northern deserts of Persia, on
an immense plain… in which stands the Solitary Tree, which the Christians call the Dry Tree. Let me describe it to you. It is of great size and girth. Its leaves are green on one side, white on the other. It produces husks like chestnut husks; but there is nothing in them. Its wood is laurel and yellow like box-wood. And there are no trees near for more than 100 miles, except in one direction , where there are trees ten miles away. It is there, according to the people of the country, that the battle was fought between Alexander and Darius
– that is, the decisive Battle of Gaugamela (331 BCE), which resulted in the downfall of the Persian empire, and which historians now locate in Iraq. From all this, we can see that – as Gasse points out – the tree Polo describes is not really a Dry Tree at all, merely an unusual, symbolic tree that has had the label applied to it.
There are, then, quite a variety of Dry Trees to think about (Grasse divides her examples into a total of five distinct groups), and these are put to quite a variety of literary uses, too. Dry Trees are often symbols of death; they are associated with suicide by hanging; they are also symbols of winter (but also of the promise of spring, and, hence, the resurrection) and, perhaps most strikingly, they are signals of moral death. Finally, the Dry Tree also appears in a slightly different context in Malory’s Le Morte d’Arthur, in which Sir Bors experiences a vision in which he looks up into a tree he notices is “passing drye” and sees it filled with birds that are “dede for hunger”. One giant bird strikes itself dead with its own beak, and the other birds feed on its blood, and are then able to fly away. Although he himself is insufficiently spiritually advanced to understand this rather entry-level vision, an abbot explains to Bors that the tree is a symbol of the world, “which ys naked and nedy”, the starving birds are representative of humankind, and the great bird which sacrifices itself for its companions is Christ.
Emilie Fréger, ‘Le manuscrit d’Arras (BM, MS.845) dans la tradition des manusctits enluminés du Pèlerinage de l’âme en vers’, in Frédéric Duval and Fabienne Pomel (eds), Guillaume de Digulleville: Les Pèlerinages Allégoriques (2008); Rosanne Gasse, “The Dry Tree legend in medieval literature,” Fifteenth Century Studies 38 (2013); Rose Jeffries Peebles, ‘The Dry Tree: Symbol of Death,’ in C.F. Fiske, Vassar Medieval Studies(1923)
Q: Did the NYTimes run the headline “The Apostle of Hate is Dead” in response to Malcolm X’s assassination?
In Ibram X. Kendi’s Stamped from the Beginning, he writes that “On February 22, 1965, the New York Times banner headline read: ‘The Apostle of Hate is Dead’.” (p. 389) He doesn’t provide a source. I’ve found this claim repeated multiple times, but a primary source is never provided. The NYTimes archive shows the headline “Malcolm X Shot to Death at Rally” for that date.
A: A search of the New York Times archive produces no references to this headline, or indeed the phrase “apostle of hate”, for the period 1965 to 1967.
You are certainly correct in saying, nonetheless, that the headline is attributed to the NYT, and not only by Kendi. The earliest usage I have found is in Peter Goldman’s The Death and Life of Malcolm X, published in 1979, and the same claim appears in Diamond’s Malcolm X: A Voice for Black America (1994).
It seems well worth noting that Goldman does not make the claim that the headline actually appeared himself; he gives it in the form of a piece of recollection by Dan Watts, who was then the editor of the “eclectic black-radical magazine The Liberator” – and in this version, Watts himself does not claim directly that the words were reported in headline form, or even that they were used, explicitly, by the paper at all:
“I remember the Times saying the Apostle of Hate is dead, he only had two or three hundred followers,” Dan Watts said, “and I remember going uptown, and it was fourteen degrees out, and these little old soul sisters were coming out of the subway and getting on line for a last look at Malcolm.” [Goldman p.302]
It would be easy to assume, but difficult to prove, that the repeated references to a newspaper headline in the NYT that you are interested in originated as a result of this claim in Goldman’s book being picked up and misinterpreted by other writers who used Goldman as a reference for their own work on Malcolm X – and that the use of the phrase “apostle of hate” by Watts was originally either a paraphrase, or a piece of misremembering, or even invention, published at a time when it was no simple matter to check a statement about a particular set of words that supposedly appeared in one newspaper on a particular date more than a decade earlier.
We can certainly pick up what appear to be echoes of this process, and it is very interesting to note that these show the usage becoming increasingly specific and concrete as time goes on, ending with the specific attribution of the phrase to a Times headline published on a particular date. In late March 1994, for example (at least according to a highly partial source), Louis Farrakhan gave a speech at Kean College in which he claimed: “The day Malcolm X was killed, every newspaper blared, ‘The apostle of hate is dead'” [my italics].
It seems very possible that the attribution of the phrase to the Times, specifically, is a product of Watts’s phrasing, but one other possible source – itself perhaps based originally on Goldman’s work – it well worth mentioning. This is the documentary Brother Minister: The Assassination of Malcolm X (1994). I note that a review of this documentary, published in the Washington Post on 17 February 1995, explicitly references “the film’s authentic images”, which it notes have an “indelible impact” and include
the New York Times banner headline “The Apostle of Hate Is Dead”; a photo of Malcolm X’s firebombed home; footage of him and Elijah Muhammed before their rift. Excerpts from many FBI memos include an appalling one that refers to “temple-type low-class Negroes.”
This seemed promising, so I tracked a copy of the documentary down. It is available to view on YouTube, but on review I note that while the narrator states (at 13:12), “the New York Times headline reads: “The Apostle of Hate is Dead”, the image shown is not in fact a clip from the newspaper. Instead, the sound effect of a typewriter is used, and the words appear on the screen in type. In other words, and despite the Post‘s incautious claim, the documentary makers had not consulted the Times archive (at least not successfully), but they had apparently picked up the idea that the phrase had appeared in the paper from somewhere else.
On this basis, I feel reasonably happy to conclude that the NYT never used the headline as alleged, and that the idea that it did is most likely based on a misreading of Goldman’s passage by later writers, starting with Diamond, who assumed that Dan Watts was recalling an actual story, rather than paraphrasing – inaccurately – his recollections of the newspaper’s coverage more than a decade after the fact.
All this is not to say, finally, that the Times wrote positively, or even neutrally, of Malcolm X in the immediate aftermath of his assassination. The editorial that the newspaper published that 22 February actually called him “an extraordinary and twisted man, turning many true gifts to evil purpose,” and concluded that his life had been “pitifully wasted.” It added that “the world he saw through those horn-rimmed glasses of his was distorted and dark. But he made it darker still with his exaltation of fanaticism.” So the sentiments that Dan Watts recalled in his “apostle of hate” passage were actually there – it’s just that they weren’t phrased so neatly.
Q: There where many types of guilds in the middle ages. Did any of them focus ONLY on illegal activities (smuggler guilds, thieves guild etc) ? Or does this only happen in fantasy novels?
A: Craft, or professional, guilds were formal organisations, formed by groups of people who shared the same occupation, and which – certainly in the period that you are referring to – had the primary purpose of protecting (and where possible extending) the privileges accumulated by their trade over the years. Typically these rights included the establishment of monopolies in given cities (that is, only members of a guild were permitted to practise a specific trade within the city walls), and they were recorded, in writing, in letters patent that were issued by the ruler of the state. Once issued, the relevant privileges were then enforced with the help of the secular authorities in the town in question.
In addition, and increasingly as time went on, guilds also came to have religious and sacramental functions, often expressed via feasting and drinking which marked saints’ days and other festivals.
Given all this, it’s hopefully fairly easy to see that guilds formed and maintained for the express purpose of allowing their members to participate in illegal activities, or activities that were injurious to the local community as a whole, or which would have been considered sinful and irreligious, could hardly have existed alongside those established by legal, socially acceptable trades. Indeed, the guilds that did exist played a significant part in defining the sorts of criminals you’re interested in as “other” and attempting to actively exclude them from town life. As Rosser puts it:
Each society defines its own margins, and the tendency of medieval town dweller with at least basic means was to draw an increasingly firm line which left petty criminals, prostitutes, the handicapped, and the permanently unemployed beyond the edge. In this harshly unglamorous world on the edge – symbolically, it was often concentrated on the urban fringes, in the suburbs – few, if any, forms of association appear to have moderated the grim realities of poverty and disease. Modern writers have sometimes sought, by drawing on the poetry of Villon and the Franciscan tradition, to romanticize this world of the outcast, but the imagined kingdoms of thieves and sororities of prostitutes lack justification from the sources.
All this is not to say that what we might now term “organised crime” did not exist in the middle ages, and that criminals did not sometimes form informal, underground fraternities that allowed them to make contact with each other in professionally useful ways. I wrote, for instance, on the “Banu Sasen”, a (very) loose grouping of marginal figures and out-and-out criminals that existed in Islamic territories in the period that you are interested in here. There are also (very scanty) references to a “guild of the handicapped” in Venice, and several towns do retain records of “guilds of poor men”, but in all these cases, it would seem, such organisations were formed in the explicit hope that they would help to differentiate the honest, worthy and legitimate seekers after charity or work from the mass of “sturdy beggars” who (in popular belief at least) actively rejected work, chose a life on the margins, and caused frequent moral panics in the late medieval and early modern periods. As such, those involved in founding and attempt to promote such groups very much ranged their guilds of the poor alongside the more official, mainstream companies, and against criminality.
It’s also true that attempts were made to regulate some aspects of the underworld from time to time in a few places. Most obviously, some towns did make efforts to regulate the sex trade by licensing brothels. This happened in England in Southwark (the borough on the south bank of the River Thames, which was, notoriously, just outside the jurisdiction of the City of London and hence a lively haven for all manner of semi-legal and illegal activities), where the sex trade was controlled by the Bishop of Winchester. To a lesser extent, licensed brothels also existed in Southampton, and in the Cinque Ports town of Sandwich. In these circumstances, approved “stewmongers” would have had some local standing and some reason to band together with the local authorities to take action against their unlicensed competitors. Unfortunately, however, surviving records from the relevant period say almost nothing about this aspect of the sex trade.
Q: So was the Bishop of Winchester a pimp? Or does it appear to be a genuine attempt to legitimize and tax prostitution?
A: The bishop was hardly a pimp in the common meaning of the term – he did not receive money direct from “common bawds” that he personally controlled. However, he absolutely did receive money from the Southwark sex trade, in the form of license payments made by approved stews, rents on the premises themselves (which were typically extremely high by contemporary standards), and fines levied on unlicensed premises. These payments, in turn, were made by stewmongers who were receiving cash direct from the prostitutes who worked in their brothels.
Moreover the trade itself – which peaked, so far as we can tell, around 1500, when there were 18 licensed brothels in the bishop’s liberty – was finally ended not by the bishop, but by the actions of central government, which outlawed the old arrangements in 1546. The only concession that successive bishops seem to have made to contemporary religious sensibilities was to ban prostitutes from working or being on the streets of Southwark during major religious festivals.
In addition, the bishop ran a local court that adjudicated on cases involving the Southwark sex trade and was sometimes used by brothel-keepers to keep the women they controlled in check. In one especially egregious case, dating to the 1470s, this court allowed a stewmonger by the name of Thomas Bowde, who had attempted to coerce a young woman, Ellen Butler, into a life of prostitution, to bring a case against her that was clearly designed to force her to work for him:
He took her to his house on the Stews side of the river and “would have compelled her to do such service as his other servants do there.” When she refused, he brought an action against her in the court of the bishop of Winchester in Southwark to get a judgement for a sum she would never be able to pay, so that she would have to remain in prison unless she agreed to work for him as a prostitute.
We don’t know, unfortunately, how the Butler case was resolved, but similar cases did occur elsewhere; the Bishop of Mainz also licensed brothels on his lands.
Christopher F. Black, Italian Cofraternities in the Sixteenth Century (1989); Bronislaw Geremek, The Margins of Society in Late Medieval Paris (1987); Ruth Mazo Karras, Common Women: Prostitution and Sexuality in Medieval England (1996); Ruth Mazo Karras, “The Regulation of Brothels in Later Medieval England,” Signs 14 (1989); Gervase Rosser, The Art of Solidarity in the Middle Ages: Guilds in England 1250-1550 (2015)
Q: How did the ancient White Horse, a huge hill-figure carved into a chalky down in the south of England in about 1,000 BCE, survive all the political, social and military changes that took place in the area for thousands of years without growing over?
A: The survival of the magnificent White Horse is, frankly, a considerable mystery.
Although it is only one of a number of hillside chalk figures found across southern England (among which the priapic Cerne Abbas Giant [NSFW] and the Long Man of Wilmington are also reasonably well known), records of these figures that date to before the early 1700s are pretty patchy, and the White Horse is the only one that can incontestably be given a prehistoric date. This dating was done as a result of a 1990s survey that showed that the horse is a much more substantial monument than had been appreciated hitherto – “not simply scraped into the chalk of the hillside,” Schwyzer notes, but rather consisting of substantial “trenches filled with loose chalk” which are up to 10 feet wide and three feet deep. This discovery suggested that a luminescent silt analysis could be done at the site. This technique establishes how long ago buried soil was last exposed to sunlight, and it ascribed the figure to the Bronze Age and gave it a date of around 1400-600 BCE.
This means that the horse, which needs to be regularly cleaned or repaired to prevent it simply growing over and disappearing, has survived for around 3,000 years, getting, according to the latest surveys, only slightly thinner across all that time – although there are early references to the horse having once had a saddle, and artists’ impressions of the horse made in 1813 and 1835 show that it had no eye, much less distinct mouthparts, and one significantly different (longer and straighter) foreleg at the earlier date. Similarly, we know that the Long Man of Wilmington was largely obscured – the outline being visible only “in certain light conditions, or after a light fall of snow” – until it was restored in the 1870s by being marked out with bricks.
How the White Horse contrived to survive for so many years is simply not known, even though we have more information about its history than we have for the other main chalk figures – the first mention of it is (probably) in De Mirabilibus Britanniae (c.1100), a catalogue of the wonders of Britain that lists, in fifth place,
the White Horse and its foal. It is wondrous that it was so made in the figure of a horse that, while the whole place where that image of a horse is is grassy beyond measure, grass never grows over the shape of the horse, but the ground to the extent of the horse is always exposed.
If this actually is a reference to the Uffington figure, it’s hard to know what to make of it. No trace has ever been found of a second figure – the foal – and no mention of it is made in any other document; nor is there any reason to suppose that grass would not have quickly covered the horse in the 12th century, as it would do today. Whatever the truth, what is incontestably a reference to the White Horse also crops up in a legal document dating to the mid 12th century, which notes it as a landmark.
After that, we have absolutely nothing about the horse or its condition until 1677. This is quite a distinct contrast to the position with some other noted monuments, such as Stonehenge or the Avebury Circle, which tend to crop up in antiquarian works from the 1500s, and the absence of the White Horse from these and similar records is quite unexplained. William Camden, who did write about such marvels, seems to have heard something of the horse, but apparently never visited it and in fact doubted it existed:
I wote [know] not from what shape of a white horse imagined to appeere in a whitish chalky hill, they term The vale of Whitehorse.
In 1677, in any case, a local man named Thomas Baskerville recorded that “some that dwell herabout have an obligation upon their lands to repair and cleanse this landmark, or else in time it may turn green,” and this is the first, and in some ways the most useful, reference that survives to tell us how the figure was maintained – as a legal requirement incumbent upon local tenants, it appears, and hence as something that was presumably at some point mandated by a major local landowner who controlled the land in question. (It’s worth noting this is not the only possible way in which chalk figures were maintained during the early modern period. There’s also a contemporary reference from Dorset, site of the Cerne Abbas giant, which notes that the local parish paid out three shillings in the autumn of 1694 “for repairing ye Giant.”) Then we have John Aubrey, who discussed its provenance in his Monumenta Britannica during the 1680s, suggesting it was either the work of pre-Roman Britons (whose coins, he noted, sometimes featured horse-figures), or of the (semi-mythical) first Saxon chiefs to land in England, Hengist and Horsa.
Thomas Cox, in Britannia (1720), mentions that the horse was then weeded annually, accompanied by “feasting and merriment,” and the Oxford librarian Francis Wise, writing in 1738, describes “scourings” of the figure as an old custom in his time.
Cox’s reference is especially interesting because we also have records, dating in this instance back to the 1750s, of a septennial “scouring” of the horse, which certainly became a major local festival that involved a fair, wrestling matches and all manner of other celebrations. Some records of this appear in a mid Victorian novel by Thomas Hughes (well known as the author of Tom Brown’s Schooldays), The Scouring of the White Horse, and all in all we have references to scourings that took place in 1755, 1776, 1780, 1785, 1803, 1808, 1813, 1825, 1838, 1843 and 1857 – but, as will be noted, either records even from this comparatively recent period are very incomplete, or the scourings of the horse were nowhere near as regular or as systematically organised as all this would imply; in fact, a newspaper article dating to 1922 noted that in that year the outline of the horse was “scarce to be seen”. This was, perhaps, the product of the massive dislocation of the local community caused by the First World War. It’s also very much unknown how, when and why the annual mandatory “cleaning” that took place around 1677 morphed into a less frequent, but much larger, public jamboree.
Now, all of this does not really help to explain how the figure can possibly have survived the period from c.1000 BCE to 1677, and all the changes that occurred during those 2,600 or so years. Schywzer contends that its survival means that it cannot possibly have been cleaned less than “once a generation” throughout that period, and he speculates about tribal “curatorships” as well as noting that the Saxons, when they eventually arrived, “may have recognized in the Horse a comfortingly familiar religious symbol” – which, it’s implied, may have encouraged them to preserve it. But he admits that “the significance the Horse and the practice of scouring held for most of these people is forever lost,” and hazards no guess at all as to what impact the advent of Christianity may have had on its fortunes. My own view, for what little it is worth, is that the fact that the horse sits on a hillside above White Horse Vale, which houses a relatively isolated and distinct community – one which now, and apparently since the 18th century at least, closely identifies with the figure – may plausibly have helped to ensure its maintenance, and so its survival.
Ultimately, however, the puzzle of how the horse survived for so long, in what appears to be its original form (something that can’t be said of other hill figures such as the one at Cerne Abbas) remains unsolved, and is perhaps unsolvable.
Thomas Baskerville, The Description of Towns, on the Road from Faringdon to Bristow and Other Places, 1681; Jacqueline Simpson & Stephen Roud, A Dictionary of English Folklore (2000); Philip Schwyzer, “The Scouring of the White Horse: Archaeology, Identity, and “Heritage”,” Representations 1999: Ralph Whitlock, The Folklore of Wiltshire (1976)
Q: Is it possible that an Islamic city-state, rather like Venice, might have flourished on the desert coast of Somalia in the medieval period, sent envoys all the way to Beijing, and evolved a stable form of republican government that lasted well into the nineteenth century?
A: This turns out to be an extremely fascinating problem, and – having made a start on it – I uncovered so many layers of assumptions, misperceptions and casual thinking that two or three days of research were needed to get to the bottom of it.
The root problem is that Barawa has never been the subject of a detailed work of history; pretty much everything that has ever been written about it comes from books and papers that are actually about something else. It’s taken me quite a while to untangle the mess left by several hundred years’ worth of passing references scribbled by a wide variety of travellers, historians and archaeologists. So, first of all, apologies for this very late response.
It’s going to take some time to lay out the evidence I’ve gathered and place it in some sort of context for you, so I’ll start with the short version of the answer.
Barawa – which is also known to historians as Brava, and sometimes as Baraawe – is a small port on the southern coast of what is now Somalia, about 125 miles south of Mogadishu. Both the traditions and the local dialect are rooted in Swahili, and the town still forms a distinct cultural enclave on the desert coast of the Horn of Africa.
Barawa was, as you note, one of the string of two dozen or so merchantile city-states that stretched along what’s known as the Swahili Coast: a 2,000 mile stretch of littoral running all the way south to Mozambique. It was, in fact, the northernmost city in the chain.
We don’t know when Barawa was founded, but the site was inhabited by the third century CE. The city appears to have been well-established by 1100,1 and it remained a distinct polity (albeit one that enjoyed a very varying degree of independence) until it was ceded to Italy by Zanzibar in 1892.2
At its height, Barawa was a significant commercial power in the Indian Ocean – so much so that merchants from the city visited China in the early 15th century. These envoys travelled in the ships of the renowned “treasure fleet” of admiral Zheng He, and they were returned to Africa several years later during another of Zheng He’s voyages. In 1430, Barawa (Pu-la-wa, 不喇哇) was one of only 18 western ports mentioned by name in an imperial decree issued by the Xuande Emperor.3
During the period 1100-1892, Barawa certainly was repeatedly described as a republic – the earliest contemporary reference to the city having such an unexpected form of government dates to around 1509,4 and the latest to 1856.5 This was seen as remarkable, and worthy of comment, by a string of visitors to the Swahili Coast, among them sailors from Portugal, France and Britain.
However, a careful examination of the evidence shows that the idea that Barawa was ever “a republic” is significantly misleading.
The most detailed contemporary references we have were written by a 16th century Portuguese who never visited the east coast of Africa.
The only other significant account, which was written by a French naval officer in the mid-19th century, has practically always been taken heavily out of context. The original reference turns out to be playful, and it was extensively qualified.
We can also say that both these influential authors would have been familiar with European concepts of “a republic” – the Portuguese writer would have known of Venice, while the Frenchman was not only aware of the earlier reference, but was writing only five years after the collapse of the Second Republic. I conclude that both were drawing on an established, but inappropriate and out of context, political vocabulary to describe a rather unfamiliar form of government.
Finally, I note that it is actually highly debatable whether it was even possible for any Muslim state to be a republic at any time before the mid-20th century, since Islamic law recognises only two forms of sovereignty – that of a Caliph, and that of a Sultan. Jumhur, the classical Arabic word that’s commonly used to mean “republic”, does not seem to have been employed in this way until it began to be used by the Ottomans to describe Venice hundreds of years after Barawa emerged as an independent city-state.6
Let’s take a closer look.
Although the history of the earliest towns along the Swahili coast can be traced back to the period c.300-1000 CE, there is little real evidence of state formation in the region until the tenth century, and the system that then evolved did not really survive its encounter with the Portuguese from 1500. At the height of its wealth and success in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, however, the coast was home to 20 or 25 maritime city-states – ranging from quite well-known polities such as those of Mombasa and Kilwa down to much smaller towns, including Barawa, which probably never had a population greater than 3,000 throughout this period.7 These statelets exhibited a number of common characteristics:
They do meet the basic definitions of city-states, having centralised institutions and defined city centres, often in the form of “stone towns”, like the famous one that still survives in Zanzibar. These housed the elites, and were usually surrounded by walls, outside which the majority of the population lived in mud-built dwellings. The inhabitants of the stone towns had the prestige and hence the power to impose law and order on their people. Finally, the populations of the ports on the Swahili coast practised some division of labour and some specialisation of function.8
These cities were never very substantial in size (the largest, Kilwa, was only about 50 acres in extent at its peak), but they contained cosmopolitan populations. By the early 19th century, when these things were first actually studied, these were typically made up of four classes or groups: an ethnically Arab merchant and religious elite; a set of (often manumitted) middle-ranking communities of African artisans, farmers, fishermen and soldiers; “foreigners” and recent immigrants; and a large population of enslaved people.9 There is still considerable controversy as to the extent to which these same groups existed in earlier periods. A significant number of historians of the Swahili coast suggest that, in the period before 1500, a large proportion of the merchant elite was probably ethnically Bantu, and Swahili speaking.10 (Most recently, archaeologists working in the area have preferred to move on altogether from attempts to parse the ethnicity of the Swahili coast.)
They were based right on the coast, and in many cases (including those of Barawa, Lamu, Pate, Kilwa and Mombasa) actually on islands just off the coast that offered superior defensive positions.
They were increasingly dependent on trade, to the point that well before 1500 most lacked the ability to support their own populations without importing food and other vital goods. This encouraged their participation in the loose but far-reaching peaceful trading networks that characterised the Indian Ocean system, especially in the period before the arrival of Europeans in the region. These networks shared common languages – Persian (for the intra-ocean trade) and various dialects of Swahili – and they had a common material culture, as well as a common religion, Islam, after about 1100.
Probably at least in part because of this, the states on the Swahili coast were militarily very weak, certainly in comparison to the forces brought against them by the Portuguese after 1500.
The cities of the Swahili coast controlled only rather small hinterlands, but sometimes served as the terminal points for extensive inland trade routes. This was most notably the case for Sofala, the “furthest south” point of the trading zone – which existed to export gold brought to the coast from the mines of Great Zimbabwe, 400 miles or more inland – but other cities further to the north prospered on an extensive trade in ivory. The slave trade was another important economic staple during this period.11
Barawa and its sister cities were an important part of the trading world of the Indian Ocean, which also intersected with the Mediterranean and East Asian trades to ship luxury goods from China to Italy and from the East African coast to India, Malaya and China.12
The delicate and complex interdependencies of the economies of ports along the Swahili coast are best suggested by the rapid collapse of the old trading system that followed almost immediately on the Portuguese seizure of Sofala, and their diversion of the gold trade into European hands.13
A little history of Barawa
The most remote period of Barawa’s history remains almost entirely obscure,14 and the town has not been the subject of any significant archaeological investigation, either,15 so we are forced to rely on what some significantly later written accounts and traditions tell us to reconstruct the early years of the Swahili coast.
Our main source in this regard is the Chronicle of the Kings of Kilwa, or Kilwa Chronicle. This is, essentially, an elaborated pedigree of the rulers of the city-state of Kilwa, which was for some time the wealthiest of the Swahili states and was located off the coast of what is now Tanzania.16 The Kilwa Chronicle is incomplete and exists in two dramatically different versions (one in Arabic and the other in Portuguese), but neither of the texts dates to earlier than the middle of the sixteenth century.17 It can be argued that the Chronicle‘s version of events is backed up by folklore collected along the East African coast and the Comoros Islands,18 but it is far from clear how independent that folklore is of the chronicle itself – and since the written accounts originate somewhere between five and seven centuries after the fact, they really have to be considered dubious. For what it’s worth, however, the Chronicle contains the claim (which most authorities now consider to be no more than a foundation myth)19 that Ali bin al-Hasan, a prince of the Shiraz dynasty of Persia, accompanied by six sons (or brothers) and a number of followers, fled the persecution of a local sultan around 870 CE and set sail for the coast of Africa.
This group, the Kilwa Chronicle continues, successfully made landfall, and each of the brothers, or sons, founded and ruled over a town. The ports that the Chronicle names do not include Barawa, but a variant of the same myth does name the town, and contends that it was one of the first founded by the Shirazi.20 Ali bin al-Husain himself, supposedly, later travelled south to Kilwa, and founded his own dynasty there.21 In one version of events, Barawa was thus one of a number of towns on the Swahili coast to owe its existence to the arrival of the Shirazis, and – Chittick suggests – among the most important, since it was apparently senior to the highly successful city-state of Kilwa.22 The Shirazis brought with them their Shia religion, the tradition of building in stone, the technique of weaving cotton, and distinctive architectural and artistic styles. It was only later that this Persian elite was supplemented by the arrival of Arab traders and, eventually, settlers, along the Swahili coast.23
Modern historical consensus is, to put it mildly, doubtful of such claims. The archaeological evidence we have suggests that every significant trading town that was once part of the Swahili Coast was first established by Africans – except, just possibly, Manda24 – and hence any immigrants who did arrive on the coast, whether Persian or Arabs, more likely established control by ousting existing rulers from existing towns by force.25 The “Shirazi” myth itself has been subjected to fairly withering criticism by Allen and Kirkham, who note that documentary and archaeological evidence for anyspecifically Persian settlement of the African coast is entirely lacking before c.1750; the most we have is a pair of thirteenth century inscriptions from Mogadishu that mention Persian names.26 Since these people could have been visiting merchants, rather than settlers or local rulers, it is fair to say that – while the idea is still quite commonly encountered in the general secondary sources – any suggestion that Barawa was founded by Persian emigrants in the ninth century remains very much unproven, and is highly unlikely.
An alternative proposal, made by John Trimingham, is that the groups from the Banadir coast (the desert coastal area of southern Somalia that includes Barawa) that can be found in medieval records from the area, and who identified as “Shirazi” were actually “Swahilised” Bantu, whose claim to Persian origins was sociologically important but at best “suspect in its quasi-historical details”.27 In other words, the medieval leadership of Barawa was predominantly African. This position is supported by the writings of Richard Burton, who was the first westerner to hear stories of the “Shirazi” from Swahili-speaking informants in the late nineteenth century. Burton concluded that the Shirazi came from Africa,28and Allen takes everything a step further by suggesting that the term most probably applied to a status group, rather than one with ethnically or geographically distinct origins.29
All in all, then, it seems most likely that Barawa was originally an African port, which probably came into existence as a fishing village some time before 1000, and that the local elite were of predominantly African origin, albeit with the addition of some Arab merchant families. There is linguistic evidence to back this up, since the people of Barawa still speak a dialect of Swahili that has been shown to have roots in the language spoken by the Bantu peoples.30
I’ve gone into some detail here because it’s important to understand Barawa’s origins if we are to understand its system of government. But, if we move past the mention of the port in the Shirazi origin myth, the next evidence that we have is an inscription dating to c.940, which is the earliest definite reference to its existence.31 Another, funerary, inscription found in the Friday Mosque in the town, commemorates the death of a Muslim resident of Barawa named Hajj Chande in 1104-05.32 We thus do have some evidence that the port existed as more than merely a village, that it was part of a trading network that attracted Arab merchants, and that it probably had an Arab immigrant community by the early twelfth century at the latest.
We now move on to the history of Barawa when the city-state was at the height of its wealth and prestige between roughly 1100 and 1500. The main items of trade in this period were most likely ivory and enslaved men, women and children. Its people also manufactured and exported cloth, hats and wooden furniture and carvings, and the profits from all these trades were sufficient to fund the construction of a stone town in the city – built, as such buildings were during this period along the Swahili coast, of coral rag.33 In the same period, Barawa also became a noted centre of Islamic learning and jurisprudence, attracting scholars and students from along the whole Swahili coast. The city did not remain independent throughout these centuries, however. When the Nahbani dynasty, based in Pate, an island off the coast of what is now northern Kenya, became the dominant regional power from the middle of the fourteenth century, its influence extended as far north as Barawa, where (says Trimingham), Sultan Muhamad II installed a representative in about 1320.34
The city, then, was a significant port of call, and it was rich enough and well enough known to have sent envoys, jointly with Mogadishu, all the way to the emperor of China. Barawa was visited, in return, by units from the fleet of the great Chinese admiral Zheng He, probably in 1421 or 1422, in the course of the seven voyages carried out on orders of the Yongle emperor and his successors between 1405 and 1433. As a result of these exchanges, we have a description of the port as it was in the first half of the 15th century, written by Fei Xin in his Survey of the Star Raft. Hyunhee Park points out that Fei himself never visited Barawa, and that his information must have come at second hand and may be at least partly generic and copied from earlier Chinese sources.35 Nonetheless, while Fei’s account certainly contains details that are incorrect, the Survey is the closest we can get to glimpsing Barawa at the height of its magnificence – though that was scarcely a height that impressed the well-travelled men of Zheng He’s fleet:
The customs are somewhat simple. There is no agriculture of any kind, and the people eke out a living by fishing. Both men and women have hair of knotted fists, and wear short shirts that they sash with strips of cotton. On their ears the women sport gold coins and above their necks they wear fringe pendants.
Onions and garlic they have, but they lack any sort of gourd. Civets, which resemble the musk deer; zebras, which are like the piebald donkey; leopards; antlerless deer; rhinoceroses; myrrh; frankincense; ambergris; elephant tusks; and camels comprise the native produce of this land. In trading with them, we use gold; silver; satins; silks; rice; beans; and porcelain.36
This prosperous and, apparently, peaceful period of the city’s history came to an end early in the sixteenth century, when Barawa attracted the attentions of the Portuguese. European sailors had rounded the Cape of Good Hope in 1498 and moved steadily up the coast; between 1505-07, Portuguese ships appeared off Mombasa and Kilwa and sacked both cities. The Barawani also received a visit from a Portuguese flotilla and, having agreed to pay tribute to the formidably-armed westerners, its rulers made the mistake of reneging on their agreement. This resulted in the port’s sack by Tristão da Cunha (the same man who gave his name to the Atlantic island of Tristan da Cunha) in 1506.37
Barawa was rebuilt relatively quickly after the Portuguese sack, but it does not appear to have regained much independence. It may well have come under the at least occasional control of the Arjuan sultanate, an inland Somali state, with an hereditary Geledi sultan, which rose and fell between c.1500 and c.1625 and had a major outlet to the sea at Mogadishu.38 The Portuguese apparently considered it a vassal state for most of the period until the 1580s,39 but in 1581 an Ottoman corsair by the name of Mir Ali Beg appeared in the region, and his activities resulted in several attempted local uprisings against the over-stretched Portuguese, during which many of the ports along the Swahili coast attempted to regain their independence.40 From 1585, the town, along with much of the rest of the North-East African littoral, was contested between the Ottomans and the Portuguese until the late seventeenth century.41
By 1600, then, Barawa – in common with the other ports along the Swahili coast – had entered into a period of relative decline, which was probably in large part the product of the diversion of most of the lucrative long distance trade that passed along the Swahili coast into European hands.42 Because the town became relatively insignificant, and was so far from the centres of either Portuguese or Ottoman power, however, it seems likely that the city was never really fully under the control of either empire. This created the conditions in which the rising regional power of Zanzibar – part of a seaborne state that also incorporated Muscat and Oman – was able to lodge its own claims to suzerainty over the port.
Two key dates in this regard were 1758, when Barawa first came into the orbit of the sultans of Zanzibar,43 and 1840, when it was sacked by an African army from Bardera – a neighbouring Somali sultanate based in a town best known nowadays for producing onions.44 In between these dates, Barawa seems to have been pushed and pulled in several different directions by the shifting balance of power in the region. It had a Zanzibarian governor and a Zanzibiarian garrison.45 But, although it is stated to have regularly paid tribute to Zanzibar, it attempted to wrest its way free of the Omani orbit during the 1840s by despatching deliberately provocative “gifts” consisting solely of weapons of war – a mail coat, gunpowder and musket balls.46 There is also a reference to its paying off the Portuguese with a fairly token tribute payment worth £20 a year. This would be remarkable if true, since the Portuguese had exerted practically no influence over the Somali coast since 1698.47
Our last glimpse of the old town comes from the writings of a French naval captain, Charles Guillain, who was sent to the Horn of Africa in the mid-1840s to improve French influence in the region. Guillain’s lengthy cruise not only took him to Barawa – he is mainly interested in offering a detailed breakdown of the contemporary import-export trade – but also allowed him to build up a detailed knowledge of local power politics. Among other things, he noted the influence that the tribes of the Somali hinterland were able to exert over the port.
According to Guillain, in the decades leading up to Barawa’s incorporation into Italy’s ramshackle overseas empire, the rulers of the town were still struggling to navigate – as they must have done for centuries – the safest path between the competing demands of local strongmen, meaning the most powerful of the tribal chiefs of the interior; the Zanzibarian governor; and the Sultan of Zanzibar.48
The sources and their problems
With this background sketched in, we can turn to the specifics of your query – the governance of Barawa and the sources that can tell us about the ways in which it was organised. These are so scanty that it is actually usual to discuss governance on the Swahili coast as a whole, as though what happened in one if its city-states can tell us something about how things worked in another – and all too tempting to look at the tiny collection of information that we have available for the whole of the – 2,000-mile-long – littoral across almost a millennium and assume that if things worked in such-and-such a way in Town “A” in 1300, then they probably worked in much the same way in Town “B” in 1840. The reality is that town “B” was probably a thousand miles away from “A”, had a different ethnic mix and a different relationship with its hinterland, and also faced a unique set of challenges from the major imperial powers of the period. It’s inherently risky to draw broad or firm conclusions from static models that, when inspected, turn out to be constructed from scanty, and often late, source material.
Very broadly, however, we need first to grasp that there were many different “levels” of power involved in the politics of the Swahili coast. At minimum, we know that these included
Relations between the different tribes represented in the towns along the coast
Relations between the different classes who made up the population of the towns
Relations between the secular and religious leaders of the towns
Relations between the elders of the towns and the local rulers, or strongmen, or regional powers who wanted to extract tribute, and frequently an acknowledgement of suzerainty, from them
This recognition has some significant implications for any attempt to label Barawa “a republic”, since even if we could prove that the town had an elected, collective leadership, that is hardly the same thing as showing that this leadership was unchallenged or free to act as it saw fit, even at the height of the city’s power. To make matters worse, the truth is that we simply do not have a sufficient wealth of sources to know for sure exactly how these different levels interacted with each other over time. The information that we have gives us little more than snapshots, taken more or less at random, and over several centuries.
Many of the most useful, and most neutral, accounts of the Swahili coast have been written by archaeologists. Unfortunately, these are generally of very little help when it comes to understanding local politics. The sources that do offer the information that we need fall broadly into three categories, which are
Accounts compiled by travellers and geographers. These date back further than any other sources that we have, but many are fanciful and based on little more than hearsay. Many apparently useful accounts, such as those written by Chinese who served Zheng He, are not actually first hand. Even those travellers who we can be fairly certain did visit the region – the Moroccan traveller Ibn Battuta is by far the best known – spent only a little time there, and usually in ports other than Barawa.
Swahili chronicles. There are several, including not only the Kilwa Chronicle but the Chronicle of Pate. However, they are predominantly concerned with establishing pedigrees, and the texts that have come down to us are very late versions of what is often orally transmitted folklore, and are of uncertain provenance.
European accounts. These cover the period from 1500 and several are first hand accounts by sailors (Portuguese, British and French) who actually did call at Barawa. Unfortunately, most spent little time in the region, and their descriptions of the political structures of the cities of the Swahili coast tend to be superficial at best, and often actively misleading.
As I pointed out above, we really only have a small handful of references that tell us anything about the way in which Barawa was governed for the whole of the period from 1100 to 1840. Since almost everything that I will say about the town’s “republic” depends on these, it’s well worth setting them all out before we take things any further.
The earliest of these sources is the writings of Muhammed al-Idrisi (1100-1165), an Arab geographer and traveller who lived much of his life at the court of the Norman kings of Sicily. His Kitab Ruyar, commissioned by Roger II and completed in 1154, mentions Barawa as a town ruled by “pagans” who worshipped standing stones smeared with fish oil.49
Next, we have the evidence of Joao de Baros, a highly-respected contemporary historian who was the principal chronicler of the first years of Portugal’s Asian empire. His First Decade of Asia, based extensively on contemporary journals and letters found in the Portuguese archives, appeared in 1552. After giving the Swahili Coast foundation myth referred to above, he adds two passages on Barawa:
The first settlement they made in this land of Ajan [that is, Zanj, the name then given to the coast and peoples of southern Somalia, Kenya and northern Tanzania] was the city of Mogadishu, and the next at Brava, which even at the present time is governed by twelve chiefs in the manner of a republic, and they are descendants of the seven brothers.50
The second passage summarises events of 1503, and discusses the experiences of Captain Ruy Lourenço, who was patrolling off the coast of Mombasa when
it happened that at different times he captured two ships and three zambucos [small, fast ships most often used in the Islamic slave trade], in which were twelve Moors who were some of the chief noblemen of the town of Brava… As this town is governed by a corporation, these twelve moors being the principal heads of government, they not only paid ransom for themselves and one of the captured ships, saying that it belonged to the town, but in the name of the said town they made it a tributary of the King of Portugal, paying a tribute of five hundred miticals [an Arab measure of gold dust] of gold per annum, and asked for a flag that they might navigate in safety as vassals of the king, which Ruy Lourenço gave them with good will.
The principal reason why these Moors had immediately made themselves vassals was because they were expecting to be followed by a very rich ship, the property of Brava, in which each of them had a large quantity of merchandise. As soon as the ship arrived, Ruy Lourenço understood this prudent conduct, and delivered it over to them entirely and freely, having ascertained that it was theirs, which proceeding filled them with astonishment, seeing that the riches of the ship did not arouse the covetousness of our men because of the protection they had promised them, although they comprehended the precautions that had been employed to save it.51
Another very helpful description – albeit one of no more than 10 lines, in the printed edition – is supplied by the Portuguese Duarte Barbosa (1480-1521), who visited the Swahili coast in about 1514, and compiled a description, The Book of Duarte Barbosa, which describes the towns he saw. We have no information about how the entries in this itinerary were compiled, or how much was based on eyewitness evidence. Thus, while there is no obvious reason to doubt that Barbosa was at least present in the area at the time, and in a good position to collect reasonably reliable information, we cannot be at all certain that he was ever actually in Barawa. Barbosa describes the city as
a town of the Moors, well walled, and built of good houses of stone and whitewash… It has not got a king; it is governed by its elders, they being honoured and respectable persons. It is a place of trade, which has already been destroyed by the Portuguese, with great slaughter of the inhabitants, of whom many were made captives, and great riches in gold, silver, and other merchandise were taken here, and those who escaped fled into the country, and after the place was destroyed they returned to people it.52
We then have a significant gap in the record, which is ended only with the appearance of the French naval officer Charles Guillain in Barawa in 1846-47. His later account of this voyage, published a decade later, was based on a fairly lengthy stay in the vicinity, and as such is worth quoting at length, even though it is so late:
The population of Brava reaches about 5,000, including slaves. It is made up of Somalis and descendants of the Arabs. The Somali are divided into five distinct tribes – the Dafaradi, the Ouarileh, the Hhadjoua, the Dakhetera and the Gougïal [all actually sub-clans of the Tunni]; the descendants of the Arabs are made up of two – the Bidda [Barawi] and the Hhatt’emia [Hatimi]. During our stay in Brava, the sheikhs of these tribes were, in the order I just listed them, Sheikh Hhadi-Aouïça, Mehadi-Heraou, Adballah-Abdi, M’hammed-Otsman, Ali-ben-Ibrahim, for the Somalis; and for the Arabs, Déra-ben-Omar and Sheikh Abouki. These sheikhs all enjoyed an equal authority on the council.
So far so good – but Guillain then throws a rather enormous spanner into the works with a quite remarkable passage that reads almost as if it was excerpted from James Frazer’s Golden Bough, then still 35 years from seeing publication:
Next to this quasi-republican government, it seems there is a species of small-scale monarch. He is elected for seven years; the election takes place in Brava, and is then proclaimed from the coast into the interior. I was seriously assured that he is put to death at the end of the seventh year; but as it seemed to me ridiculous that there would be people willing to accept the title of sultan with such prospects, I believe it is a canard of Idrisi’s concerning the inhabitants of Brava.
The present incumbent lives in this land and is called Ali Hap’hénou; they told me of his power, [but] I do not believe that Youceuf [the most powerful tribal leader in Barawa’s hinterland] leaves him much to do in the interior; as for the city, it is certain that power is exercised by the sheikhs.
Guillain concludes his passage with some rather heavy-handed humour:
One of the most curious peculiarities of what some geographers call the Republic of Brava is its multiplicity of sovereigns. There are three that I could mention. First Sultan Ali Hap’hénou; then Youceuf, who the people of Brava have good reason to look on as their lord and master; and finally Saîd [Seyyid Said, better known as Said b Sultan, the sultan of Zanzibar, Muscat and Oman], who, again, took all the authority he was allowed to take.53
Discussion of the primary sources
At first glance, then, we appear to have recovered a set of primary sources that are in broad agreement with each other and which cover the whole period from the first European contact with Barawa in 1503 all the way to the 1840s. These sources describe a city-state that “does not have a king”, but is governed by a number of “elders” or “sheikhs” who all have “equal authority” on a “council” – and it’s easy to see how Barawa could have come to be thought of as a “republic” in these circumstances. Several of the historians of the East African littoral actually use the term, among them Nurse and Spear, who suggest that the “underlying political structure” along much of the Swahili coast was the “oligarchic republic.”54
We need to note four things here, however.
The first is that neither De Baraos, nor Barbosa, nor Guillain actually tell us that the port was a republic; De Baraos says it is governed “in the manner of a republic” and Guillain – the only one of the three witnesses who actually spent significant time in Barawa – is careful to call the place a “quasi-republic”: that is, a state that seems rather like a republic, but which isn’t. In other words, both writers are introducing the idea of a republic as a comparison in order to explain the city’s system of governance to readers familiar with European republics such as Venice, but unfamiliar with the ways of the Swahili coast. Moreover, De Baros is careful to add that membership of the council is open only to descendants of the original – Shirazi – inhabitants of Barawa. As such, it would seem that it was also to a significant degree hereditary.
Alessandra Vianello, who lived in Barawa for two decades in the 1990s and early 2000s, and is the only outside scholar who has ever actually written about the town at any length, is likewise careful to be precise with her description, and avoids suggesting that it was ever actually a republic:
Brava… was one among those Swahili centres where internal administration had always remained in the hands of a council of elders, without ever having individual rulers.55
The second point to bear in mind is that, as soon as we start digging beneath the surface, we find evidence of the hidden complexities and layers that I outlined above. Al-Idrisi describes a state that is still run by pagans at a time when we know that Barawa had already acquired its Friday Mosque; if his description (which may well have reached us via a fairly long chain of informants) can be trusted at all, it suggests – quite plausibly, I think – that in this very early period the city had more than one religious authority, and hence very possibly no single locus of power. Barbosa describes a town left in turmoil by its sack by the newly-arrived Portuguese. And Guillain explains that Barawa’s council has to deal with several competing would-be power-brokers, one actually based in the port, one in the hinterland surrounding it, and the third on an island a thousand miles to the south.
A third point is that we have some evidence, even in this small selection of sources, that the government of Barawa was far from unchanging in this period. Pagan stone-worshippers give way to Muslim tribal elders; these “elders” – a description that, in this place and at this time, surely refers to religious leaders – are conflated with “noblemen” who apparently wield some secular power; the number of seats on the town council shifts from 12 to seven; the people of the hinterland begin to exert political power within the walls of the port (so that the all-“Shirazi” council described by De Baraos in the 16th century turns into the council dominated by Swahili-speaking Somali clans 400 years later); and an odd sort of sultanate apparently emerges. And the white-haired, land-based Islamic elders described by Barbosa and Guillain seem a pretty poor sort of fit with the wily seagoing merchant consortium encountered by Ruy Lourenço.
This last dichotomy is perhaps the most startling of all, since Ruy Lourenço met his group of Barawani elders in 1503, while Barbosa was on the Swahili coast a mere seven years later. Islam has always been more respectful of commerce than most other religions, and indeed merchant capital played an important part in the rise of the religion.56 But, even so, it seems at the very least unlikely that these two men were encountering the same group of rulers.
To go further than this, we need to consider a fourth point, which is that we do have other evidence, from other places up and down the Swahili coast, to help us understand how Barawa’s sister city-states were run. Potentially dangerous though it is to draw too many comparison and links between what were often very different polities, it can be illuminating to look in more detail at this set of evidence, and it is to the city-states surrounding Barawa that we now turn.
Governance elsewhere on the Swahili coast
To the Portuguese, newly arrived on the east African littoral, the Swahili city-states were a type of polity whose governance – however superficially exotic – could be explained in perfectly familiar terms. Mogadishu had a “king”;57Mombasa had “a king” who was also “a Moor”, meaning a Muslim,58 just as “a Moor ruled” in Kilwa, further down the coast.59 Malindi was ruled by a “wealthy sultan,”60 Sofala by a “king”,61 and Zanzibar by a “lord of the land.”62
Even the slightest actual acquaintance with these states, however, very rapidly introduced complications. Thus the rulers of Kilwa’s dynasty of hereditary sultans turn out to be advised by a council representing the main clans on the island,63and this council, in turn, was led by one designated “chief man”.64 Those who were more fully acquainted with existing forms of Islamic rule spotted additional cogs in what were often actually quite complex governmental machines. Thus, a century and a half before the Portuguese appeared, when the Swahili coast was at its height, it was visited by Ibn Battuta – a Moroccan, a vastly experienced traveller, and also an Islamic legal scholar – who spent some time in Mogadishu and noted that its ruler was supported by groups of clerics, elders and military commanders, and had an elaborate “royal court”.65
Present-day scholars continue to debate how government in the Swahili city-states actually worked. The detailed examination of governance offered by Sinclair and Hakansson (which I should point out is far from uncontested) builds on the earlier work of Allen to break down these various forms of government into two broad types, the “Shirazi model of domination” and the “Arab-Wangwana mode of domination” (in which “wangwana” or “waungwana” is an Arabic term meaning free or nobly born). The former draws on African ideas – though it also borrows the old legend of a founding dynasty of Persian migrants from Shiraz to lend legitimacy to its rulers. This model, which is also known as the jumbesystem, places power in the hands of a single overall leader (jumbe) but supports him with a wide variety of officials, some of whom have advisory powers, while others are responsible for raising and commanding troops, and others again are purely ceremonial. The sultans who ruled under the Shirazi model generally had some hereditary claim to lead, but their accession was subject to “a process of acceptance” that was not quite so clear cut as an actual election; Sinclair and Hakansson describe it as “a combination of hereditary and consensus.” For Allen, the Shirazi model was quasi-feudal and was erected on a hierarchical system of ranked titles, each of which came with sumptuary, economic and ritual privileges attached.66
In this view, the Shiarzi model was the dominant one along the Swahili coast before the arrival of the Portuguese, and survived the considerable shock of the Europeans’ appearance, only to be replaced by the “Arab-Wangwana model” during the ascendancy of the sultans of Zanzibar during the eighteenth century. In this new model, the overt and hierarchical ranking of people that had existed under the Shirazi model became anathema, and significant power devolved into the hands of
a system of corporate patrician groups of equals based on patrilineal descent. However… clans and lineages were ranked according to prestige and individuals according to descent seniority.67
In Allen’s view, the “Arab-Wangwana model” was the product of the Ibadite Islam practised in Oman, “which abhors overt ranking”, and it produced the stone towns of the Swahili coast; these consisted of homes that “represented the wealth and power of the patrician descent groups.” Under this form of governance, even the sultan was merely a first among equals.68
As Sinclair and Hakansson very reasonably point out, these models – while conceptually useful – are too static to apply to the shifting circumstances of the Swahili coast over nearly a thousand years; in addition, they certainly break down when it comes to the histories of ports such as Barawa and Mogadishu, which were reported to have elements of the Wangwana model as early as the 12th or 13th centuries, well before the shock caused by the Portuguese or the arrival of Omani power in the region.69 Nonetheless, understanding the ways in which the Wangwana model of governance actually worked offers considerable insights into the government of Barawa, and allows us to identify several significant “nodes” that appear to match the descriptions that European observers have left us of the Somali port. Sinclair and Hakansson describe the 18th and early 19th century government of Mombasa in this way:
Mombasa was organised into two sets of waungwana, free-born or noble, clan alliances, usually called the three and nine “tribes” or “nations” which appointed members to a council with great power over political affairs and over the sultan or governor as well. In Mombasa, the Omani family Mazuri ruled between the beginning of the 1700s until 1836, when they were overthrown by the Omani sultanate of Zanibar. The Mazuri governors seem to have been in the same position as earlier Swahili “kings”, i.e. dependent on the powerful descent groups, each with their appointed leaders. Although frequently at loggerheads, the Mombasa waungwana elected a chief as leader, and the British commandant of Mombasa between 1824 and 1826, Lieutenant Emery, observed when meeting with the Mazuri leaders [that] they had to wait for the chief, “without whose sanctions nothing could be finally adjusted.”
The wangwauna clans were ranked according to a system of prestige and representation which was quite fluid, and each clan alliance contained both wealthy merchants and regular farmers. While members of different clans were appointed to different government positions by the sultan or governor, few specialised political and economic institutions seem to have existed. Indeed, matters of taxation, trade, justice, and military organisation were in the hands of the clans. Subclans, clans, and clan alliances were the backbone of the Swahili states, which were organized into kin groupings reflected in ward organisation. For example, the custom dues from the island of Pemba, a dominion of Mombasa, were in the hands of the “Three Tribes” clan alliance. Similarly, military mobilisation and deployment was not only dependent on the clans but also on their “Nyika” allies in the hinterland of Mombasa.
The tension between collective clan-based government and hierarchical kingship seems to permeate historical and archaeological analyses of the coastal polities.70
Here, then, is a description of a model of government that matches what we hear of Barawa – with its councils of elders, its seven distinct tribal groupings (two “Arab” and five “Swahili”), its notable absence of departments of government, and its fractious relations with the more powerful and more warlike tribal groupings of its hinterland, and which falls down only in terms of its periodisation – the “council of elders” reported from Barawa was apparently in existence about two hundred years before the Omanis came to dominate the Swahili coast. This need not, however, be an insuperable problem; the location of the port – on the Somali coast, much closer to Arab influences than most of the other city-states of the Swahili littoral – suggests that it must have had extensive contacts with Oman from an early date, as, in fact, the story of the Barawan delegation that visited China suggests; the merchants of the port are supposed to have encountered Zheng He’s fleet while visiting Hormuz.71 Ibadi Islam, moreover, was already dominant in Oman by the time that Barawa emerged as an Islamic state.72 So perhaps it was natural for the waungwana model of government to make inroads on the Somali coast from quite an early period.
Lapidus summarises the situation by saying that
little is known of the political systems of these towns, but it may be surmised that they were composed of lineages. Each town may have had a council of clan chiefs, although such councils were probably superseded by a dominant lineage or by an outside Arab or Persian chief who became ruler and mediator among the local clans. The rulers were legitimised both in terms of hereditary succession and of African symbols.73
Given everything that we have learned so far, this makes a considerable amount of sense. Nonetheless, before trying to draw the various parts of this enquiry together in a general conclusion, it’s worth mentioning that we do have more detailed (albeit very late) accounts of at least one Swahili polity that existed during this period and which the ethnographer AHJ Prins identified as “a republic”, and his evidence also opens up some unexpected windows on the position in Barawa.74
Prins’s “republic” is Lamu, another island port located less than 10 miles south-east of Pate on what is now the coast of Kenya. Even at its peak, the town controlled no more than about 140 square miles of territory in its hinterland, but it did boast plenty of fresh water and one of the best deep-water, all-weather ports on its stretch of coast. Like Barawa, it also benefitted from being contested, in this case between neighbouring Pate and the Omani sultans of Zanzibar, who established a small garrison in the port in 1813.75 Since the Omanis were relatively powerful, but distant, while Pate was weak, but very close, the result (as Blanton and Fargher explain it) was the hesitant flowering of a state that was never fully independent, but which nevertheless retained significant real control over its affairs.76
Lamu, like Pate and like most other Swahili maritime towns, was dominated by a small group of tribes, but the key to its system of government – at least in the 19th century, which is the only period for which we have good evidence – was that the balance of power in the port was uniquely delicate. Thus, while Pate was dominated throughout the eighteenth century by the Nabahani clan, from whose ranks a line of sultans was chosen, Lamu (so Ylvisaker explains), was divided into two halves called Zaina and Suudi – the former of which claimed precedence because it was closer to Mecca, while the latter did so on the grounds that its territory incorporated the town’s economically vital port.
All of the noble families were affiliated with one or the other. The halves elected leaders from the heads of their constituent families and, alternately, the elected leaders from the two sections ruled the whole town for four-year periods. Even though the elders of the leading families acted as advisers to the mngwana wa yumbe, as the ruler was called, this form of government tended towards division. That the military regiments were also drawn from the two halves did not lessen this tendency.77
Here, too, then, we can hear echoes of the situation in Barawa, with its council divided between elders who claimed Arab descent, and those who were Swahili, and its “elections” – a word that carries with it quite significant republican baggage, but which we surely need to understand, rather, as a process of selection via discussion and consensus.
Perhaps the most significant parallel between Lamu and Barawa, though – certainly from our perspective – is that both states enjoyed fairly lengthy periods of peace and stability in the 18th and early 19th centuries. In the case of Barawa, Vianella says,
the different ethnic groups living in Brava … achieved a remarkable balance of power and a community of interests that led to a sustained peaceful coexistence. Inter-clan clashes were unheard of in Brava during the whole nineteenth century, as witnessed by all the foreigners who visited the town, for whom the situation appeared so exceptional in the Benadir [south Somali coast] context of the time as to warrant particular remarks. Law and order was also maintained in Brava by checking the daily influx of people from the countryside at the town gates, where they had to leave their weapons until the time they left in the evening, after they had sold their goods or transacted their business.78
Perhaps it is here, then – in this delicate stability that nonetheless succeeded in producing an enduing peace – that we can root Barawa’s unusual, if not quite unique, system of government: one that attained a state of equilibrium based on a combination of consensus backed by the influence that tribal elders had over their tribes without requiring a local sultan to take charge and lead the state against its enemies.
I believe that this is the best explanation for the Barawa described by Guillain – at least if the town is stripped of the bizarre and impotent seven-year “sultan” that the French naval captain describes – particularly if we conclude that it was, perhaps, the razing of the city by the forces of a neighbouring town in 1840 that began the process of destabilisation and the rise in the influence of the heavily-armed tribes of the hinterland that Guillain witnessed.
This does not, admittedly, explain why we have no references to Barawa (apparently uniquely among all the city-states of the Swahili coast) having ever had a genuinely influential sultan at any time in its history, nor how a consular form of government could have survived the seismic impact of the sack of the city by the Portuguese in 1506-07 apparently unscathed. That is why I draw attention to the considerable gap in our records of the city. The Portuguese records of Barawa’s government date to the period before, and immediately after, the sack; we then have no real idea of how the city was governed until the peaceful days of the early 19th century.
It does seem possible that the port underwent changes of government during this period, and that perhaps we simply have no record of the rise and fall of one or more sultans in the city who based their claims to legitimacy at least in part on military prowess. We may never know the solution to this problem, but, whatever the answer is, we know enough, now, about Barawa to realise that even though the city-state was never in any real sense a “republic”, it did have a rather remarkable, very unusual – and apparently effective – government for much of the time that it existed as an independent polity.
Cerulli, Somalia: Scritti Vari Editi ed Inediti, I, 37. It’s worth noting that we have no photograph of this inscription, and its content has never been verified. Cerulli himself never visited Barawa in more than two decades in Somalia (an indication of the town’s remoteness and perceived unimportance nowadays), and had his information from a local correspondent.
Omar, The Scramble in the Horn of Africa p.20.
Wyatt, The Blacks of Premodern China pp.97-8; Ma Huan, The Overall Survey of the Ocean’s Shores pp.18-19
Barbosa, A Description of the Coasts of East Africa and Malabar (London, 1866)
Guillain, Documents sur l’histoire, la géographie et le commerce de L’Afrique Orientale, II, 170-1.
Lewis, “The concept of an Islamic republic,” pp.1-5.
Jama, The Origins and Development of Mogadishu, p.87.
Sinclair and Hakansson, A Comparative Study of Thirty City-State Cultures p.463.
Horton and Mudida, “Exploitation of marine resources” pp.673- 75; Insoll, The Archaeology of Islam in Sub-Saharan Africa pp.154-55.
Sinclair and Hakansson, op.cit. p.473.
Abu-Lughod, Before European Hegemony p.34.
Nurse & Spear, The Swahili p.85.
Vianello, “Nineteenth and twentieth century Brava,” p.51.
Ibid p.50. But see also Jama, op.cit. pp.41-48. Jama notes a core problem for anyone with an interest in medieval Barawa: a dynamic local environment has left very few traces of the old port, and “most of its old buildings are now buried underneath deposits up to 6 m deep.”
Freeman-Grenville, The East African Coast: Select Documents p.34; Chittick, Kilwa I, 14.
Chittick, “Kilwa and the Arabic settling of the East African Coast,” p.251.
Freeman-Grenville, op.cit. pp.34, 89.
Allen, “The ‘Shirazi’ problem in East African coastal history,” p.183.
Theal, Records of South-Eastern Africa VI, 240.
Freeman-Grenville, The East African Coast: Select Documents pp.35-36.
Chittick, “Medieval Mogadishu,” p.51.
Hrbek, Africa from the Seventh to the Eleventh Century, p.292.
Pouwels, Horn and Crescent p.214.
Allen, Swahili Origins, pp.114-15.
Allen, “Shirazi problem,” p.183.
Allen, Swahili Origins, p.115.
Allen, “Shirazi problem,” pp.183-85; Wynne-Jones, A Material Culture p.370.
Vianello, op.cit. p.51.
Lewis, “Somali Conquest of the Horn of Africa,” p.218
Cerulli, op.cit. I, 37. More work would need to be done by specialists in the region to confirm the ethnicity of this person. Cerulli comments: “I was unable to go personally to Brava to carry out direct research on the remains of the Arab medieval antiquities that undoubtedly exist there. A Bravanese … sent me the copy of another (I believe funerary) inscription, which reads thus: Hajj Shanid, son of Abu Bakr, son of Umar, son of Uthman, son of Hasan, son of Ali, son of Abu Bakr; and he passed into that (?) tomb in the year 498, the month being Rabi’ al Akhir.” The lineage sounds distinctively Arabic, but Nurse, in his Bajuni Database, adds that the correct transliteration of the name “Shanid” is Chande, which is Swahili, and is “written as is usual for Swahili/Chimiini with Arabic letters shin-alef-nun-dal).” Perhaps this is an example of an Arab immigrant family integrating with the local Bantu community?
Sinclair and Hakansson, Comparative Study p.467; Nurse & Spear, The Swahili p.16.
Trimingham, Islam in East Africa p.13.
Park, Mapping the Chinese and Islamic Worlds p.176.
Quoted in Wyatt, The Blacks of Premodern China, pp.103-04.
D’Alòs-Moner, “Conquistadores, Mercenaries, and Missionaries,” p.8.
Allen, Swahili Origins, pp.148, 160.
Casale, The Ottoman Age of Exploration pp.152-80.
Barendse, The Arabian Seas, pp.15-17.
Coquery-Vidrovitch, The History of African Cities South of the Sahara, p.198.
Mukhtar, Historical Dictionary of Somalia p.51.
Guillian, Documents, II, 38.
Vianello, op.cit. pp.57, 59.
Guillian, op.cit. II, 569.
Brooks & Marshall, New Universal Gazetteer, p.121; Trimingham, Islam in East Africa p.20.
Guillian, op.cit. II, 571.
Allen, Swahili Origins, p.71; Jama, Origins and Development of Mogadishu p.37; Freeman-Grenville, East African Coastp.87; Trimingham, op.cit. p.5. We should note that al-Idrisi’s account does not mention “Barawa” or “Brava” – it describes a town that he calls “Bedouna, at the extremity of the country of the kaffirs”. It is usually assumed that his description actually refers to Barawa, but it would be dangerous to assume that this is absolutely confirmed.
Theal, Records, VI, 233.
Barbosa, A Description of the Coasts of East Africa, p.15.
Guillian, op.cit. II, 570-571.
Nurse & Spear, op.cit. p.85.
Vianello, op.cit. p.52.
Ibrahim, Merchant Capital, pp.76-125.
Freeman-Grenville, East African Coast p.33.
Kusimba, Rise and Fall of the Swahili States p.93.
Corea, The Three Voyages of Vasco da Gama, p.292.
Nurse & Spear, op.cit. p.93.
Kusimba, Rise and Fall p.167.
Freeman-Grenville, East African Coast p.76.
Corea, op.cit. p.293.
Freeman-Grenville, East African Coast pp.28,30.
Sinclair and Hakansson, op.cit. pp.468-69.
Wyatt, op.cit. p.97.
Staples, “Oman and Islamic maritime networks,” pp.81-115.
Lapidus, History of Islamic Societies, p.481.
Prins, The Swahili-speaking peoples of Zanzibar and the East African Coast, p.48.
Bhacker, Trade and Empire in Muscat and Zanzibar, pp.82-83.
Blanton & Fargher, Collective Action in the Formation of Pre-Modern States pp.48.
Ylvisaker, Lamu in the Nineteenth Century p.67.
Vianello, op.cit. pp.53-54.
Janet Abu-Lughod, Before European Hegemony: The World System A.D. 1250-1350 (New York, 1989)
Andreu Martínez d’Alòs-Moner, “Conquistadores, Mercenaries, and Missionaries: The Failed Portuguese Dominion of the Red Sea,” North-East African Studies 12 (2012)
J. de V. Allen, “The ‘Shirazi’ problem in East African coastal history,” Paideuma: Mitteilungen zur Kulturkunde 28 (1982)
Duarte Barbosa, A Description of the Coasts of East Africa and Malabar (London, 1866)
Rene J. Barendse, The Arabian Seas: The Indian Ocean World of the Seventeenth Century (London, 2002)
M. Reda Bhacker, Trade and Empire in Muscat and Zanzibar: The Roots of British Domination (London, 1994)
Richard Blanton & Lane Fargher, Collective Action in the Formation of Pre-Modern States (New York, 2008)
Richard Brookes & John Marshall, A New Universal Gazetteer: Containing a Description of the Principal Nations of the Known World (Philadelphia, 1840)
Giancarlo Casale, The Ottoman Age of Exploration (Oxford, 2010)
Enrico Cerulli, Somalia: Scritti Vari Editi ed Inediti (Rome, 3 vols, 1957-64)
Neville Chittick, “The ‘Shirazi’ colonization of East Africa,” Journal of African History 6 (1965)
_______________, Kilwa: an Islamic Trading City on the East African Coast (Nairobi, 2 vols, 1974)
_______________, “Medieval Mogadishu,” Paideuma: Mitteilungen zur Kulturkunde 28 (1982)
Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch, The History of African Cities South of the Sahara (Princeton, 2005)
Gaspar Corea, The Three Voyages of Vasco da Gama (London, 1862)
G.S.P. Freeman-Grenville, The East African Coast: Select Documents (Oxford, 1962)
Charles Guillain, Documents sur l’histoire, la géographie et le commerce de L’Afrique Orientale, vol.2 (Paris, 3 vols, 1856-57)
Mark Horton and Nina Mudida, “Exploitation of marine resources: evidence for the origin of the Swahili comunities of East Africa,” in Thurston Shaw et al (eds), The Archaeology of Africa: Food, Metals and Towns (Abingdon, 1993)
I. Hrbek, Africa from the Seventh to the Eleventh Century (London, 1992)
Mohammed Ibrahim, Merchant Capital and Islam (Austin, 1990)
Timothy Insoll, The Archaeology of Islam in Sub-Saharan Africa (Cambridge, 2003)
Ahmed Dualeh Jama, The Origins and Development of Mogadishu AD 1000 to 1850: A Study of the Urban Growth Along the Benadir Coast of Southern Somalia (Uppsala, 1996)
Chapurukha M. Kusimba, The Rise and Fall of Swahili States (Walnut Creek, 1999)
Ira M. Lapidus, A History of Islamic Societies (Cambridge, 1988)
Bernard Lewis, “The concept of an Arab republic,” Die Welt des Islams, NS 4 (1955)
I.M. Lewis, “The Somali conquest of the Horn of Africa,” Journal of African History 1 (1960)
Ma Huan, The Overall Survey of the Ocean’s Shores (trans. JVG Mills) (Cambridge, 1970)
Mohamed Haji Mukhtar, Historical Dictionary of Somalia (Lanham, 1975)
Derek Nurse & Thomas Spear, The Swahili: Reconstructing the History and Language of an African Society, 800-1500(Philadelphia, 1986)
Hyunhee Park, Mapping the Chinese and Islamic Worlds: Cross-Cultural Exchange in Pre-modern Asia (Cambridge, 2012)
Randall L. Pouwels, Horn and Crescent: Cultural Change and Traditional Islam on the East African Coast, 800-1900(Cambridge, 1987)
A.H.J. Prins, The Swahili-speaking peoples of Zanzibar and the East African Coast: (Arabs, Shirazi and Swahili) (London, 1961)
Paul J.J. Sinclair and Thomas Hakansson, “The Swahili city-state culture,” in Mogens Herman Hansen (ed.), A Comparative Study of Thirty City-State Cultures (Copenhagen, 2000)
Eric Staples, “Oman and Islamic maritime networks (632-1507 CE),” in Abdulrahman al-Salimi and Eric Staples (eds.), Omani Maritime History (Hildesheim, 2017)
George Theal, Records of South-Eastern Africa, Collected in Various Libraries and Archive Departments in Europe (Cape Town, 9 vols, 1898-1903)
John Trimingham, Islam in East Africa (Oxford, 1964)
Alessandra Vienello, “Nineteenth and twentieth century Brava: a Swahili cultural enclave in a Somali context,” in Francesca Declich (ed.), Translocal Connections Across the Indian Ocean (Leiden, 2018)
Don J. Wyatt, The Blacks of Premodern China (Pennsylvania, 2010)
Stephanie Wynne-Jones, A Material Culture: Consumption and Materiality on the Coast of Precolonial East Africa (Oxford, 2016)
Marguerite Ylvisaker, Lamu in the Nineteenth Century: Land, Trade, and Politics (Boston, 1979)
Q: How did the general public in England regard Halley’s Comet in 1066? Was universally seen as an ill portent?
A: Sadly, sources that tell us what the man on Watling Street thought about anything in 1066 are almost entirely lacking; the opinions of the common freeman, serf or slave were of no interest to the people who actually kept the records, monks.
But, with that said, we do have several more or less contemporary sources for what went on in 1066. On the English side of things, the main one was the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, kept in seven somewhat different versions in various monasteries up and down the country; there is also the Vita Ædwardi Regis (1065-67). On the Norman side there is the chronicle of William of Poitiers (c.1071-77) (which, like the Vita Ædwardi, doesn’t actually mention the comet) and that of William of Jumieges (1071), which does, together with the Carmen de Hastingæ Proelio, or Song of the Battle of Hastings (1067), a long poem usually attributed to Guy, the French (but not Norman) Bishop of Amiens.
We can usefully begin with the ASC, which covers the period from the mid-fifth century to the mid-twelfth century, albeit not always contemporaneously and not always in much detail. The Chronicle mentions a total of 11 different comets, including the appearance of Halley’s Comet in 1066, and the general impression given is that these celestial visitations are being mentioned because they were considered significant, usually as portents of some sort. That said, several of the mentions, mostly the early ones, are remarkably neutral. The earliest (which dates from before the Chronicle was actually kept up on a year-by-year basis) comes from 678 and says merely:
In this year appeared the star called comet, in August, and shone for three months each morning like a sunbeam.
Following that, there are reports of two comets being seen in 729, one in 892, another in 905 and a fourth in 995.
The 892 comet attracted a bit more notice from the chronicler:
And the same year after Easter during Rogation-tide or earlier appeared the star which in Latin is called ‘comet’, likewise men say in English that the comet is a long-haired star, because long beams of light shine there forth, sometimes on one side, some times on the other side.
But it was the comet of 975 that gives us our first real glimpse of what the Anglo-Saxons thought of such signs in the heavens:
And in this year Edward, Edgar’s son, succeeded to the kingdom, and soon at harvest time of the same year appeared that star known as Comet. And the next year came great hunger.
It’s interesting to note that this comet appeared sandwiched between two noteworthy events, the accession of a new king and a famine, and that the chronicler pretty clearly links it with the latter, not the former – it appeared at harvest time because it was a portent of something that was going to happen next harvest time. And that portent was a message for the country as a whole – not a warning aimed at a specific person, as the comet of 1066 would be interpreted (and as such celestial phenomena were classically interpreted in China, where they very much were seen as indicating the judgement of heaven on the performance of the then ruler).
So, a comet was not considered a commentary on events that had already happened, whether they were good or bad; rather, each was a foreshadowing of events still to come. And a comet could have a message meant to be understood by a whole nation, as well as being a warning or a judgement on a single person. For this last reason, we are justified in assuming that the everyday Anglo-Saxon would have been just as interested in the appearance of a comet, and in what that appearance might tell him or her, as a king would be.
We then come to the comet of April 1066. Of course 1066 was a very important year, and it’s not surprising that the ASC offers substantially more detailed coverage of events for this year than it had for others. Still, we have to note that it was compiled retrospectively – so we’re not reading speculation about the appearance of a comet that portended … something, but rather a post-hoc interpretation of what the comet’s appearance actually did mean, based on full knowledge of what happened next:
And Easter was on the fourteenth day before the Kalends of May. Then it happened that all through England such a sight in the heavens was seen as no man had seen before. Some men said that it was the star Comet, that some men call the long-haired star; it appeared on the even of Letania Maior, that is the eighth day before the Kalend of May, and so shone for all seven nights.
Although the ASC does not say so explicitly, it seems fairly clear this mention of the comet is made because of what happened in England later in the same year – the Norse and Norman invasions and the death of King Harold. And it also seems the duration of its appearance – for all seven days of the run up to the Kalends of May – was (then or afterwards) interpreted as an indication of the relative importance of what was going to happen – the comet was seen throughout the period leading up to the Kalends, so it portended something really significant.
As such, Halley’s comet appears to have been regarded as a very important omen of some very portentous happenings. But, of course, I myself am writing this in the full knowledge that it did indeed antedate a vastly important set of events – and it is possible, in fact, to glimpse a possible alternate meaning in the comet’s appearance in the skies. This is because the mention of the comet appears directly before a description of the appearance of Harold’s brother, Tostig, with a fleet off the Isle of Wight. Harold was able to deter a landing, and Tostig subsequently reappeared in the north of England in alliance with the King of Norway, leading an invasion force that the Saxons, under Harold, defeated at Stamford Bridge. Had events in 1066 developed differently, and had William never landed, or had the Saxons actually triumphed over him, it’s thus possible to imagine that our reading of the Chronicle might have changed, and that the comet might now be read as one that was considered by the Saxons to be an ill omen for Tostig, not for Harold.
The next description of a comet in the ASC comes from 1097, which was part way through the reign of the notoriously anti-clerical William Rufus. Again it consists of a fairly lengthy description of what was seen and when, but without any explicit commentary as to meaning:
Then after Michaelmas fourth day before the Nomen of October there appeared a rare star shining in the evening, and soon sinking into its setting. It was seen in the southwest, and the beam of light which stood out from it seemed very long, shining in the south east, nearly all week it appeared in this way. Many men supposed it was a comet.
However, the passage that follows on immediately from this one in the Chronicle gives us a pretty clear idea of what sort of bad omen the monk who wrote the passage thought this comet represented:
Soon after this, Anselm, archbishop of Canterbury, obtained permission from the king, though against his inclination, to leave the country and go over the sea, because it seemed to him that in this nation little was done according to right, or after his desires.
This flight took place in October 1097 and marked the start of a four-year exile for Anselm, which was ended only by Rufus’s death. During those years, the king seized the revenues of Canterbury and there was no archbishop of Canterbury in England – both of which would have been considered fairly major calamities by the monks of the time.
Based on all this (and on further references to comets in the Chronicle that occur in the years 1106, 1110 and 1114), we can say with some certainty that the English, in common with many other people during this period, saw comets, knew that what they were seeing were comets, and that these were a distinct sort of celestial phenomenon, and that they recorded them quite specifically as portents of ill-omen.
But that’s not quite the end of the story, because portents of all sorts have always been things that can be subjected to what we’d today call “spin” – they were as liable to be reinterpreted in ways that suited the dominant powers of the time as they were to be recorded as judgements on them. And this certainly happened in 1066, since the appearance of the comet was also noted on the Bayeux tapestry. Now, exactly what the tapestry says, what it means, who created it and even whether it is pro-Norman or pro-English is famously open to question. It’s fair to say, however, that the consensus is that the strong implication is given that the comet was a portent of ill-omen specifically for King Harold, who is presented as a faithless, oath-breaking king who deservedly loses his throne to Duke William. Indeed, as Lucien Musset points out,
the true purpose of the Tapestry has long been understood … it is clear that the central theme of the narrative is not the conquest of England… but the oath taken by King Harold on the relics contained in two caskets – an oath whose causes and circumstances are explained in detail… and whose eventual consequence was catastrophic defeat for the perjured Harold and his people at Hastings.
Cowdrey puts all this in context for us by observing that Harold is shown in the relevant panel of the tapestry sitting “in regality… but under the comet the emptiness of his power is manifest.” And Elizabeth Carson Pastan’s reassessment of the piece points out not only that the comet panel shows the “populace marvelling at a comet presaging his downfall” – implying that the concept of the comet-as-portent was widely understood and commonly applied during this period – but also that an attempt has been made to give the comet’s appearance added weight by fudging the question of precisely when it was seen. The tapestry places its appearance directly after Harold’s acclamation as king. In fact, Harold was crowned in January 1066, and the comet appeared in April. This rather fascinatingly suggests that the strength of a cometary portent was considered to be proportional to the directness of its association with events – that is, that the comet would have been considered a stronger portent of doom for Harold had it appeared at the time of his coronation than it would have been if it was seen mid-way through his short reign.
Of course, the Bayeux version of the story is also, potentially, capable of reinterpretation. It can be seen not only as presenting the comet as an ill-omen for Harold but also – implicitly at least – as a good omen for William. This same meaning is repeated in other continental sources relating to the Conquest. The most explicit appears in the Carmen de Hastingae Proelio, which actually moves the comet’s appearance to associate it directly with the Norman landing. The relevant passage reads:
And blazing from heaven the streaming hair of a comet proclaimed to the English foreordained destruction.
But, very similarly, William of Jumieges, who portrays Harold explicitly as a usurper (and indeed as a fratricide as well), not only suggests the comet was direct proof of God’s wrath at his presumption in seizing the English throne, but also suggests it had an explicitly predictive message. William is the only contemporary source to say as much, but he notes that the comet appeared with “a three-forked tail, remaining visible for fifteen days” – which, surely, is intended to be read as a prediction of 1066 as a year of three kings – Edward the Confessor, Harold, and William. And William adds a further note that suggests the appearance of such omens were the subject of common gossip at the time:
It portended, as many said, a change in some kingdom.
We have added one further bit of information here that is worthy of comment – because the comet appeared in the distant skies, it was associated with heaven. This helps us to understand why comets and other celestial phenomena were considered especially important portents. But all of this can be placed in a broader context, too, of course, one which shows belief in cometary portents as only part of a much broader set of beliefs in miracles and other signs of the intentions and the activities of God – you might be interested in Lapina’s book on the various miracles and portents associated with the First Crusade. Similarly, Dutton has a useful discussion which tells us something about the reasons why cometary portents were seen as uncertain and debatable: he mentions the ninth century monk Lupus of Ferrières, who received a letter from a fellow ecclesiastic observing that “concerning the comets that have been seen, it would seem that there is more to dread than to discuss,” and who sent a reply noting that the Bible makes no reference to comets at all, although pagan authorities such as Virgil invariably saw them as fearful portents of pestilence, famine or war. This suggests that contemporary ecclesiastics felt they had no reliable, sanctioned means of interpreting the meanings of comets.
So, to summarise, and in conclusion: while it’s certainly possible to suggest that comets were generally understood as portents of ill-omen in 1066, it’s certainly also the case that fixed meanings were only attached to them some time after the fact. Dutton, again, has useful commentary on this: when Halley’s comet appeared in the sky in 837, during the reign of the Carolingian emperor Louis the Pious, Louis
immediately called on one of his courtiers, the one popularly known to us as the Astronomer since, as he said of himself, he was reputed to know the stars. The Astronomer tried to buy some time, as even Louis realized, for a more cautious reading of the comet lest he rush to announce something precipitous and unfortunate. But Louis would not be put off, and so sent the Astronomer into an adjoining room (effectively, then, an observatory) to study the star that very night. The two of them had had such conversations before. “But I know,” said the Emperor (presumably of the tail of Halley’s), “that this is a sign of comets about which we have spoken before. Tell me what you think it portends!” Not what the comet was, but what would follow from it was Louis’s true concern.
When Halley’s comet appeared in April 1066, likewise, the people of England would have understood that something momentous was going to occur, but they would have had no idea what, exactly, would occur. It might have been another bad harvest. It might have been an epidemic, or some other natural calamity. It might have been a political or a military event. But while there may have been a few who suspected the comet’s message was aimed at King Harold, we have no evidence to suggest that the vast majority of Saxons, at this time, saw him as anything but a legitimate and duly consecrated monarch, nor any that the later Norman narrative of an oath-breaking usurper was circulating anywhere in England. For most Saxon observers, then – elites and common people alike – the question of what the comet portended would have been a matter for mere speculation prior to the events of October 1066.
H.E.J. Cowdrey, “Harold II and the Bayeux Tapestry: a critical introduction,” in Gale R. Owen-Crocker (ed.), King Harold II and the Bayeux Tapestry (2005); Paul Edward Dutton, Charlemagne’s Mustache: And Other Cultural Clusters of a Dark Age (2004); Elizabeth Lapina, Warfare and the Miraculous in the Chronicles of the First Crusade (2015); E.G. Mardon et al, “The eleven observations of comets between 678AD and 1114 AD recorded in the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle,” in Lunar & Planetary Institute, Asteroids, Comets and Meteors 1991 (1992); Lucien Musset, The Bayeux Tapestry (2002); Elizabeth Carson Pastan et al, The Bayeux Tapestry and Its Contexts: A Reassessment (2014).
Q: How did the sack of Guangzhou (Canton) in 879, at the end of the Tang dynasty, affect transoceanic trade between the Tang empire and Abbasid caliphate?
According to the Wikipedia page, between 120k-200k foreigners were robbed and killed there in 878. The Wikipedia page is very bare. It mentions a previous massacre of foreigners a hundred years before by pirates and then the fact that a rebel army again massacred the foreign merchants in the city.
I am just wondering if I could have a bit of background into the city, the regional issues, etc. Considering how closed off China has been, such a large foreign population seems even bigger. I’m guessing it was a trade port, but for what? And if it had been previously massacred within a hundred years, why did people come back and remain unprotected?
A: You’re asking about the sack of one of the most important cities in China, which took place in the middle of a rebellion that played a major part in shaping the history of the Middle Kingdom for several hundred years to come. So it’s unfortunate that the sources that survive for the events of 879 (not 878, as Wiki has it) are not only pretty meagre, but frequently contradictory.
For all these reasons, constructing a full answer worthy of this question is going to take some time – so I’ll start with the short version.
Guangzhou (which some readers will be more familiar with under another name, Canton, or possibly in the Wade-Giles version of its name, Kuang-chou) was an important trading city in this period, and it sat at one end of what was, for a time, a major maritime trading route running all the way to the Persian Gulf.
The port was large and wealthy for more than 100 years – until the massacre you mention, directly followed by the fall of the Tang dynasty and then the onset of a long period of civil war in China, severely curtailed the transoceanic trade and reduced Guangzhou to the status of a comparative backwater for several more centuries.
While it lasted, however, the trade between the Abbasid caliphate and Tang China was based largely on ceramics. We know this because large quantities of bowls, dishes and jars and have survived to be found on several important shipwrecks of the period, as well as in archaeological digs in what is now Iran. The trade did also feature other luxury goods such as silks, mirrors and Tibetan musk, but these aren’t always as durable, so we have less archaeological evidence to help us determine their relative importance.
Unlike the Europeans, whose later trading efforts were often stymied by lack of Chinese demand for western products, the Arab merchants of the Abbasid caliphate had plenty of luxury products of their own to trade. By exploiting the diverse riches of the many lands bordering the Indian Ocean, and ranging as far south as the gold port of Sofala, in what is now Mozambique, it seems that they were able to trade on more or less equal terms with the Tang.
As for the question of how Guangzhou survived and prospered despite experiencing several different sacks, I’d say that part of the answer was that these events took place across quite a few trading generations (there was more than a century between the two major disasters that you reference); part was that the normal run of maritime dangers in this period, which certainly include piracy, typhoons and shipwreck, would have loomed a lot larger in the minds of the merchants of the time than the occasional one-off massacre; and part was to do with the nature of the first of the two sacks of the city, which was probably the work of the merchants of Guangzhou themselves…
We’re not quite certain about this last point; accounts differ. All of which brings us on to…
The two Chinese dynastic histories that cover the late Tang state were both compiled more than 200 years after the events they describe, and they contain little more than a passing mention of what happened at Guangzhou – which was then probably the largest port in southern China. Our main Arab source, in the meantime – which is where the estimates of six-figure deaths is drawn from – was compiled by a man who never left the Abbasid caliphate, so it’s probably best to begin this response with an acknowledgement that the figure of 120,000 deaths cannot be proven, and is almost certainly best understood (like most medieval figures of this sort) to mean simply that “a lot of people died.” Since the Chinese sources that we have offer no detailed discussion at all of what happened at Guangzhou, it wouldn’t even be safe to presume that the rebels specifically targeted foreign merchants. I’ll come back to this point later.
As for that Arabic source I mentioned, it is Accounts of China and India, a book of akhbar – a compilation of oral accounts, supposedly taken down verbatim but more likely polished by the compiler – set down in two distinct parts, about a century apart. The earlier portion that we are most interested in is traditionally attributed to Sulaymān al-Tājir (that is, “Sulaiman the Merchant”), though he was at most only one of a number of travellers who apparently contributed accounts to an anonymous compiler. Although there are quibbles about some of the material contained in this portion of the Accounts, internal evidence suggests that much of the book does rest solidly on material contributed by merchants who had travelled to China and who had ranged almost as far north as the Korean peninsula.
From the particular perspective of this question, however, we have to note one significant problem with the Arab sources: the material contributed by Abbasid travellers who we can be fairly confident had actually visited China dates to c.851, before the sack of Guangzhou. The information we have about the sack of the city itself comes from the second part of the Accounts, which was compiled in about 916 by an Arab geographer named Abu Zayd al-Hasan al-Sirafi. Abu Zayd, as his name indicates, came from the Gulf port of Siraf, at the western end of the sea route to China, but he never travelled to the east, and his portion of the book is less clearly sourced than the part usually attributed to Sulaymān al-Tājir. For this reason, and while there’s certainly no reason to write it off completely, the second part of the Accounts is usually considered less reliable than the first half of the book. I’d suggest we need to be very cautious of the figures that it offers, including that for the number of dead at Guangzhou.
With all this said, however, there’s no obvious reason to doubt that the foreign trade that passed through Guangzhou was pretty significant, nor that the sack of the city did not result in the deaths of a very high proportion of the foreign merchants who had based themselves there, and every reason to think that the commerce they were engaged in was important for both the caliphate and for China. Thanks in part to some recent archaeological advances, especially the discovery of several important shipwrecks, we know quite a bit more about this trade than we did even a couple of decades ago, so it is now possible to look in some detail not only at the ways in which merchants lived and worked in Guangzhou, and at what the city meant to the Tang state, but also at the fundamentals of the transoceanic trade itself.
Arab-Chinese trade in the ninth century
Trade between China and the lands to the west appears to date back to at least the era of the Han dynasty; the Arab name for Middle Kingdom, Al-Sin, is derived from the Qin dynasty under which the country was first unified in the third century BCE. But it flourished especially strongly in the ninth and tenth centuries CE, a period in which the Tang and Song devoted significant resources to promoting foreign trade, unlike many of the dynasties that would succeed them. There is considerable evidence not only that there was significant commercial contact between China and merchants from the Abbasid caliphate during this period, but also that the trade was considered valuable by the Chinese, quite a contrast to the ways in which the later Ming and Qing dynasties came to view such contacts. For example, while we know that at least 40 groups of Arab envoys travelled to China between 651 and 798, we also read that several Chinese delegations were dispatched to the Abbasids in the tenth century. These envoys were sent, ostensibly, to solicit tribute, but it seems clear, reading between the lines of the various imperial edicts, that their true purpose was to encourage trade.
Two main trade routes existed during the Tang dynasty – one overland, via central Asia, and the other maritime. The Tang and the Abbasids were both expanding for much of this period, and, as is well known, their respective spheres of influence eventually butted up against each other and resulted in Abbasid victory at the Battle of Talas, to the south-east of the Aral Sea, in 751. The outcome of this battle helped to determine that Muslim powers would dominate in central Asia for centuries to come, but there is little evidence it interfered much with trade. The overland route continued to be used until 755, when the devastating An Lushan rebellion, combined with the rise of the Tibetan empire, introduced barriers that more or less halted land-based commerce between China and the Middle East. From then on, trade went by sea, via what was the longest sea route in regular use before Europeans began to trade with India round Africa in the 1400s. We know that a maritime route that stretched from the Persian Gulf to the ports of southern China existed at least as early as the 760s, since Du Huan, one of the prisoners taken by the Arabs at the Battle of Talas, was released and travelled to Guangzhou by sea in 762.
The account that he wrote of his time as a prisoner of war – the Jiangxinghji, or Travel Record – which survives today only in a small number of fragments, is the earliest first-hand account of the Islamic world by a Chinese writer, and Meng Wei points out that the material that survives from it “demonstrates remarkably accurate and rich knowledge.” Nonetheless, the sea route was not much travelled until the latter part of the eighth century; a biographical note on Li Mian, who was viceroy of Lingnan in 769, notes that only five or six Arab ships a year called at Guangzhou at that time. Thanks in large part to Li Mian’s honesty and fair-dealing, however – the same account contends – the total number of Abbasid vessels visiting China during his period in office eventually totalled 4,000.
Much of the best evidence that we have for maritime trade in this period comes not from written records but from the archaeology of several shipwrecks that have been excavated since c.1990. From our perspective, the most important of these is the early ninth century Belitung Wreck, discovered in 1998 off the coast of Sumatra. The wreck is of an ocean-going Arab dhow, made from sewn planks, which had been carrying a cargo that included as many as 60,000 pieces of Chinese ceramics, one of which was inscribed with a date in 826. This dates the wreck to c.830, and it’s evidence of a direct trade between Chinese ports and the Abbasid caliphate – though, thus far, it remains a mystery as to why the ship sank something like 380 miles south of the normal sea-route that connected Siraf to Guangzhou.
Meanwhile the discovery of a second ship, the Intan Wreck, a few years later, offers an insight into the changes that happened as a result of the sack of Guangzhou. The location and the cargo of this c.920 wreck suggests that it was an Indonesian ship engaged in trade with the Srivijaya Empire in Sumatra, an entrepôt whose rise coincided with the decline of the Chinese port. The wreck tells us a good deal about the variety of goods, including Chinese exports, available in Srivijaya ports at this time, and helps to confirm textual sources that tell us many Muslim merchants preferred not to make the long and dangerous voyage all the way north to China in the tenth century, instead picking up the ceramics they coveted after they had been shipped south as far as Indonesia. But this change in trade routes does not seem to have limited the opportunities to pick up a wide variety of valuable goods. In fact, the Intan wreck disgorged a smaller overall number, but a much wider variety, of artefacts than the Belitung vessel, including tiger bones and elephant teeth. The rest of the cargo comprised
ceramics, silver ingots, mirrors, and ironware from China; tin ingots and currency from the Malay peninsula, pasteware and bottles from Thailand, and glass and amphorae from the Middle East
and confirms that a thriving maritime trade linking ports in Africa and Persia to the Malay Peninsula, Indonesia and China was still in existence at this date, about a half-century into the decline of Guangzhou – albeit one that probably no longer featured long voyages made direct from the Abbasid caliphate to China.
The port and fanfang of Guangzhou
Guangzhou had existed for well over 500 years by the time the city reached its early zenith, but it’s important to recognise that – while you can look at maps showing the borders of Tang China and see the whole of the coast shaded south all the way to Vietnam – the inland areas that surrounded it had by no means been fully integrated into the empire by this date. It’s safer to see the port as a remote, exotic outpost, which the Tang wrote of as located somewhere in the “land beyond the mountains” (the ranges north of Guangdong). Early biographical directories compiled by Chinese scholars list few people who came from the far south, and almost all of those who did appear were either state functionaries or local “chieftains” who had proved themselves loyal to the empire. “Outside Guangzhou,” notes David Faure, “was a no-man’s land dominated by local powers that few in Guangzhou understood or wanted to understand.”
A Han-era work, the Account of Strange Things, had been written to describe the wonders of the far south, which included
rice that ripened twice a year, birds that moved their nests lower down the tree as their eggs hatched, peacocks, the delicious lichee fruit, betel nuts, coconuts, and human beings whose ears stuck to their faces before dividing into several pieces drooping down to their shoulders.
This book was later supplemented by the Tang’s Records of Strange Things Beyond the Mountains, which mentioned deadly mists that swept down from the mountains and rebels, driven down from the north, who had fled into the sea and lived in houses made of shells. Guangzhou even had its own book of marvels in the Tang period, Dai Fu’s Strange Things of Guangzhou, which discussed a half-human race, the shanxiao, who supposedly lived in the hinterlands, squatting in trees and demanding payments from passers-by.
Communication with the main centres of Tang power was via the inland “Dayuling pathway,” opened up on the orders of the Emperor Xuanzong in 716, or by sea. The city did house a small army garrison, whose main duty was to keep the peace among the local aboriginal peoples, and it was also a centre of Buddhism that supported several important monasteries. Nonetheless, according to Faure, Guangzhou existed almost entirely to funnel luxury goods (whether sourced locally or imported) to the emperor and the great clans who clustered around the imperial court:
The [Tang] prefect’s reputation seems to have rested on his ability to quell the barbarian tribes that inhabited the vast unknown beyond the city. Taxes from Guangzhou probably were insufficient to pay the troops, but that does not seem to have mattered, as long as the rarities of the south were dispatched north to the imperial court. Guangzhou was an outpost where Arabs traded with aborigines under the military protection of the Chinese imperial state.
Simply reaching Guangzhou, however distant an outpost it was for the Tang, was a substantial achievement for the seafarers of the ninth century. The journey from the great Abbasid port of Siraf, in the Persian Gulf, to Guangzhou, via Kulam Mali in India and the lost city known as Kalah Bar on the Malay peninsula, involved about 90 days at sea, and took six months in total to complete, including time in port. The seagoing dhows that took part in it benefitted from the trade winds of the Indian Ocean – which, thanks to the annual monsoon, blew from east to west consistently in one season, before reversing themselves to blow from west to east.
Remote though Guangzhou was, however, it was a major entrepôt during this period, and according to the Accounts it had “twenty lesser cities under it.” The Buddhist monk Jianzhen, who visited during the eighth century, described it as crowded with large ships from Borneo, Java and Persia, carrying spices and pearls and jade “piled up mountain high.” From other sources we know that Sinhalese sailors from Sri Lanka, traders from the Malay peninsula, and ships from Japan were regular visitors to the port alongside Arabs and Persians. There is also a tradition, reported by the Jesuit missionary-scholar Matteo Ricci in 1605, that Jewish merchants were active in the city from 800. Guangzhou may well have been the most cosmopolitan city on earth during the ninth century.
The Accounts of China and India contains some fairly detailed description of the general condition of Chinese cities. They were plagued by frequent fires, we’re told, “because their houses there are built of wood and split bamboo.” But the inhabitants were prepared for this possibility: “The doorways of their houses have no thresholds, because their goods and treasures and all their possessions are kept in chests mounted on wheels, so they can be moved about. If fire breaks out, these chests and their contents can be pushed to safety, with no threshold to impede their swift exit.”
The merchants of Guanzhong, meanwhile, lived in their own quarter, or fanfang (fan = non-Han or foreigners, while fang = a residential area). The fanfang was certainly in existence by 835 and it appears to have grown significantly thereafter. By the 870s it housed a considerable community, comprising not only merchants and envoys, but also sailors, soldiers and refugees.
As to how the inhabitants of the fanfang lived: Tang law was clear that foreign merchants should live in their own communities, elect their own leaders, live according to their own customs, and – in cases of trouble – “be tried and sentenced using their own laws.” This meant that the fanfang grew up to the west of the city walls and formed a socially as well as a geographically distinct community. It had its own leader, known as the fanzhang, who combined a religious role as head of the local Muslim umma, or community, and what Wei describes as “a legitimate community authority, endorsed by the state.” The holder of this role was apparently elected by the fanfang as a whole, though their nominee required the emperor’s approval before he could take office and was also required to wear Chinese dress.
All this suggests, of course, that the fanfang was religiously as well as geographically and ethnically distinct, and it certainly had its own mosques and its own imams from an early period. One of the earliest Arab embassies to China is said to have been led by Mohammed’s uncle, Sa’d ibn Abbi Waqqas (c.584-664), who reached the Tang court during the time of Gaozu, the founder of the Tang dynasty, who reigned from 618-626. Gaozu welcomed the delegation and given orders permitting a mosque – the Huaisheng Mosque – to be erected in Guangzhou to serve the merchant community in the port.
The port area of Guangzhou was pretty large by the end of the ninth century. Faure notes that that fanfangwas probably several times the size of the Chinese portion of Guangzhou: “the Tang walled city was tiny,” he says, and though it probably did house the residence of the local prefect, the chief justice and the city’s eunuch chief of finance, the tuqam, the other major Chinese official, the maritime trade commissioner (shibo si, a post established in 763), probably lived outside the Tang walls in the port area itself.
Leslie makes the point that, while most foreigners who settled in China in this period quite quickly adopted Chinese customs, married into local families, and adopted Chinese names and customs, the same does not seem to be true of the Guangzhou Arabs, who apparently kept their own names and customs. This suggests a community large enough to be self-sustaining, and also one in which links to home communities remained strong, though this certainly should not be taken to mean that Arab traders did not live in the city for long enough to think of it as home, or that intermarriage never happened. Certainly Lu Jun, who was prefect of the city shortly before its sack, was concerned by the frequency with which Arab merchants formed relationships with Chinese women. According to one of the two Tang histories, the Jiu Tang shi, one of the local Maritime Trade Commissioners living in the city wrote that
First the locals and foreigners live together, then they marry each other. Sometimes the officials try to stop them. Somehow they seem to attract each other. When Jun came to the job, he established rules that Chinese and foreigners should live separately, and they shouldn’t marry. Foreigners shouldn’t buy land and build houses.
Examination of the surviving contents of contemporary wrecks suggests that porcelain was almost certainly the most important commodity traded between China and the Abbasid caliphate, but Accounts of China and India mentions other sorts of cargo, which would not have withstood centuries of immersion nearly so well: silk is one, and musk is also mentioned. The Chinese, meanwhile, were importing camphor together with
ivory, frankincense and copper ingots, as well as dhabl from the sea [tortoiseshell] and the bushan[rhinoceros horn].
They were also, arguably, expanding their own efforts to trade along the same sea routes, rather than leave the profits of the trade to the Arabs. Chinese trade with the west was underway by 785. There are records that suggest that Chinese merchants may have traded in Cairo during this period (an idea that raises eyebrows among more conservative historians), and in 863 the Tang poet and administrator Duan Chengshi published an account of voyages made by Chinese junks in search of ivory and ambergris to places as distant as Somalia – all undertaken nearly 600 years before the much better-known journeys of the eunuch admiral Zheng He.
For the most part, the Accounts assure us, trade in Guangzhou was very well-regulated. The shibo si required foreign captains to register at his office when they arrived in port, and he and his men inspected their manifests, collected export duty and freight charges, and policed attempts to export forbidden rarities. The same authorities were also responsible for maintaining the shoushi, or imperial monopoly on specified categories of luxury goods, and administering the jinfeng, or exchange of gifts, all of which had to be completed before trading could begin. Finally, they levied the very high 30 percent duty in imports, taken in kind from the cargoes that were landed at the port, and a sales tax of an additional 5 percent, the latter designed in part to pay the maintenance costs of the army garrison.
In exchange for all this, the Tang authorities ensured that the goods were securely warehoused and their owners were indemnified against breakage or loss. No trading was permitted until all the vessels in a fleet had arrived. It’s possible to interpret this last piece of information in a couple of ways – as an example of Chinese fair dealing, which ensured all the merchants in a party had an equal opportunity to buy and sell, or, as George Hourani suggests, as a piece of legislation designed to benefit the Tang, since it made it more likely that the local markets would be flooded with goods before trading began, reducing prices. Whatever the truth, the only person with special rights was the emperor or his representative, but “he gives the very highest price and pays immediately, so he does no harm to the merchants.”
Relations between the Chinese and members of the foreign merchant community were not always friendly, however. The “pirate raid” of 758 that you mention is variously explained. Suleyman’s account paints it as the work of Arab and Persian pirates based on the island of Hainan. On the other hand, the Jiu Tang shu suggests that it involved not an attack from the sea, but a rising by members of Guangzhou’s Muslim merchant community, who for unstated reasons (Wei suggests anger at the exorbitant taxes levied on imports) apparently escalated a dispute with local imperial officials into a sack of the city so severe that it reduced the port to backwater status for at least four decades. It seems likely that the latter account is to be preferred, since Howard points out that, in the aftermath of the violence, the Tang ordered that the port be closed to foreign trade, and that it remained closed until early in the ninth century – which would seem a harsh judgement if the damage had been caused by pirates. If Arab merchants were in fact responsible for this devastation, moreover, that would at answer your question as to why they were willing to return to Guangzhou and resume trading there when the port reopened after 800.
Much of the trade that had flowed into the Pearl River was shifted south to Tống Bình (Hanoi) in the years that followed the sack and massacre of 879, and Abu Zayd, the compiler of the Accounts of China and India,writes that “the trading voyages to China were abandoned, and the country itself was ruined, leaving all traces of its greatness gone.” Most of the remaining trade with the west moved to Quanzhou, a port the Muslims knew as “Zaytun” – which is in Fujien, further to the north in the Taiwan Strait. This was the major Chinese port mentioned by both Marco Polo and Ibn Battuta.
To understand how that happened, we need to look next at the internal politics of Tang China, and especially at the events that led up to the sack of Guangzhou, which revolve around one of the largest and most devastating wars recorded in the long history of rebellion in China.
The Huang Chou rebellion
The uprising that resulted in the sack of Guangzhou was a peasant rebellion led by a southerner named Huang Chou and was caused, according to Adam Fong, by a combination of increasingly bad and corrupt government, and a series of devastatingly bad harvests that occurred during the early 870s. The ensuing revolt lasted for ten years (874-884), and, at least according to the main dynastic histories of the Tang, involved several hundred thousand rebels – making it one of the largest, longest-lasting and most significant such uprisings in the whole of the history of China.
We possess only a few scraps of information about Huang Chou’s background, but the details that we have are certainly suggestive. Both Tang dynastic histories state that came from a merchant family that had been engaged in the salt trade for several generations, though one of them adds that he was also a disgruntled failed candidate in the imperial civil service exams – which opens the intriguing possibility that he may have had a rather similar background to the much later rebel Hong Xiuquan, the well-known leader of the mid-nineteenth century Taiping Rebellion. More importantly, however, Huang Chou’s profession of salt merchant brought him into conflict with a government that claimed a monopoly on salt production, and already raised more than 50% of its revenues by controlling production and adding so much tax to the price of the commodity that it became almost unaffordable to the average Chinese. This probably explains why one Tang history states that Huang Chou embarked on a career as a smuggler – which in turn, it would appear, brought him into conflict with Tang officials who saw him as an outlaw, and was the proximate cause of his decision to rebel.
The Tang’s control over the more distant provinces in their empire had so weakened by this point that there were already plenty of bandits and disgruntled peasants willing to fight for a charismatic and successful leaders. Huang Chao began his rebellion as only one of a number of commanders in a loose rebel alliance, but, after the death of his superior Wang Xianzhi, who was killed in battle with Tang forces in 878, he was able to unite the various factions into an effective army and have himself accepted as its “Heaven-Storming Generalissimo”.
Huang Chou and his men arrived outside the walls of Guangzhou in 878, having apparently been forced south by the actions of imperial armies to the north. Neither of the Tang histories tell us much about the events that followed beyond the mere fact that the city fell to him – “merchants were not that important to society,” Fong argues, so “their mass slaughter in a remote city was not deemed important enough to be added to the dynastic histories.” Other than that, we are forced to turn to Arabic sources for more details. The Accounts of China and India states that
at first the citizens … held out against him, but he subjected them to a long siege … until, at last, he too the city and put its people to the sword. Experts on Chinese affairs reported that the number of Muslims, Jews, Christians and Magians [Zoroastrians] massacred by him, quite apart from the native Chinese, was 120,000.
The same account adds that “the only reason the number of victims from these four communities happens to be known is that the Chinese had kept records of their numbers.” This is an interesting bit of commentary; read carefully, it suggests that the Chinese bureaucracy listed 120,000 foreign merchants in the city before the siege (“had kept records”) rather than counted 120,000 corpses after it. Since we know that at least some of the merchants in the fanfang survived the massacre, we can be pretty certain that the total number of dead was below the 120,000 figure, that at least some of them were Chinese – and that since Abu Zayd gives us no more detail as to how the figure was obtained or made its way to him in Persia, we’re probably right to be quite sceptical of it; the Chinese historian Chao Zongchen suggests the real total may have been as little as 10,000. Nonetheless, there’s little reason to doubt that Huang Chao’s men did a huge amount of damage, and it’s more than likely that a high proportion of the local merchant community was killed.
What’s a lot less certain is what exactly the rebels were hoping to achieve by attacking Guangzhou. There are two broad schools of thought in this respect. It’s very possible to argue that Huang Chao was eager to wreak general havoc, both to punish the Tang (who, according to one of the dynastic histories, had rebuffed his attempts to negotiate a favourable surrender, refused the request-cum-threat that he’d sent them suggesting that he be named prefect of the city, and offered him an insultingly lesser post instead), as well as to reward his men with the rich plunder available within Guangzhou’s fanfang. On the other hand, several authors, such as Wright and Risso, have suggested that the massacre may have been specifically directed against the immigrant community, and was the product of Chinese resentment at the economic clout enjoyed by Arab and Persian merchants.
My own view is that there’s little real evidence that Huang Chao intended to destroy the fanfang alone, rather than do more general damage to Guangzhou as a whole. We know that at least some of the foreign merchants there survived the sack of the merchant quarter, and that these men, rather than being rounded up and executed, were simply expelled from China. Nor was Huang Chou’s anger solely directed at foreign merchants; he also devastated the city’s hinterlands and destroyed the valuable cocoons that underpinned the local silk trade. Whatever his motives, the damage he and his men did was irreparable, at least in the short term. The Jiu Tang shu cites an official named Yu Qiong as complaining that
the southern sea contains the profits of the maritime trade, offering pearls and jewels annually. Now the wicked thieves took it. The national treasury will be vanishing gradually.
We can wrap up the remainder of the story fairly briefly. At the height of Huang Chou’s revolt, in 881, he captured and sacked the imperial capital, Xi’an (a place more familiar to many historians under the earlier transliteration of Chang’an), then had himself proclaimed as “Emperor of Great Qi”. The rebels then held the largely ruined city for two years. Huang Chao’s great mistake, almost certainly, was to sacrifice the mobility that had made him such a threat to the Tang; by staying in Xi’an, he allowed the ruling emperor, who had fled to Sichuan, to mobilise several armies against him and also call in Kirghiz troops from the Turkic west.
Huang Chou and his supporters were expelled from what was left of the capital – temporarily in 882, and permanently in 883. Depending on which dynastic history you favour, Huang Chou either committed suicide, or was killed by a nephew, soon afterwards, and what was left of his rebellion collapsed. At its height, nonetheless, he had controlled a significant part of China, and the damage done by the uprising is usually cited as one of the key factors behind the decline of the late Tang state, which collapsed only a few years later in 907. Xi’an never recovered, and in fact the great city – which had once been four times the size of Rome – fell into such decay that it disappeared altogether and reverted to farmland. The poet Wei Chuang records the desolation left behind by the rebels, and it is worth giving a few lines here, as it also offers us some insight into what happened at Guangzhou:
Xi’an lies in mournful stillness: what does it now contain?
Ruined markets and desolate streets, in which ears of wheat are sprouting.
Fuel-gatherers have hacked down every flowering plant in the Apricot Gardens.
Builders of barricades have destroyed the willows along the Imperial Canal.
All the gaily-coloured chariots with their ornamental wheels are scattered and gone,
Of the stately mansions with their vermilion gates less than half remain.
The Hanyuan Hall is the haunt of foxes and hares…
Only a dreary waste meets the eye; the old familiar objects are no more.
Half a century of further conflict then ensued in China – a period dominated by warlords ruling over what are known as the Five Dynasties – and the Song state that emerged after 960, and which lasted until the Mongol invasions of the 1270s, neither controlled as much territory as the Tang, nor had as much contact with the west.
The area surrounding Guangzhou split off from the Chinese state after the collapse of the Tang and called itself the kingdom of Nan Han (= “Southern Han”). It retained its independence for three generations, funded in part by a revival of foreign trade and the riches of the pearl fisheries around Guangzhou. The ruling dynasty became noted for its extraordinary cruelty and its extraordinary wealth, and its rule was supported by the remnants of the indigenous gentry who had emerged during the Tang dynasty and survived the massacres of 879. The Southern Han state was not reintegrated into the imperial polity to the north until the reign of the Song emperor Taizu (960-976).
From what little we know about the history of Guangzhou in the aftermath of Huang Chou’s rebellion, it seems that the city failed to recover from its sacking for several centuries to come. Zeng Yanwen notes a widespread culture of corruption, which had already begun to drive foreign traders to move to the rival port of Quanzhou even before 879. (“It was well known that posting in Guangzhou led immediately to great wealth,” Faure confirms.) This, combined with the devastation wreaked by the rebel troops, meant that Guangzhou had been relegated to the status of a second-class port by the time trade revived under the Song dynasty. It took several more centuries for the town that had once been one of the great symbols of the system of transoceanic trade to revive.
Janet Abu-Lughod, Before European Hegemony: The World System A.D. 1250-1350 (1991); David Faure, Emperor and Ancestor: State and Lineage in South China (2007); Adam Fong, “Ending an era: the Huang Chao Rebellion of the Late Tang, 874-884,” East-West Working Papers 26 (2006); Heng Chye Kiang, Cities of Aristocrats and Bureaucrats: The Development of Medieval Chinese Cityscapes (1999); George F. Hourani, Arab Seafaring in the Indian Ocean in Ancient and Early Medieval Times (1951); Michael C. Howard, Transnationalism in Ancient and Medieval Societies: The Role of Cross-Border Trade and Travel (2012); Donald Leslie, The Integration of Religious Minorities in China: the Case of Chinese Muslims (1998); Donald Leslie, The Survival of the Chinese Jews: The Jewish Community of Kaifeng (1972); Xiaobing Li, China At War: An Encyclopedia (2012); Patricia A. Risso, Merchants and Faith: Muslim Commerce and Culture in the Indian Ocean (1995); Harold M. Tanner, China: A History (2009); Meng Wei, “The Advent of Islam in China: Guangzhou Fanfang during the Tang-Song Era,” (unpublished Washington University in St Louis MA thesis, 2010); David Wright, The History of China (2001); Dennis C. Twitchett (ed.), The Cambridge History of China vol.3 part 1: Sui and T’ang China, 589–906 AD (1979); Victor Cunrui Xiong, Historical Dictionary of Medieval China (2008); Zheng Yangwen, China on the Sea: How the Maritime World Shaped Modern China (2011); Abu Zayd al-Sirafi, Accounts of China and India (trans. Tim Mackintosh-Smith) (2017).
Q: I was reading about the history of the stapler and found that the first stapler was made for King Louis XV. “The ornate staples it used were forged from gold, encrusted with precious stones, and bore his Royal Court’s insignia.” Is this true? Does the stapler still exist?
A: Fascinating question, not least because a moment’s thought suggests that the type of staples you’re describing would be pretty useless for any stationery-related purposes – gold is a soft metal and encrustations of “precious stones” would be an obstacle to any attempt to neatly collate paper.
A few checks reveal that this story has been pinging around online since the turn of the millennium on sites such as Mental Floss, almost always accompanied by the rather worrying prefix “legend has it”. But in fact the story does antedate the internet; the earliest version I have found – which is, importantly, stripped of all mention of royal insignia, gold staples and precious stones – actually appeared in Investor’s Reader, published by Merrill Lynch, in 1962. The reference appears in the “Business at work” feature of the 3 January 1962 issue of Investor’s Reader. This contains a three page section on the Swingline company (formerly the Parrot Speed Fastener Co.), of Queens, NY, which noted that founder and chairman “Jack [Linsky] showed NYSE prexy [president] Keith Funston the original stapler developed by Louis XV and its streamlined replacement…”, but unfortunately absolutely no more detailed description of the device. It does however run a photo of Linsky holding the object, albeit at too small a size for us to be very certain exactly what the “stapler” actually was or was supposed to do.
All this is interesting not least because Jack Linsky was the man who invented the modern stapler, creating the adhesive that is used to fasten lines of staples together so they can be loaded into a magazine. He emerges from histories of the staple as a man who took a serious interest in the history of the device, and I think it’s almost certain that the story of Louis XV’s “stapler” was first disseminated by him.
The reality, though, was that nothing created in this early period really matches the modern description of a stapler, and the detail that Louis’s staples were jewel-encrusted and made of gold does not appear until the very end of the 20th century. Moreover, Linsky plainly had good reason to re-label early paper-fastening devices – and especially devices produced under the patronage of a royal court – as “staplers” when they were really nothing of the sort, since this dignified his own business with a long and royal history.
From the scant information available, it appears that there are two broad possibilities. One, mentioned by an Italian industrial design website, is that the machine was actually “a tool that uses decorated pins, with which the king imprints the royal seal”. The other is that the “staples” used at Louis XV’s court were a type of paper fastener, used to secure papers in place of the sealing wax or tape or string then used. This would mean that the device described by Linsky was in effect some sort of binding machine, perhaps more accurately imagined as a distant precursor of the modern saddle-stitch binder, which would have been used to pierce the papers and insert a metal fastening and bend or twist it so it secured the papers.
The practicality of such a device would have been dubious, as it was not until the development of steel wire in the second half of the 19th century that a wire with the correct combination of softness and durability to be useful in fastening and binding papers was developed. This suggests that the Italian description is probably more accurate – though, if so, we’d be looking at something not unlike a Braille embosser that functioned in the same way as a stapler (insert paper, press down, use metal spikes to make holes in paper) rather than a device having the same purpose as a stapler. That is, it would not be any sort of paper fastener. My – inexpert – feeling is that the shape of the object displayed by Linsky in *Investor’s Reader* supports the idea it was designed to emboss a royal seal onto paper using a pattern of pins.
Unfortunately, despite the investment of some time and effort, I have not yet been able to trace any mention of the original machine referenced by Linsky in more general sources relating to the history of paper fastening technology or the court of Louis XV – very probably because such sources refer to the device by its unknown proper name. But, in the meantime, we can note that modern staples of the sort that are dispensed by machine date only to the 1840s, with the invention of devices such as Samuel Slocum’s “Machine for sticking pins into papers” (1841) and Lipman’s Improved Eyelet Machine (c.1868), a form of modified rivet for use by clothing manufacturers. The word “stapler” dates only to the 1880s; it first appeared in The American Bookseller of 2 June 1884 to describe a new type of “novelty paper fastener”.
And the humble staple was a successful enough innovation to make Linsky rich. A New York Times profile of him notes that
“He and his wife, Belle, were philanthropists and art collectors who once owned one of the largest collections of Fabergé eggs in America. Jack died in 1980, and in 1982 Belle donated a collection of the couple’s European art, then worth $60 million, to the Metropolitan Museum of Art.”
The Linsky Art Collection – which, perhaps not coincidentally, is quite heavily focused on pieces created during the reign of Louis XV – is now an important feature of the Met. It seems to me quite possible that the device used in France in Louis XV’s time, and which was once part of the Linsky collection, still survives somewhere as well – although, having reviewed the Met’s catalogue, it appears it was not one of the items transferred to that museum by Belle Linsky.
More when I have it. But for now I think it’s reasonably safe to conclude that the basic story originated with Linsky and that the accoutrements – not least the jewel-encrusted staples – are just inventions added by imaginative writers to make the story more interesting around 2000. So, the device you are interested in was almost certainly not a stapler and did not dispense gold staples, jewel-encrusted staples, staples imprinted with the royal insignia, or any combination of the three.
Note: my thanks to the staff at the Library of Congress for tracking down and sending me a copy of Investor’s Reader for 3 January 1962.
Q: Why can’t I find very much information about the 14th Century black death in Asia?
A: You’re asking about an extremely important but remarkably neglected problem – and it’s one that also happens to have remarkably large implications.
It’s important because it asks about what happened to a large proportion of the world’s population in the fourteenth century. It’s neglected because there are major problems with sources, and because the vast majority of research into the Black Death has, historically, been done by Europeans who are chiefly interested in the pandemic’s impact on Europe. And it has substantial implications not only because it involves our understanding of the course of the lives and deaths of hundreds of millions of people, but also because it impacts on our understanding of the basic mechanics of how plague spread.
The short answer to your question, though, is that while historians did long assume that the Black Death began its journey in China, the modern consensus is that it did not. The most recent studies, dating to the last dozen or so years, place its original focus somewhere in the region of the west banks of the Caspian Sea, and the majority of those authorities, led by Ole Benedictow, the author of The Black Death 1346-1353: the Complete History, now prefer the idea that the pandemic had its origins in about 1345 in the lands controlled by the Golden Horde. While there is no doubt, moreover, that the disease reached and devastated the lands of the Middle East, it’s now believed to be very much open to question whether it ever reached what were then the world’s two most heavily-populated regions, India and China.
Benedictow is backed up by a recent revisionist paper, published in the Bulletin of the History of Medicine, in which George Sussman summarises the available evidence for the pandemic’s impact on China and India, combining a re-examination of contemporary primary sources with a close look at what is known of the pathology of the plague bacteria itself, and concludes that evidence for an east Asian origin for the Black Death is seriously lacking. Sussman’s ideas, in turn, have received support from bacteriologists studying the disease, most notably in a paper by Spyrou et al which appeared in Cell Host and Microbe in 2016 and argued that study of the DNA evidence supports a reversal of our usual ideas about the transmission of the plague bacterium – that is, that it actually travelled from Europe to Asia, and not the other way around. The team behind this paper says that their research “provides support for (1) a single entry of Y. pestis in Europe during the Black Death, [and] (2) a wave of plague that traveled toward Asia to later become the source population for contemporary worldwide epidemics.”
So there are growing doubts as to whether the Black Death originated in China, as mainstream narratives have had it for several generations, and hence still active debates as to how exactly the pandemic was experienced in Asia as a whole. In order to assess the evidence for and against this new hypothesis, we need to look at a couple of key themes, which can be conveniently grouped under three main headings: why earlier authorities favoured an origin in east Asia; what evidence there is for any sort of plague pandemic in either China or India during the fourteenth century; and what our current understanding of the origins of such pandemics can do to inform this discussion – which in turn requires us to think about the the concept of plague foci, or hot spots.
Let’s take these issues one by one.
The mainstream view – a plague with origins in Asia
Historians of the Black Death have long argued that the pandemic had its origins in east Asia, probably in a region in the northernmost reaches of imperial China or in the adjacent steppe-lands.
Typically, the evidence presented in support of this idea includes some or all of the following:
• China is known to be a major plague focus, by which is meant an area in which the disease is endemic among rodents, and from which it occasionally erupts to cause pandemics among humans elsewhere in the world. Specifically, the argument goes as follows: there have been three global bubonic plague pandemics – the first was almost certainly the Plague of Justinian, in the sixth century; the second was the Black Death; and the third began in Hong Kong in 1894 and spread from there. Since China was certainly the area from which the third pandemic spread, and since plague foci are believed to endure for very long periods of time, it’s credible it also provided the focus for the Black Death.
Quite of lot of plague literature seems content to leap to such assumptions without subjecting the evidence to much of a critical enquiry. For example, William McNeill’s influential Plagues and People (1976) merely states that it’s “impossible to believe that the plague did not affect China, India, and the Middle East,” without actually examining the evidence – or lack of evidence – that it did so.
• It’s possible to back this idea up by appealing to contemporary sources. European chroniclers of the fourteenth century did believe that the pestilence that had exploded in their territories came originally from the distant, unknowable east. The writer most usually cited here is Gabriele de’ Mussis, an Italian lawyer whose Historia de Morbois one of the most detailed and well-respected histories of the Black Death. His chronicle includes a long list of the places where there was “weeping and lamenting” as a result of the passage of the plague, and this list includes China, India and Persia. De’ Mussis also says that
In the East, in Cathay, which is the greatest country in the world, horrible and terrifying signs appeared. Serpents and toads fell in a thick rain, entered dwellings and devoured numberless people, injecting them with poison and gnawing them with their teeth. In the South, in the Indies, earthquakes cast down whole towns and cities were consumed by fire from heaven. The hot fumes of the fire burnt up infinite numbers of people, and in some places it rained blood, and stones fell from the sky.
Of course we have no real idea where De’ Mussis got this idea from, and whether it has any basis in anything more solid than contemporary speculation, which, after all, took place in an area thousands of miles away from the area where the Black Death supposedly originated. One of the points that Benedictow draws attention to in his book is the conversion of the Golden Horde, or Kipchak Khanate, to Islam in 1313, and the impact that this may have had on east-west trade. Although Peter Jackson argues to the contrary – his The Mongols and the West, 1221-1410 posits that there was a golden age of trans-Asian trade that lasted from 1320 until 1345, precisely the period in which plague would most likely have been travelling west if the Asian origin theory is correct – Sussman tends to concur with Benedictow that it is much more likely it was badly disrupted, and that this disruption would have fatally impeded the transit of the Black Death across the Asian steppe. Sussman points out that the Golden Horde was not the only Mongol state to embrace Islam; both the Ilkhanate (c.1295) and the Chagatai khanate (after c.1330) also converted, creating a substantial barrier to trade that probably did result in the severe disruption of travel across Asia in the crucial years before 1345. Since the Horde was actually at war with the Genoese and Venetians by that latter year – these were the “Mongols” whose siege of Caffa is generally seen as the starting point for the journey of the Black Death west – we therefore at least need to question how readily a pandemic that originated in China could have made the leap to Europe.
Benedictow’s conclusion is that
It must be considered highly unlikely that plague could have been passed on by trade and travel from China to the Italians in the Crimea. No merchants in their senses would risk precious goods and expensive and dangerous transport over thousands of kilometres to the Christian Italian merchants through Muslim states that were intensely hostile to trade and contact with Christians… At the end of the caravan route, the ruler had actually gone to war to drive away the Christians, and the towns of destination were under siege.
Benedictow’s ideas seem to me to have some merit, though perhaps it’s not necessary to hypothesise that trade goods began their journey in China with a specific destination in the Christian territories to the far west in mind. It still seems possible that a pandemic might have spread in stages along a trade route where the passage of trade goods was more localised.
• The chronicler Ibn al-Wardi, of Aleppo, spoke to merchants who had seen the Black Death in the Crimea (and who brought it back with them to Syria), and reported their belief that it had been wreaking havoc in Asia since the early 1330s, had its origins in “the land of darkness” – a phrase usually interpreted to mean the northern steppe-lands. Al-Wardi adds:
China was not preserved from it, nor could the strongest fortress hinder it. The plague afflicted the Indians in India. It weighed upon the Sind. It seized with its hand and ensnared even the lands of the Uzbeks. How many backs did it break in what is Transoxiana!
Here again we have evidence that contemporaries suspected the plague came from the far east, but – again – little to suggest this was more than a sort of orientalist fantasy. The east (as De’ Mussis’s chronicle also demonstrates) was seen as a mysterious place where all sorts of wonders frequently occurred, and, for the inhabitants of both Europe and the Middle East in this period, it was also the only more or less unexplored part of the known world, so it was a natural spot to locate the origins of something as apparently new, and as completely devastating, as the Black Death.
• The Chinese census of 1200 (which like all such censuses at this time counted “doors” – households – rather than “mouths” – individuals) revealed a population estimated at 120 million. Another, taken in 1393, found that the total had fallen to just 65 million.
I’ve seen it suggested that a significant proportion of the empire’s “missing” subjects, who apparently vanished between 1200 and 1393, were lost to the plague. Unfortunately, this claims takes no account of Kublai Khan’s census of 1290 – which is rated probably the most reliable of the Mongol enumerations. This census put the total at 13.9 million households, and hence at an estimated 59 million people, and would suggest that the great majority of the apparent population loss took place during the thirteenth century – and may be associated at least in part with the Mongol conquest – rather than the fourteenth century and the Black Death.
• Most of this information was noted by the earliest modern historians of the plague, most importantly the German medical historian J.F.C. Hecker, writing in the 1830s. His account became hugely influential (not least because it was first published at a time when another pestilence, cholera, was raging in Europe), and so Hecker’s description of “an universal pestilence, which extended from China to Iceland and Greenland” became the default from which later writers took their lead – even though it’s now generally agreed that the plague did not reach either Iceland or Greenland.
• One additional bit of evidence pointing to a pre-1347 Asian origin for the Black Death that you’ll often see cited comes from inscriptions found on grave markers in two Nestorian cemeteries to the north of lake Issyk-Kul – a stopover on the silk road in what is now Kyrgyzstan, only about a hundred miles from the westernmost borders of China – that were excavated by Russian archaeologists in the middle 1880s. Daniel Chwolson, the archaeologist leading the dig, noted that he had collected a total of 650 names from surviving headstones, dating from 1186 and 1349. Of these, 106 had died – in about 10 percent of cases it was specified of “pestilence” – in one two-year period, between 1338 and 1339. An example is a stone that reads:
In the year one thousand six hundred and fifty [= 1339 AD], the hare year. This is the grave of Kutluk. He died of pestilence with his wife Mangu-Kelka.
It did not take much joining of the dots for plague researchers to notice such a dramatic concentration of deaths less than a decade before the Black Death erupted into Europe, and to turn these inscriptions into evidence of the plague’s slow westward migration. More sceptical voices, however, point out that “pestilence” could mean a wide variety of diseases, and Sussman adds that Chwolson’s work remains, nearly a century and a half later, “the only evidence we have of a possible plague outbreak in the steppes before the reports from the Crimea in 1346, to which the European and Middle Eastern epidemics have been traced.” Without a better context, and ideally verification in the form of evidence from contemporary Nestorian graves – which has not yet been forthcoming – it would be unsafe to assume these deaths were caused by the Black Death.
Evidence and lack of evidence for the Black Death in China and India
Chinese historians kept records of major epidemics from at least the Tang dynasty, and these were typically incorporated into dynastic records alongside floods, droughts, astronomical phenomena and other events that could collectively be considered portents or evidence of the judgement of heaven on the emperor and the imperial administration. Historians who have examined these records are fairly dramatically divided into those who argue that they contain clear evidence that the Black Death did ravage China and those who believe that it did not.
There seems to be general agreement here that the Chinese archives contain no absolutely conclusive reference to any epidemic of bubonic plague the Middle Kingdom before 1640. There certainly are records, however, of significant epidemics that took place in China at about the right time to have been associated with the Black Death. These include:
• An apparently devastating epidemic in Hebei, in the north-east of China, in 1331-34. The contemporary description of this pestilence – which may well be an exaggeration – suggests that it killed 90 percent of the population of the province, and a summary compiled at the end of the nineteenth century by the Imperial Maritime Customs Service places the mortality at “13 million persons”.
• A “great pestilence” in the coastal provinces of Fujian and Shandong in 1344.
• An apparent pandemic that cycled through several northern provinces in 1351-52, and which supposedly killed two-thirds of the population of Shanxi and Hubei.
• Additional “great pestilences” in northern and central China between 1356 and 1362.
There are two possible ways of interpreting this information. One is to assume that they are a record of a pandemic of the Black Death. This is certainly not impossible, at least if the various “pestilences” were actually linked; waves of bubonic plague, which moved steadily from place to place but were also capable of returning and revisiting areas they had already devastated, are characteristic of the progress of the plague in the better-chronicled regions of western Europe. And the timing, at first glance, looks right, at least if we assume that the Hebei pandemic was the first eruption of the Black Death; it would have had 15 years to make the journey from the eastern borders of China to the lands of the Golden Horde, which is no faster than the pace that the disease advanced across Europe. Estimates of vast numbers of deaths, moreover – assuming they are at least roughly accurate – suggest a pandemic of exceptional virulence, and again provide a good match for the Black Death.
Yet it’s also possible to look at the same evidence more sceptically, and observe that every one of the epidemics mentioned in contemporary Chinese sources is recorded in a very similar way – as a “pestilence”, that is, but without any specific mention being made of the symptoms of the disease. This might indicate that the pathogens were familiar ones, creating symptoms that were not considered strange enough to be worth recording; we know China was vulnerable to outbreaks of smallpox, typhus, dysentery and and influenza throughout this period. In this view, the Chinese record stands distinct from that we have from Europe and the Middle East, where it is commonplace to find detailed descriptions of the previously unheard-of – but highly recognisable – symptoms of the Black Death, characterised as it was by the presence of agonising, blackened buboes in armpits and groins, the spitting of blood, and almost certain death after three or four days.
In the European context, descriptions of what is undoubtedly the plague can be traced all the way back to ancient Greece. So is it really credible that generations of Chinese scholars could fail to make mention of the unique and distinct symptoms of the Black Death if they really were describing an exceptionally virulent pandemic of a type never seen in the country before? There are records to suggest that China was hit by what could have been the Plague of Justinian, since the physician Sun Ssu-mo (also known as Sun Simiao), who died in 652, refers in his Valuable Prescriptions to a pandemic characterised by the presence of a “malignant bubo”. How could his successors 700 years later have failed to make similar observations?
Determining which of these two competing positions is most likely to be correct means determining whether or not it is reasonable to suppose that a pandemic as devastating and distinctive as the Black Death could have taken place in China without contemporaries making any comment – especially as the 1330s and 1340s were a period in which the writing of history flourished under the patronage of the Yuan emperor Toghon Temür, who sponsored completion of the long-paused official histories of the Liao, Jin and Song dynasties during this period.
On balance, I believe, the evidence probably favours the sceptics. At the very least, it seems to show that the “pestilences” that visited China did not behave in exactly the same manner as the Black Death, which, in its journey through Europe, devastated the continent far more completely and more systematically than seems to have been the case in China. Moreover, it may very well be dangerous to assume that the pandemic could advance across the thinly-populated Asian steppe at the same sort of pace as it could move across the densely-populated lands of Europe. “Easier to believe,” Sussman concludes, “in the plague focus closes to there [the disease] was first observed in the Crimea [and that it] never reached China.”
An even more startling absence of evidence for a plague pandemic can be found in an examination of records from India, the northern portions of which were then dominated by the Delhi Sultanate and which maintained significant ties with Transoxiana, the area to the north and west from which the Tughluq dynasty had originated, and well as diplomatic and trade links the stretched across the Indian Ocean and connected Gujurat to the Red Sea. Trade – not least in slaves – also took place, via caravans, between the Sultanate and the Mongols of the Ilkhanate and the Golden Horde.
It would certainly seem, then, that India ought to have been at substantial risk of importing plague from its trading partners to the north. Our main source for this period of its history, the chronicle of Diya-yi Barani (also known as Ziauddin Barani), which covers the period up to 1351, describes an epidemic of cholera that devastated the Sultanate in 1334/35, but says nothing about any pestilence that could be bubonic plague. Diya-yi Barani’s successor, Sham Siraj Afif, who chronicled the reign of Firuz Shah between 1357 and 1388 (a period during which secondary and tertiary waves of plague were still devastating Europe) likewise makes no mention of any major epidemic, and indeed notes that the period was one of prosperity, peace and rising populations in India. Since we likewise have no DNA evidence to point to the existence of plague in any contemporary Indian cemeteries, it is generally agreed that the disease cannot have penetrated the subcontinent until what was clearly an outbreak of the disease was reported in Agra in 1619.
The most convincing reason that I’ve seen put forward to account for the failure of the Black Death to visit India was put forward by Sussman, who observes that the most efficient “vector” for the plague, and the one generally suspected of being the primary means of transmission of the Black Death, is Xenopsylla cheopsis, the oriental rat flea, a native to Egypt. Unlike some other species of flea that become infected with the plague bacillus, which digest the bacillus they ingest when they bite infected rates, X. cheopsis is unable to process the pathogen. Instead, the bacilli form a large blockage in the upper reaches of the flea’s stomach, which is regurgitated into the bloodstream of the next mammal it bites. It is this peculiarity that many epidemiologists suggest helps to explain the incredible virulence of the Black Death; the earliest unlucky victims of the pandemic of 1346-51, at least, were receiving gigantic doses of the plague bacillus delivered by fleas with blocked alimentary canals.
According to Sussman, there is no evidence that X. cheopsis reached India before the nineteenth century, and if this is indeed the case, it may help to explain why the subcontinent was not devastated in the 1340s and 1350s. I should stress, however, all that this is very tentative and hypothetical. X. cheopsis was almost certainly not responsible for spreading the Black Death throughout Europe; most specialists in plague fleas believe that only the first stages of transmission were the work of Egyptian rat fleas, and that most of the damage that occurred during the Black Death was inflicted by the human flea.
Sussman writes in some detail about the concept of plague foci, or “plague reservoirs” – areas which play host to a population of infected animals over a period of many years, and even centuries. He traces the evolution of the idea, which really got established as a result of turn-of-the-last-century research into the origins of the third global pandemic of 1894 onwards. He points out that, as late as 1881, it was generally accepted that the Black Death was a European and Middle Eastern pandemic which did not penetrate further east than Persia – it was the discovery than endemic centres of the plague existed in northern India and south-west China, in which incidences of the disease could be traced back at least as far as the 1820s, that gave birth to the idea that the Black Death, too, probably had its origins in Asia. The idea was given added credence by the work of Wu Lien-teh, a Chinese epidemiologist working in the 1920s, who identified 12 such foci – two in Africa, and the other 10 in Asia.
The idea that the existence of plague reservoirs explains now only how, but also where, pandemics of bubonic plague originate has entered the mainstream since Wu Lien-teh wrote. McNeill used the hypothesis to suggest that the ultimate origins of the Black Death were in the reservoir that lurked in south-west China, on the border between the Chinese province of Yunnan and Burma. His suggestion was that it began its spread towards Europe practically a century before it erupted into Italy, at the time of the Mongol invasion of Burma in 1252-53. From there, he suggested, it returned the Mongolia via fleas transported in the clothes and saddlebags of the invading warriors, before moving west along long-distance trade routes.
This idea would make more sense if there was any contemporary evidence that the plague reservoir in Yunnan existed in the fourteenth century. In fact, however, the earliest known reference to the existence of the disease in this province dates to no earlier than 1792. For this reason, Benedictow and several other authorities prefer to trace the Black Death to plague reservoirs that existed much closer to the Crimea and to Europe, specifically to the areas around the Caspian Sea that I mentioned earlier.
Varieties of plague
One possible way of resolving all the uncertainties created by the ambiguous evidence offered up by history and epidemiology is to turn directly to biology to better understand the plague bacterium itself.
The foundational work in this regard is that of a French doctor, R. Devignat, who in 1951 identified three different biovars, or strains, of plague, based on a study of their ability or inability to ferment glycerine. He labelled these three pathogens Y. pestis antiqua, Y. pestis medievalis and Y. pestis orientalis, and suggested were responsible for the three global pandemics of plague mentioned above. According to Devignat, Y. pestis medievalis – the strain responsible for the Black Death – probably had an Asian origin, although he speculated that its plague reservoir was probably originally in Kurdistan or southern Russia, much closer to the Crimea than had been imagined hitherto and a direct contradiction of McNeill’s speculations regarding an infestation brought from Burma to the Crimea by Mongol horsemen.
For John Norris, who followed up on Devignat’s work in the mid-1970s, the biological difference that exists between the strains of plague in foci in China and Mongolia on the one hand, and the southern Russian steppes, on the other, clearly argued that the Black Death had its origins in Devignant’s southern Russian reservoir – that is, pretty much where Benedictow and Sussman say it did: somewhere along the shores of the Caspian sea or on the steppes directly to the north, which were then dominated by the Golden Horde.
Reviewing this rather lengthy post, it seems possible to suggest that the evidence that the Black Death originated in the far eastern part of Asia, somewhere in northern China or the steppe directly to the north of the Great Wall, is not supported by much evidence. To argue that it was, in essence, a Chinese disease requires us to make links between “pestilences” that may or may not have been connected, to assume that the disease could make its way across the vast steppe-lands at a time when east-west trade was probably very much disrupted, and to have done all this without impressing any chroniclers in its path with its uniqueness in such a way that they felt compelled to make a record of its symptoms. The Chinese origin theory probably also runs foul of Occam’s Razor; if there was indeed a plague reservoir in the vicinity of the Caspian, an east Asian origin would be far from the most parsimonious explanation for the presence of the Black Death in the Crimea in 1346.
We can conclude, then, that the reason that you have found it so difficult to locate information on the passage of the Black Death through Asia in the fourteenth century is very possibly that it never actually made such a journey, remaining instead a pandemic restricted to Europe and the Middle East.
Ole J. Benedictow, The Black Death 1346-1353: the Complete History (2004); Bruce Campbell, The Great Transition: Climate, Disease and Society in the Late Medieval World (2016); John D. Durand, “The Population Statistics of China, A.D. 2–1953,” Population Studies 13 (1960); John Norris, “East or West? The Geographic Origin of the Black Death,” Bulletin of the History of Medicine 51 (1977); Maria A. Spyrou et al, “Historical Y. pestis Genomes Reveal the European Black Death as the Source of Ancient and Modern Plague Pandemics”, Cell Host & Microbe 19 (2016); John Stewart, Nestorian Missionary Enterprise: the Story of a Church on Fire (1928); George D. Sussman, “Was the Black Death in India and China?”, Bulletin of the History of Medicine 85 (2011)
Q: In Les Misérables, Victor Hugo claims that children were kidnapped during the reign of Louis XV, and rumours were whispered of the King’s ‘purple baths’. What is Hugo referring to here, and would the rumours have been common knowledge to a reader at the time?
A: For those not familiar with Hugo’s work, the passage you are referring to reads as follows:
These abandonments of children, be it said, in passing, were not discouraged by the old monarchy [that is, the Bourbon Ancien Regime which ruled until the French Revolution – Hugo was writing of the early 1830s]… Moreover, the monarchy sometimes had need of children, and then it skimmed the street…
Under Louis XV, children disappeared in Paris; the police carried them off – nobody knows for what mysterious use. People whispered with affright horrible conjectures about the purple baths of the king. Barbier speaks ingenuously of these things. It sometimes happened that the officers running short of children, took some who had fathers. The fathers, in despair, rushed upon the officers. In such cases, the parlement interfered and hung – whom? The officers? No; the fathers.
Hugo is referring here to rumours that abounded during the reign of Louis XV (1715-1774) that the monarch was afflicted with leprosy and was willing to try almost anything in his desperate search for a cure. His source is the lawyer Edmund Barbier’s diaries, published in Paris as the Chronique de la Régence et du Règne de Louis XV (1718–1763) in eight volumes in 1857. According to Barbier, writing on 16 May 1750,
“For a week now people have been saying that police constables in disguise are roaming around various quarters of Paris, abducting children, boys and girls from five or six years old to ten or more, and loading them into the carriages which they have ready waiting nearby.”
Barbier added that it was generally believed that these agents of the monarchy worked on behalf of
“a leprous prince whose cure required a bath in human blood, and there being no blood purer than that of children, these were seized so as to be bled from all their limbs.”
Jones notes that while these rumours did not specifically identify which member of the Bourbon line was leprous, “in accounts which circulated widely at court and which reached the ears of the king himself, that leprous prince was metamorphosed into the morally and spiritually unclean and sexually debauched Louis XV”, leading the king to complain that “the wicked people… are calling me a Herod.”
I should point out that there is, of course, no evidence at all that Louis or any other Bourbon prince had leprosy – but the idea that he might suffer from the disease made perfect sense in contemporary terms. Leprosy had long been believed to be the corporeal manifestation of sin, and there were Biblical precedents for this – in 2 Chronicles, King Ozias is punished for his sins by being afflicted with leprosy. Plenty of other important theological commentators, moreover, made the same association: St Ambrose had said that Jews would be eaten away by leprosy of the body and soul for failing to recognise Christ; St Jerome wrote that leprosy was God’s punishment for the original sin of Adam and Eve; and Gregory of Tours, writing in the 6th century, reported a case in which a thief who had stolen from a church was struck down by leprosy in consequence. Since Louis XV was known to be lazy and feckless; since he was frequently criticised for his inability to rule either energetically or justly; since he spent huge sums of public money on personal pleasures; and since he publicly acknowledged that he kept mistresses, it was no great stretch to assume that he was precisely the sort of monarch who might attract the wrath of a vengeful God.
As for the “purple baths” that Hugo mentions: these were, it appears, imagined to be literally baths of blood. The French “pourpre” is redder than the English “purple”, and the word is often used to refer to the colour of blood, as in the Jean Reno vehicle Les rivières pourpres (2000) – which can be translated as “The Crimson Rivers“. And blood had long been imagined to be a cure for leprosy. It was closely associated with the concepts of vigour and healing, and it wasn’t unknown for rulers to drink blood – according to Maluf, Pope Innocent VIII was given “a draught of blood from three youths for strength and rejuvenation” in 1492, and in fact the idea that the strength and vigour of the young could pass to the sick or elderly via their blood was the main reason why doctors began experimenting with blood transfusion during the sixteenth century.
The use of blood to treat leprosy had been noted as early as the time Pliny (1st century BC), who in book 26 of his Natural History suggested that the “divine kings” of ancient Egypt were allowed, by reason of their divinity, to seek this remedy if stricken with the disease: it was, he wrote,
“deadly for the people when it afflicted the kings, for their baths were usually prepared with human blood for treating it.”
This short passage, Demaitre notes, fuelled “feverish fantasies” in doctors and in other writers, and the idea that restorative baths could be prepared from human blood crops up sufficiently frequently for us to trace its progress across the centuries. Hagiographies of the Emperor Constantine (4th century AD) suggested that, prior to his conversion to Christianity, he had been advised by his priests “to have three thousand children slaughtered and to bathe in their warm blood” as a cure for leprosy – his refusal to countenance the idea was advanced as an early sign of his incipient holiness. An 11th century Latin text, similarly, advised that a leper could recover by bathing in the blood of two infant children, and Hildegard of Bingen recommended the use of menstrual blood as a cure for leprosy brought on by “sexual incontinence”.
So it is not actually that surprising that the people of Paris were willing to believe that, if their king truly did suffer from leprosy, he might seek to kidnap and murder enough children to fill a tub with their fresh, vigorous young blood. And certainly belief in this rumour was strong enough to spark trouble in Paris when the fantasy of murderous monarchs collided with the reality of a Paris police drive to sweep the streets of the French capital of vagrants in 1749-50.
The anti-vagrancy drive had nothing to do with Louis XV and his health, and it was merely a coincidence that it was embarked on at a time when the rumour that the king was leprous was widely believed in Paris. Its roots actually lay in an instruction issued late in 1749 by the Lieutenant General [commander] of the Paris police, Nicolas-René Berryer (1703-62) – a protégé of Louis XV’s mistress the Marquise de Pompadour, but also an innovative officer who is generally credited with both the creation of the Sûreté [“Security Office”] and a domestic espionage system based on networks of police spies. Berryer ordered that
“all beggars and vagrants found in the streets of Paris…of whatever age or sex, shall be arrested and taken to prison, there to be detained for as long as shall be deemed necessary.”
In practice, however, it proved much easier to catch children than adult vagrants, and since the Paris police were being rewarded on the basis of the number of “beggars” they could arrest, they detained a disproportionate number of youngsters – enough for the locals to assume that the round-up was being specifically directed against them. Berryer then further compounded matters by issuing another order for the detention of “all children of workers and bourgeois alike caught gambling in the squares and market places along with other little rascals and vagabonds.” This guaranteed that at least some of those arrested had parents and other relatives on hand to protest the new policies – hence the outbreak of disorder.
It was widely assumed that the children caught up in this drive were not merely being imprisoned in Paris or relocated outside the city. The truth was that the six children whose arrest sparked the rioting in May 1750 were carted off to Le Grand Châtelet, a fortress on the right bank of the Seine, and that others, arrested later, were taken to another prison at Bicêtre, while at least some of the vagrant children detained in the round-ups, meanwhile, are generally believed to have been transported to help populate the French territories in Canada and along the Mississippi. Rumour, however, insisted that they were actually being arrested in order to be supplied to the Bourbon court, and according to one police report, a spy haunting a tavern near the Place des Victoires heard a local woman claim that they would have their revenge for these atrocities: “Our women of Les Halles will go to Versailles to dethrone the King and tear his eyes out.”
The result was serious rioting in at least six areas of the French capital, during which at least 20 people, including one royal official suspected of kidnapping children, were killed. Three of those involved were arrested and hanged for public order offences, and – intriguingly – the police (apparently seeking to distract attention from their own heavy-handedness) were responsible for the unleashing of another rumour: that the riots had been provoked by mysterious “men in black” who worked their way through the crowds assembling on Paris’s streets, and offered money to those willing to start trouble.
It’s worth pausing, in conclusion, to consider the rumour of these “men in black.” Farge & Revel note that the “basic premise” of the contemporary police was that
“disorder cannot exist without someone being guilty of causing it. The police knew perfectly well what had enraged the people of Paris and for the most part they freely admitted it, some of them even going so far as to deplore their colleagues’ actions. However this was rarely put forward as a valid explanation for the revolt. Since, in their view, collective aggression and street violence could never be justified in themselves, they drew on a powerful set of unshakeable beliefs to explain the causes of the situation. One of the strongest of these theories was that if peace was under threat and violence unleashed, it had to be the work of malign forces infiltrating the social body in Paris. The forces of law and order had always been quick to recognize these pernicious invaders.
One thing I am told which I can hardly believe is that at the height of the disturbances… there were three or four individuals pretending to be drunk who were handing money out to people saying, ‘Here, my friends, here are six francs, go and buy some broom handles to attack these rascals with.’ If that were true, it means there were secret leaders to the sedition. Only time and further information will reveal the truth of the matter.
“Despite his careful wording, prosecutor [A.N.] Gueulette, who recorded this rumour of 23 May , did not have much faith in the existence of ‘men in black’ supposedly emerging from the shadows to lead the uprising… Clearly he was not convinced by the enigmatic presence of those archetypal agents provocateurs who were almost too perfect and certainly too elusive to be credible.”
So, there appears to have been no official follow up by the Paris police to the emergence of this rumour. However, I certainly should add that precisely the same supposed mechanism of rumour-generation was very much in evidence again a generation later at the time of the “Great Fear” – a series of rumours that swept France in July-August 1789, during the immediate run-up to the French Revolution. These rumours suggested that the country was being either invaded or scoured by what were variously supposed to have been the Austrians, brigands or gangs of pirates, and once again there were certainly reports that the rumours were spread by mysterious and unidentifiable agitators. However outlandish they may appear to us today, popular belief and wild rumour were, and are, capable of causing real and significant problems for the people who find themselves caught up in the ways that they play out.
Peter Lewis Allen, The Wages of Sin: Sex and Disease, Past and Present (2000); Clare Anderson & Hannah Maxwell-Stuart, Convict Labour and the Western Empires, 1415–1954 (2013); Richard Mowery Andrews, Law, Magistracy, and Crime in Old Regime Paris, 1735-1789, vol.1 (1994); Luke Demaitre, Leprosy in Premodern Medicine: A Malady of the Whole Body (2007); Arlette Farge & Jacques Revel, The Vanishing Children of Paris: Rumor and Politics before the French Revolution (1993); Victor Hugo, Les Misérables; Colin Jones, The Great Nation: France from Louis XV to Napoleon (2003); Georges Lefebvre, The Great Fear of 1789: Rural Panic in Revolutionary France (1932; 2014); NSR Maluf, “History of blood transfusion” in Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences 9 (1954); Alan Williams, The Police of Paris, 1718-1789 (1979).
Hat-tip to Redditor u/Commissar_Sae for information about the French word pourpre.
Q: Do we know of any cases in the Catholic Church when the Advocatus Diaboli (or Devil’s Advocate) successfully argued against someone becoming a saint?
Yes – at least it’s very likely, but it is far from clear which. Kenneth Woodward, in his Making Saints, notes that “many cases do not succeed” – but since judgement is rendered on an overall case, comprising many documents other than the arguments of the Devil’s Advocate, and since no commentary is issued on the judgements that are rendered, it is impossible to be sure whether any cases have been rejected explicitly as a result of the Advocate’s work. In addition, while the prospective candidate for sainthood has already passed several other tests by the point his case reaches the pope for final approval, and while the Advocate’s material is the only explicitly negative portion of the documentation that remains, the decision is the pontiff’s – and a reigning pope is perfectly entitled to take account of some other, unstated, factor not contained in the process documents in rendering a judgement.
Breaking all this down a little further, it’s important to recognise two things. First, the lawyer popularly known as the Devil’s Advocate was not literally some evil agent provocateur seeking to throw a spanner in the works of the church establishment; rather, he was a key bastion of orthodoxy, whose official title was actually Promoter of the Faith, and whose role was to help ensure the worthiness of candidates for sainthood. Secondly, while the procedure created by the church to assess such cases (which was in place from 1587 until its abolition under John Paul II in 1983) was adversarial – with the Devil’s Advocate debating with an advocate for the candidate for sainthood – the role of the Promoter of the Faith was only one part of a much larger process. His advocacy, moreover, was never conducted in the form of an actual trial. Rather, the two advocates pitched written arguments back and forth, often over a period of decades, seeking to hone their arguments regarding the case before them.
The two advocates taking part in this stage of the canonisation process (called the Ordinary Process) were supplied with materials assembled by the local bishop, who was charged – as a first step – with collecting evidence and with determining that the candidate was not the object of a public cult. For several hundred years, the next stage in the process was for this evidence to be reviewed by censors for any evidence of unorthodox teachings or of heresy; it seems certain that far more prospective saints were disbarred as a result of these two steps than were ever failed by the work of the Devil’s Advocate. One example is Jean-Jacques Olier, the 17th century French founder of the Society of Saint-Sulpice, who was proceeding slowly towards canonisation in the 19th century when a publication of his containing unorthodox views on the Virgin Mary was uncovered. Olier’s process was immediately halted. Since 1940, the advocates of a candidate for sainthood also have to obtain a declaration of nihil obstat (“nothing objectionable”) from Rome, which is based on a search of the files of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith – the group responsible for maintaining the well-known Index Librorum Prohibitorum, or list of banned books.
The adversarial phase in which the Devil’s Advocate participated began after these checks. It started with the selection of a “postulator”, a lawyer who would argue the prospective saint’s cause, who was selected from a group of canon lawyers (still in existence and currently around 200 strong) recognised by the Congregation. The postulator, in turn, selected his own Devil’s Advocate from among a smaller group of around two dozen lawyers licensed by the Holy See to handle such cases. Both men received copies of the materials produced by the local bishop, examined them, and began to engage in a dialectic, which might, as noted above, go on for decades, but which eventually produced a printed positio which incorporated the materials produced by the bishop and the key arguments of both advocates.
It was this positio that was considered by the cardinals and prelates associated with the canonisation process, and which went to the pope for approval. But this was not (and is not) the end of the process. Cases that passed this initial test went into a new “Apostolic Process” in which the office of the Promoter of the Faith drew up a new set of queries relating to the virtues of the candidate, which had to be considered by a new tribunal held in the candidate’s diocese. This collected additional evidence – from eyewitnesses where possible – which was sent back to Rome and used in the preparation of a new document, the informatio, which systematically laid out the case.
The Devil’s Advocate and the advocate for the putative saint would again register points for and against the candidate, based this time on examination of the informatio, which would again be printed, and would again be studied by the Congregation; and this entire process was repeated three times, with the advocates on either side getting repeated opportunities to advance new arguments and respond to existing ones. The pope himself would take part in the third of these exchanges, and only candidates who received the final approval of the pontiff could proceed.
But even that was not the end of the procedure – those candidates who survived examination of their credentials still had to go through the processes of beatification and then canonisation, meaning that between two and four miracles had to be attributed to them and accepted as genuine as a result of separate studies by the Consulta Medica, a tribunal of Catholic doctors tasked with assessing evidence assembled to show that a reported cure could not be anything but miraculous. In addition, beatification was subject to a final sign off which might be, and sometimes was, put on hold if the candidature was politically sensitive (for example, in the case of a martyr who had died at the hands of a regime that was still in power by the time he or she came up for consideration). Typically there has always been a further delay between beatification and canonisation, during which more miracles are required to occur. Since the late 19th century, the act of canonisation itself has been made by infallible decree of the pontiff, meaning that it is not something that can ever be reconsidered or withdrawn.
Finally, it seems incontestable that the pontiff takes a key role not only in the process of canonisation, but also in the selection and acceptance of candidates, and can steamroll the entire process if he wishes – as John Paul II did in 2002 in the case of Juan Diego Cuauhlatoatzin, the main actor in the supposed visions of the Virgin Mary that took place at Guadalupe in Mexico in the early 16th century. There is considerable doubt as to whether Juan Diego actually existed at all, so his canonisation is good evidence that the elaborate process set out above is, at least in certain circumstances, more window-dressing than serious investigation in any case. So is the dramatic increase in the number of beatifications and canonisations dealt with by John Paul II, who not only abolished the devil’s advocate’s role but also, in the course of his 27-year reign, approved the candidacies of more people than all other popes put together since the modern system was created in the 17th century. So, arguably, is the controversial canonisation of Josemaría Escrivá, founder of Opus Dei, which was at least in part the product of the investment of significant resources in creating and arguing his case by the members of his own order.
Still, all in all, the process of canonisation has been, more often than not, a very protracted one (Benedict XIV, in the 18th century, set the timescale as a minimum of 100 years, a ruling that is no longer in effect; John Paul II was canonised in 2014, only nine years after his death). It’s one in which the Devil’s Advocate played an important but far from central role. Candidates for sainthood might fall out of the process at any time, for a variety of reasons, and while successful objections lodged by the Promoter of the Faith are certainly one possible cause of the failure of a candidacy, such failures were never formally announced as such.
John L. Allen, Jr., The Future Church: How Ten Trends are Revolutionizing the Catholic Church (2009); John Cornwall, Hitler’s Pope: the Secret History of Pius XII (2000); John Cornwall, “A game of miracles: how saints are made,” New Statesman 25 July 2013; Donald S. Prudio, Certain Sainthood: Canonization and the Origins of Papal Infallibility (2015); Kenneth Woodward, Making Saints: How the Catholic Church Determines Who Becomes a Saint, Who Doesn’t, and Why (1996)
Q: In 1801, Tsar Paul I of Russia was assassinated by conspirators funded by the British government. How did the British have the means to assassinate a monarch of a European superpower at the beginning of the 19th century?
A: This is a very interesting question, the answer to which opens up some fascinating windows not only into the early history of national intelligence services, but also into our understanding of the historians that study them.
Let’s begin, for those unfamiliar with this period, with a brief history of Tsar Paul, son of Catherine the Great, and with the events surrounding his murder.
Paul came to the throne on his mother’s death, in 1796. By that time he was 42 years old, married, and had an adult son, Alexander, who was 19. The new Tsar had spent his early adulthood being kept at arm’s length from the business of ruling Russia, and the historical consensus is that he proved to be a generally incompetent, capricious and poor-tempered ruler. His foreign policy saw him change sides in the Napoleonic Wars in 1800; having been elected as Grand Master of the Knights Hospitaller in 1798, and been promised that the order’s base, Malta, would be handed over to him after the French were expelled from it, the Tsar was enraged when the British reneged on the deal and retained control of the island. In retaliation, Paul expelled the British ambassador to Russia, Charles Whitworth, and allowed himself to be persuaded to drop out of the Second Coalition against Napoleon in favour of joining Prussia and Sweden in the so-called League of Armed Neutrality.
On top of all that, in January 1801 the Tsar committed to an attack on British India, ordering the Don Cossack host to proceed through Khiva and Afghanistan to the Indus, destroy the British armies there, “liberate the oppressed from their overlords, gently bring them under our dependence, and divert their trade to us.” Astoundingly, it seems Paul believed that this incredibly ambitious project, conducted in harsh conditions in midwinter, would not only succeed, but could be completed in little more than a month.
So, while it’s unclear exactly how much the British knew of the Cossack threat, London certainly had strong reasons for wanting the Tsar off the throne in the weeks and months before Paul’s death, and we also know that the British were preparing to take military action against Russia; shortly before Paul’s assassination, a Royal Navy squadron sailed into the Baltic with orders to make for St Petersburg.
Britain was, nonetheless, far from the only enemy that the Tsar had. Some accounts of Paul’s foreign policy suggest his withdrawl from the Second Coalition was a product not of British action over Malta, but of his distrust of Austria, which, he feared, was preparing to annex territory in Italy. In addition, the Tsar had as many domestic enemies as one might expect of a ruler who was prone to violent rages and the imposition of severe discipline, and who was also in the process of implementing a number of relatively progressive policies – several of which had the potential to upset elements of Russia’s ruling classes. For example, Paul attempted to reduce the burdens of serfdom, clamped down on corruption in the Russian government, and preferred to appoint professional bureaucrats over gentleman place-men in his administration.
The plot to remove the emperor is generally agreed to have been led by the military governor of St Petersburg, Count Pahlen, and approved by the heir to the throne – certainly it’s very telling that when Alexander became Tsar, he failed to punish any of the conspirators who had had removed his father. Pahlen assembled a group of discontented nobles and senior army officers, who in March 1801 forced their way into the Tsar’s palace, either bearing a pre-prepared abdication document, or at least having the intention to force Paul to write and sign one. When Paul resisted he was strangled and trampled to death.
Historians remain divided as to the motives of the regicides. The consensus, it is fair to say, favours the idea that the assassins were a poorly organised group who were drunk when they burst into the imperial apartments and had no clear idea of how they expected events to pan out, and that Paul’s death was not only unintended, but not necessary to their plans. Nonetheless, some evidence has been advanced to suggest that Britain was behind the murder, and that it had been planned in London and co-ordinated by Whitworth. Some of it is merely circumstantial: one of the conspirators, Levin von Bennigsen, was a Hanoverian mercenary, though he was apparently a late addition to the plot, and not apparently one with any significant ties to the British; and James Talbot, who was a close associate of Whitworth’s, was apparently relatively close by, in Sweden, in the run-up to the murder. The most widely cited piece of evidence, meanwhile, is a passing mention in a letter of Napoleon’s, which darkly accused British spies of being responsible for the murder.
Nothing in the letter, however, suggests that Napoleon had any specific evidence to back up the suggestion. All of which leaves us with the work of Elizabeth Sparrow, whose Historical Journal paper on the UK government’s “Alien Office” – set up to monitor foreigners in Britain during the Napoleonic Wars, but, Sparrow claims, later a sort of precursor intelligence agency – and book Secret Service: British Agents in France, 1792-1815 contain the only referenced claims concerning British involvement in the murder of Tsar Paul.
it is in the nature of the service that only records of failures were preserved, for the very good reason that they were necessary to protect the individuals concerned… Success must be attributed to conventional warfare or diplomatic treaty and never to the secret service. I have not therefore attempted to include the one great success in the years discussed, but there is reason to believe that the assassination of Paul I was directed from the alien office, almost certainly with the assistance of Calonne [who was a French royalist and the former Minister of Finance to Louis XVI]. There is a paper in the foreign office files which suggests that Lord Whitworth laid the basis of the plan, and the French records unequivocally state that that was so. They also name an agent, Charles-Philippe de Bosset, a Swiss officer from Neuchatel, whose employment by the alien office is well documented, as the man who is believed to have taken the order from London to St Petersburg for the operation to be put into effect.
Unfortunately, Sparrow never quotes directly from the documents she cites – her British archive reference is “Unsigned communication, dated Paris, 13 Mai 1801, P.R.O., F.O. 95” and her French one is “Jean Tulard, ‘Whitworth, Sir Charles’, Dictionnaire Napoleon (Paris, 1987), p. 1750; Constantin de Grunwald, L’Assassinat de Paul 1er Tsar de Russie (Paris, 1960), pp. 174-5″, so it’s impossible to say with any certainty whether they are actually as incriminating as she suggests. It’s worth pointing out that few academics have followed her lead, with the exception of William R. Nester, a professor of political science at St John’s, Newfoundland, whose book on British power in the period not only follows Sparrow (without citing any additional evidence), but rather surprisingly uses her work to allege that
circumstantial evidence links the Alien Office to such “wet operations” as the attempted murder of Napoleon Bonaparte in 1800 and actual murder of Tsar Paul in 1801.
It certainly does seem to be the case that there was sufficient discontent within senior circles in St Petersburg to make it relatively unsurprising that Paul was deposed, and that British intervention would not have been required to bring about this result. Similarly, the half-organised, semi-farcical assassination that actually occurred was not the sort of plot that could only ever have been brought to fruition with foreign help; it was also scarcely something that required “funding,” and no one has produced evidence that the British had any reason to be certain that Paul’s son Alexander would return Russia to the coalition fold, which he eventually did – rather than carry on with his father’s attempts to invade India, which Napoleon certainly encouraged him to do. Conversely, it is possible to make the argument that Sparrow, like other intelligence historians, is prone to exaggerate the influence and impact of secret service operations, and also true that her depiction of the Alien Office as a ruthless and efficient proto-SOE hardly squares with the amateurish, uncertain, thuggish murder that actually took place in St Petersburg in March 1801 – a conspiracy that, inter alia, involved the leader of the plot and half his men getting so lost in the palace gardens that they did not arrive until after the emperor was dead. And, very definitely, the British did not have the capacity, in 1801, to assassinate the Tsar without significant co-operation from a large number of the most senior figures in the Russian state.
Finally, I should point out that Sparrow was not a professional historian, and came to her study of the Alien Office via an unusual path – so, while she deserves praise for her diligent and imaginative research methods, it is permissible to wonder whether her accounts are as cautious as would be considered ideal for an historian of this rather complex period of history. Certainly I, reading her stuff, thought it involved quite a lot of unproven assumptions and was terrible at placing the activities of the Alien Office within the broader context of British strategy and aims in the Napoleonic period.
Main sources were:
Richard Cavendish, “The murder of Tsar Paul I”, History Today 51:3 (2001)
Janet Hartley et al, Russia and the Napoleonic Wars (2015)
William R. Nester, Titan: The Art of British Power in the Age of Revolution and Napoleon (2016)
Andrew Roberts, Napoleon the Great (2016)
Elizabeth Sparrow, “The Alien Office, 1792-1806”, Historical Journal 33:2 (1990)
Elizabeth Sparrow, Secret Service: British Agents in France, 1792-1815 (1999)
But I also skimmed through of a number of period studies and mainstream histories of the period, including AC Czartoryski, Memoirs of Prince Adam Czartoryski and His Correspondence with Alexander I; Marie-Pierre Rey, Alexander I: The Tsar Who Defeated Napoleon (2016); and WB Walsh, Readings in Russian History: From the Reign of Paul to Alexander III (1963). As I say, these also tend to suggest that the conspirators’ intention was to force an abdication, not murder Paul.
Czartoryski’s verdict is:
It will be seen from the above narrative how easy it would have been for the undertaking to have been foiled by an accident, notwithstanding the precautions which had been taken to ensure its success.
With regard to your final point: we just don’t know for certain. But Czartoryski says he was willing to countenance keeping his father in some sort of detention while he acted as regent, and the presumption is that he had been an active, if not especially willing, participant in the plot, even if he had not wanted it to end in his father’s murder. In the early years of his reign, Czartoryski concludes,
Alexander’s position with regard to his father’s murderers was an extremely difficult and painful one. For a few month he believed himself to be at their mercy, but it was chiefly his conscience and a feeling of natural equity which prevented him from giving up to justice the most guilty of the conspirators. He knew that there was a general sympathy for the objects of the conspiracy, and that those who had personally taken part in their realisation had only decided to do so when they were assured of his consent. It would have been difficult under these circumstances to distinguish between degrees of guilt; every member of the society of St Petersburg was more or less an accomplice in the fatal deed…
Q: Did Coca-Cola produce a clear version of Coke for General Zhukov that could be disguised as vodka? If so, for how long was this going on?
A: Zhukov’s “white Coke” was a product of the Coca-Cola Company’s Technical Observer programme, established with the help of the US Army during World War II as part of a plan to raise morale among American troops by ensuring they had a constant supply of their preferred non-alcoholic beverage.
The story seems to have originated in interviews conducted by Mark Pendergrast in the late 1980s and early 1990s for his unauthorised history of Coca-Cola. He reports that, in the course of the war, Coke sent 248 TOs into the main combat zones, each of them exempt from conscription thanks to “a remarkably cozy arrangement” with US draft boards. The TOs were charged with installing Coke manufacturing and bottling plants behind the lines and ensuring supplies of the proprietary syrup from which the drink was made came through safely from the States. Between them, they were responsible for serving the US armed forces a total of 10 billion Cokes in the course of the war. The scheme was a propaganda triumph for the Americans (and Coke), with MacArthur personally autographing the first bottle of Coke to come off the production line in the Philippines after the liberation. Eisenhower was also a supporter of the programme, and according to the Times-Herald (19 June 1945), on his return to Washington after the war,
After feasting copiously at the Statler luncheon yesterday, Gen. Eisenhower was asked if he wished anything else.
‘Could somebody get me a Coke?’ he asked.
After polishing off the soft drink, the General said he had one more request. Asked what he wanted, he answered:
Coke had withdrawn from central Europe during the war, though thanks to the efforts of some remarkably loyal local employees, their operation in Germany had managed to stay in existence during the conflict under another name and without its lead product – Fanta being the most famous replacement drink it introduced during this period. But the Company took aggressive steps to recover its position after the war ended, opening 38 new plants in southern Europe in the years 1946-47 alone in an effort to prevent Pepsi from establishing itself in what had once been Coke territories.
One of Coke’s TO’s in Europe was Mladin Zarubica, a wartime PT boat captain who was sent to Austria in 1946 to supervise the installation of a massive new bottling plant there, four city blocks long and capable of producing 24,000 cases of the beverage per day. Zarubica’s relations with the US Army were typically close – the first consignment of the sugar required by the new plant was guarded by 500 GIs to prevent it being plundered by black marketeers. He also had sufficient influence to get a huge villa in Berchtesgaden refurbished as a base for corporate entertainment. “We had waiting lists to come there,” he recalled. “Senators, potentates, you name it.”
It was Zarubica who arranged for the engineering of Zhukov’s “white Coke.” According to his account, Eisenhower had introduced Zhukov to Coke during their time together in the Occupied Zones, when Zhukov was in charge of the Russian zone and Eisenhower of the American one. Zhukov liked the drink enough to request Eisenhower’s subordinate, Mark Clark, for a supply of it, but with one proviso:
It couldn’t look anything like Coke. As the central Russian war hero, Zhukov knew he couldn’t be seen drinking an American imperialist symbol. Clark passed the request up the line to President Truman, who summoned Jim Farley [Chairman of the Board of the Coca-Cola Export Corporation], and soon word filtered back to Zarubica, who found a chemist to take out the caramel coloring. Then the Coca-Cola man had the Crown Cork and Seal Company in Brussels make a special straight, clear bottle with a white cap and a red star in the middle.
Zarubica’s first shipment of White Coke for Zhukov amounted to 50 cases of the drink. In addition to the benefit to Soviet/US relations, there was also a plum for Coke: “The regular Coke supply from [the manufacturing plant at] Lambach had to pass through the Russian zone to reach its Vienna warehouse. While other supplies often waited weeks for the Russian bureaucracy to allow them through, the Coke shipment was never stopped.”
So Zarubica’s account explains how and why Zhukov’s white Coke came to be manufactured, but unfortunately he gives us no clue as to how long it was made for. We also need to be aware that the whole incident has been filtered through the lens of the – very often self-glorifying – Coke company tradition; in fact, outside the Coke tradition, I’ve seen no evidence the incident took place. There’s good evidence in Zarubica’s book The Year of the Rat that he could be a highly unreliable narrator; the book suggests that the guide he hired to hunt chamois during a holiday in the Tyrol around this time turned out to be Martin Bormann.
But there is one interesting bit of corroborating evidence. Pendergrast’s book contains an appendix discussing the famous “secret formula” for the Coke syrup that lies at the heart of the Company’s IP and contributes substantially to its mystique. This formula, notoriously, is available only to a tiny number of Company high-ups, there are restrictions in place to prevent all those who know it travelling together on the same plane, and in 1977 the Company withdrew from India rather than share the formula with the Indian government – which had demanded sight of it as a condition for Coke continuing to trade in India.
In the course of his research, Pendergrast uncovered what he believed to be the original formula in the Coke archives – unlabelled and apparently missed by the Company archivists. When he interviewed Zarubica, and mentioned he had a Coke formula, the former TO responded:
“Oh, really? So do I. The Company gave me one when I had to take the colour out for Zhukov. Want to see it?”
I did indeed. When the photocopy of his January 4, 1947, correspondence arrived, it contained exactly the same formula that I had found in the archives – same amounts, same format, even the same misspelling of “F.E. Coco.” The only difference was that Zarubica’s formula was incomplete, leaving off the final two ingredients in 7X [the flavouring at the heart of the Company’s formula]. It appeared they hadn’t wanted to release the complete formula and had taken the precaution of altering it in this fashion… [leaving] enough for his chemist to figure out how to turn brown Coke to white.
Of course Zarubica could still have been lying about the Zhukov incident – but, if so, for what reason would Coke have sent a mere TO a copy of its sacred formula? He had no need of it to run a manufacturing or bottling plant, since Coke always made up the syrup in the US and shipped it out to overseas partners. That was the way it ensured the secret was kept. And Zarubica never claimed to have done anything else that would have involved him in tampering with the formula to produce a variant Coke.
So since Pendergrast was not a Coke man (and Coke wasn’t happy he published the original formula in his book), I’d say it’s not a bad bit of supporting evidence.
Mark Pendergrast, For God, Country and Coca-Cola: The Unauthorized History of the Great American Soft Drink and the Company That Makes It (1993); Mladin Zarubica, The Year of the Rat (1964).
Q: Why did Poland have lower rates of Black Death than other European countries during the 1300s?
I’m in the middle of creating an essay/presentation on this topic, and I’m having trouble finding concrete, sourced info. I’ve read anecdotal information on Reddit, Quora, etc. about the leadership of King Casimir the Great and the lack of cat-killing playing a role, among other things. What I really need is some quality, sourced primary or secondary information about the topic.
A: I agree with you that this question deserves proper investigation, and a better sourced answer to what is a pretty frequently posted query. My contribution is this short critical review of sources. I need to start by stressing that I do not read Polish and that the real answer, insofar as one does exist or can exist, is almost certainly going to be found in specialist economic and demographic studies done by Polish-speaking scholars. I’d strongly encourage anyone able to supplement our knowledge with information drawn from such sources to do so.
That said, I think we can make a couple of basic points that take us further than we’ve gone so far. The first is that Poland has not always been associated with low incidences of plague deaths. Something happened at some point in the 20th century to change our ideas as to how the relative incidence of plague in Poland should be viewed, and it’s interesting and revealing to investigate what exactly that “something” was, and to what extent it was based on heavy-duty primary source research in Poland.
My second point is that there is some reason to suppose that the association of Poland with low incidence of plague is a product not of any actual variance in the death rate, but of lack of sources or lack of research. Ziegler, in his influential popular history of the Black Death (1969), makes the point that “until quite recently it was accepted tradition that the plague scarcely penetrated to Castile, Galicia and Portugal”; but he accepts that more detailed investigation of these regions dispelled the idea. This seems important to me, especially as discussions of Poland as mysteriously almost “plague free”, and forming a dramatic contrast to the rest of Europe, are pretty much entirely an internet phenomenon; while historians of the period, and even historians of plague, concede that the region did experience the Black Death somewhat differently to the lands to the west, they do not see that history as so different that they seem to have felt compelled to launch in-depth investigations to understand why; the explanation most commonly suggested in scholarly texts is that the population density of the area in this period was too low to allow the disease to be transmitted readily. Hence it seems to me to be at the very least possible that the idea that the Polish experience of the Black Death was unique, or almost so, is actually wrong, and that the explanations you cite for the supposed lesser incidence of plague deaths in the region (no cat-killing, the leadership of Casimir the Great) are post-hoc rationalisations – attempts to find explanations that fit the supposed evidence – rather than being sourced in contemporary materials.
Finally, I have to wonder to what extent lack of contemporary source materials impacts on the difficulty of discussing what happened in Poland during the plague years. Assessing the number of deaths caused by the Black Death is a notoriously difficult thing to do, even in countries with significant quantities of extant records, with estimates for total mortality varying dramatically from author to author; even today, after decades of intensive research, one can read estimates of mortality across Europe that vary from a third up to a half up to 60 percent of total population, so it would be astonishing if there was anything like a consensus for Poland, and indeed the materials I’ve read suggest there are dramatic instances of disagreement on crucial matters such as the approximate population of Poland (and even what constituted the “borders of Poland”) in the period 1000-1500. Until such matters are resolved (if it is even possible to do so), we will never be in a position to make any statements about the demographic impact of the Black Death in Poland with any confidence.
Part I: A survey of histories of the plague in Poland, 1832-2015
OK, let’s start with a survey of what has been said about the impact of the Black Death in Poland over time.
• Hecker, a once highly renowned German medical historian, says in his On the Black Death (1832), that the plague arrived in Poland from Germany, and cites the chronicle of Jan Długosz (better known to English speakers as Johannes Longinus Dlugloss) Annales seu cronici incliti regni Poloniae (1515) as his authority for the statement that “in Poland the infected were attacked with spitting of blood and died in a few days in such vast numbers that… scarcely a fourth of the inhabitants were left” – that is, he thought mortality in Poland was practically 75%.
• Most other works published around the middle of the nineteenth century mention Poland only in the context of what was then seen as the most interesting and remarkable thing about the plague’s passage through eastern Europe: “it had thus made the circuit of the Black Sea, by way of Constantinople, southern and central Europe, England, the Northern Kingdoms, and Poland, before it reached Russian territories, a phenomenon which has not again occurred with respect to more recent pestilences originating in Asia.” (Buckle’s Common Place Book 556 (1872)
• Sticker, in his monstrous Treatises on the History of Epidemics and Episcopal Doctrine (1908/10), basing himself on two contemporary chronicles, suggests that the Black Death entered Poland from Hungary and caused incredible mortality. He writes that the plague killed half the population and depopulated entire towns and villages. This estimate is in line with the contemporary figure normally given for plague deaths elsewhere in Europe.
• Similarly, the Polish Encyclopædia (1921) states that “long, for instance, did the land bear the traces of the ‘Black Death’… which swept down with unabated fury upon Poland after decimating the populations of Italy, France, England and other countries of western and central Europe.”
• This seems to have been the consensus for some time. As late as 1969, George Deaux, in his The Black Death, 1347, could write that “the Black Death attacked Hungary and Poland at the same time as it appeared in Austria and with the same results. Towns were left totally depopulated…” In this context, it is interesting to note that Deaux (a popular writer) had access to no population studies for the region more recent than Hecker’s and makes the same claims about 75% mortality in Poland.
Then we come to the mid-20th century shift, after which it is generally accepted that something unusual did happen in Poland. Thus for example…
• Perry Anderson’s Lineages of the Absolutist State, a very broad survey first published in 1974, observes that “Poland suffered less from the late feudal crisis than any other country in Eastern Europe; the Black Death (if not ancillary plague) largely passed it by, while its neighbours were ravaged.”
• Joseph Strayer’s Dictionary of the Middle Ages (1982) says that the plague was devastating “in all of eastern Europe save Poland.”
• Norman Davies’s God’s Playground: A History of Poland (1982) states not only that
“Poland escaped the scourge of the Black Death,” but also makes the extraordinary claim that “economic life was not disrupted.”
• And by 1983, a Rutgers professor, Robert S. Gottfried, could confidently state that “Poland lost about a quarter of its population to the plague.”
To the extent that this “something” is defined, it’s generally placed, as I mentioned above, in the context of relative population density – Poland was too sparsely populated to allow the plague to spread as rapidly as it did elsewhere. Sometimes the relative absence of trade – and hence of both travellers and the sort of transport of goods in which infected rats might hitch rides – is also suggested. It has also been argued that the relatively slow and late enserfment of peasants in eastern Europe suggests there was no demographic catastrophe in the region in the mid-14th century.
And the change in position had certainly been well-cemented by 2000:
• Jerzy Lukowski & Hubert Zawadzki, A Concise History of Poland (2005) p.30 suggest that “the Black Death left a sparsely populated Poland largely unscathed“.
• Adam Zamoyski’s popular Poland: A History (2009) goes so far as to state that “most of Poland remained unaffected. The populations of England and France, of Italy and Scandinavia, of Hungary, Switzerland, Germany and Spain were more than halved. Poland’s grew, perhaps as a consequence of conditions elsewhere.”
• But these are survey works, mostly interested in later periods of Polish history, in which rather basic research and sweeping statements may be expected. Robert Frost, in The Oxford History of Poland-Lithuania, provides a more nuanced discussion. He similarly suggests that the “relatively sparsely peopled lands of east central Europe did not suffer as badly as western and southern Europe from the Black Death,” but adds that “Poland was not untouched. Population growth slowed, but its upward trajectory was not reversed, and by the mid fifteenth century the disparity between the density of settlement in Poland and western Europe had ceased.”
Frost goes on to state that the stream of German migrants heading east was “abruptly halted” by the plague, and that this caused the Polish economy to collapse after 1350, in part because of shortages of specie flowing in from the west. This may well be true, but, if so, it would partially or completely mask any impact to Polish population and economic activity caused by the Black Death within the borders of the kingdom, and make it harder to study the population problem in Poland. I think this is an important point, since once we start to consider Poland as an interconnected part of the broader socio-economic history of eastern Europe, we necessarily also have to start wondering about any claims to either its “isolation” or its “uniqueness”, both of which are central to the popular view of Poland as being mysteriously unaffected by the plague.
Part II: Was there anything special about Poland?
So, what can we do to investigate the idea of “Polish exceptionalism” in the spread of the Black Death?
• To begin with, I think that the literature which is available to me suggests it is actually difficult, verging on impossible, to extrapolate any accurate demographic info for Poland in the period before, during and immediately after the Black Death. The sort of detailed, manor-by-manor, records that still survive for some parts of England, for example, and inform works such as Hatcher’s The Black Death: An Intimate History, simply don’t exist. All we have left are chroniclers’ stories (which are notoriously likely to over-estimate the amount of destruction caused, and certainly seem to have informed the 19th century estimates we’ve seen of 75% death rates in Poland), one detailed – but late – economic study, and extremely broad surveys of Poland’s demography, which attempt to extrapolate large figures from isolated bits of information and tiny samples. Thus…
• The chapters by Christopher Dyer (on rural Europe) and Alexsander Gieysztor (on the post-1370 Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania) in The New Cambridge Medieval History, vol.7 help add to our understanding of all this. Specifically, Dyer takes issue with the idea that it is possible to use the enserfment of Poles as an indicator of demographic crisis in the region:
parts of north-eastern Europe – now Poland and the Baltic states – are often cited as following a course opposite to that found in the west. Weak states, an undeveloped urban sector and a powerful nobility meant that peasant conditions deteriorated, beginning in the period of ‘second serfdom,’ as tenants were restricted in their movement and forced to perform heavy labour services. In fact, the peasants of eastern Europe were being brought under serfdom for the first time (they had been encouraged to settle the new lands in the east with privileges and easy terms in earlier centuries.) Enserfment took a long time, beginning in the later years of the fifteenth century, and was not completed until well after 1500 This cannot therefore be seen as an immediate response to any fall in population.
• Gieysztor notes that the population density of Poland in 1370, after the ravages of the plague, was about 8.6 people per square km, based on a total population of about 2m, but this figure is challenged by Frost, who notes it includes “Mazovia, whose princes recognized Casimir’s overlordship, but not that of the Polish kingdom, or of Louis of Anjou.” A second estimate by Kuklo (Demografia Rzecypospolitej przedrohiorowej, 2009, cited by Frost) excludes Silesia but includes Prussia and Mazovia, and suggests an estimated population of 1.25m in 1000 (with a density of 5 per sq.km) rising to 2m in 1370 (8 per sq.km) and 3.4m in 1500 (13 per sq.km).
• I have found only one detailed study which appears to show the impact of the plague on Poland. Two economic historians, Pelc (a Pole, writing in the 1930s) and Abel (a German, writing in the 30s and again in the 50s, and reorganising Pelc’s apparently opaque series of data), organised wage and price data from Krakow for the period beginning in 1369. This is a little late to be ideal, but Abel’s broad conclusion was that the Polish data matched equivalent figures from France and England for the same period; that is, there was a major fall in grain prices, and a major rise in wages, both of which are best explained by a significant decline in population. Benedictow observes that while these figures only relate to one Polish town, they must imply that there was a shortage of labour across at least much of Poland, otherwise the availability of higher wages would have encouraged immigration to Krakow.
These patterns therefore suggest the impact of the plague on Poland was similar to that in western Europe – that is, very significant.
• We can also attempt to trace the idea that Poland’s escape from contagion was a product of special factors – the ideas, frequently encountered online that Casimir the Great “wisely quarantined the borders” or that Polish love of cats was a determining factor. The earliest reference to the former I can find appears in Christine Zuchora-Walske’s Poland (2013), and though I would certainly love to have a contemporary source, I have to point out that even if something of the sort actually was ordered, that’s not proof that an order was effectively implemented, or had a measurable impact.
As for cats – the idea that they helped retard the spread of plague can be traced back online at least to 2010 (though not in the context of Poland), but not to any academic study I have found. I have not seen any evidence that suggests either that cats were commonly massacred in most of Europe in this period because they were associated with the devil, as Hollee Abbee argues, or indeed that the Poles were less likely to kill cats than people of any other group. And it seems well established that cats can act as carriers of both bubonic and pneumonic plague in any case, so the idea that Polish cats were efficiently disposing of diseased rats, without picking up fleas and contracting plague themselves, seems highly dubious (see Kauffman et al; Doll et al, Weiniger et al, all in the sources at the foot of this post).
[We’re actually passing another historical rabbit hole here, one I just don’t have the time right now to explore in any depth. But briefly: it’s possible to trace the idea that there was an extensive slaughter of cats in Europe the period before the Black Death to various discussions of a Papal decretal known as Vox in Rama, issued by Gregory IX in c.1233. Thus Wikipedia features an entry for this document suggesting it was issued to condemn a sect of German heretics uncovered in Mainz who “worshiped devils in the forms of a demonic man and of a diabolical black cat”. The same entry goes on to claim that
Some historians have claimed that Vox in Rama is the first official church document that condemns the black cat as an incarnation of Satan. In the bull the cat is addressed as “master” and the incarnate devil is half-man half-feline in nature. Engels claims that Vox in Rama was “a death warrant for the animal, which would be continued to be slaughtered without mercy until the early 19th century.” It is said that very few all-black cats survive in western Europe as a result.
The sources given for these statements are Donald Engels’s book Classical Cats: The Rise and Fall of the Sacred Cat(1999) and Malcolm Lambert’s The Cathars (1998). I have not found any sources dating to earlier than 1995 that make this claim, or any more solidly scholarly resources, of any date, that suggest the decretal resulted in any persecution of cats whatsoever, but there are plenty of internet resources out there making precisely this claim in extravagant fashion, for example “That One Time the Pope Banned Cats and It Caused the Black Plague”. Kors and Peters stress that Vox in Rama was not a bull (as it is often stated to be), and never entered canon law. The decretal also suggests devils take the form of frogs and toads, so any focused persecution of cats would seem odd. And anyway, even Engels suggests only black cats were killed, presumably leaving Europe’s population of other-coloured cats untouched.
So what we seem to be seeing here is another process of post-hoc rationalisation, where the line of argument – flawed throughout – goes something like this:
- Gregory IX’s decretal suggested that cats were the tools of the devil.
- This prompted a great cat massacre, lasting for centuries, which killed most of the cats of Europe.
- Without cats, the rats that carried the Black Death were able to flourish, significantly increasing the impact and spread of disease.
- Poland escaped the ravages of the plague.
- Therefore the Poles cannot have massacred their cats.
… but the argument itself is obscured by the fact that the articles, essays and blog posts that result from it start with the definite – but unsourced and unproven – statement that the Poles had always had a special relationship with their cats, one so unique and so strong that it allowed them, and only them, to ignore the Papal “orders” contained in Vox in Rama.]
• Finally, it’s worth adding that other explanations have also been hazarded, again apparently only very recently. For example Norman Cantor’s In the Wake of the Plague: The Black Death and the World It Made observes that “the absence of plague in … Poland is commonly explained by the rats’ avoidance of these areas due to the unavailability of food the rodents found palatable.” This seems an extraordinary idea, and it took only a minute’s searching to uncover (for instance in Lardner) Polish chroniclers’ tales featuring “countess multitudes of rats, of an enormous size,” which seems to argue pretty strongly against the idea that such vermin were scarce in the area.
Part III: The smoking gun
So, with all that said, let’s look at the reason for the seismic shift in attitudes to the impact of the plague in Poland, which, as we’ve seen, takes place (at least in the English language sources) in about 1969-74. I think it is possible to identify exactly where the idea that Poland was somehow less badly affected by the Black Death comes from. The clue comes from Philip Ziegler’s best-selling and influential popular history, The Black Death – published in 1969, remember – which states (p.118):
Dr Carpentier has prepared a map of Europe at the time of the Black Death showing the movements and incidence of the plague. Virtually nowhere was left inviolate. Certain areas escaped lightly: Bohemia; large areas of Poland; a mysterious pocket between France, Germany and the Low Countries; tracts of the Pyrenees.
It seems to be Élisabeth Carpentier’s map, then – first published in the French journal Annales in 1962, but given a substantial push in its cross-over into English by Ziegler – which helped to introduce the idea that Poland escaped much of of the impact of the Black Death. Now, admittedly, if this information is merely written down, it’s hard to understand how Carpentier’s work makes it possible for us to privilege Poland’s exceptionalism. After all, she and Ziegler go on to list other areas of Europe that also appear to have almost escaped its ravages. (In this context, it’s well worth adding, at this point, that the legend Carpentier adds below the map specifically draws attention to the apparent escape of Milan from the worst effects of the plague. That has also become an item of popular belief, and is very frequently the subject of questions posted online.)
We need to look at the map itself [above] to understand how it could have had such a dramatic impact. It illustrates the regions lightly touched by the Plague using shading – and simple geography dictates that the area left “untouched” in Poland is well over ten times the size of the next largest bit of shading, covering Béarn, in the northern reaches of the Pyrenees. Don’t believe me? How about this version of the same map, coloured this time, but taken originally from Angus Mackay’s Atlas of Medieval Europe? Or the spectacular gif offered by Wikipedia to show the spread of the outbreak? Looking at these, it would be hard not to conclude that something amazing happened in Poland in 1347-60, something requiring some remarkable explanation.
I think a glance at Carpentier’s map, by itself, is sufficient to let us see how the idea that Poland was somehow veryspecial came about – and when we couple that with mention of the effect (and publication of the map) in Ziegler’s book, which was and is by far the best-selling popular study of the Black Death in English, we can make a pretty educated guess as to how it wormed its way into our collective consciousness, and from there crossed over onto the internet. It must have helped that, as early as 1964, the same map was also republished in Scientific American.
While it was crossing over into the Anglophone world, however, the map was also attracting some criticism, by far the most interesting example of which is an article by David Mengel of Xavier University which appeared in Past & Present(pretty much as prestigious a history journal as there is, it seems hardly necessary to add) in 2011. Mengel’s focus is on the widely-accepted escape of the Kingdom Bohemia (a region very roughly equivalent to the modern Czech Republic) from the worst ravages of the plague, but what he says applies equally to the very similar situation with regard to Poland. His paper acknowledges the “influential role of popular history in shaping the questions and assumptions of scholars” and also discusses “the power of cartography to convey historical arguments.” He calls the influence of Carpentier’s map “astounding”.
Mengel’s criticisms are backed by those of a Czech historian, Frantisek Graus, who was the author of several highly detailed studies of Bohemia, which drew on sources – chronicles, sermons and letters – that had never previously been used in plague studies. Graus’s work showed that there was far less uniformity in the impact of the plague in Bohemia than Carpentier’s – very broad brush – map implied. More importantly, it concluded that while Bohemia had probably not suffered exceptionally severely from the initial outbreak of plague in 1349-50, the disease had returned in catastrophic style in 1380, visiting an exceptionally severe outbreak of plague on Prague and other major cities in the kingdom. In other words, Bohemia was not in some way uniquely resistant to the plague. It got (relatively) lucky once, but overall suffered at least as badly from the Black Death as did most other parts of Europe. In fact, Graus’s work is largely a call for the Black Death to be placed in a much broader context, as part of a wider pattern of epidemics. This, he stresses, is certainly how contemporaries saw it, though we can also read his work as a plea for the social crisis of the fourteenth century to be viewed in classical Marxist terms, and not as the product of the chance intervention of mere pathogens. For Graus, it was Bohemia’s proximity to (and not, as Ziegler mistakenly argued, distance from) Europe’s major trade routes that explained the impact of the epidemic in 1349-50 and 1380.
There are plenty examples of the sort of problems caused by basic acceptance of the idea that various areas of Europe “escaped” the plague – it’s invidious to pick out examples, really, but this is an important issue, so see for instance the Rutgers undergraduate paper referenced in the notes. It’s an example of what happens when you assume something to be true and then try grimly to explain it, without challenging yourself further on your initial assumption.
In summary, however, it’s very worth going back to Carpentier’s original essay, and consulting that alongside our study of the map. It’s at once clear that she is making no strident claims for the apparent exceptionalism of Poland (or indeed Milan), but rather presenting what is explicitly identified as a preliminary map. I think it’s certainly unhelpful that she felt able to suggest that there were areas in Europe that were left untouched by plague – something we simply do not have the sources to be sure of. But she goes on to state that more work would allow for the production of a better map which, she expects, will show much finer and more precise variations in mortality by city and by region.
So Carpentier’s map, in and of itself, is not really the culprit here. The real problem is that the map has not been republished with her textual caveats intact – indeed, in many cases it has been republished without any sort of source attribution, making it impossible even for interested and diligent students to go back to the original and realise how badly out of context her work has been taken. Among the culprits in this regard have been several very widely circulated books, such as Fred Hoyle and Chandra Wickramasinghe’s Diseases from Space (1979), which argues for an extraterrestrial origin for the plague.
There’s only one thing left to do at this point, and that’s to ask exactly what encouraged Carpentier to conclude that Poland experienced the Black Death differently to practically every other part of Europe. After all, however inadvertently, her paper, and her map, have caused a thousand lazy writers on the net – and some first-rate historians, as well – to think of Poland as some sort of shining beacon in the grim history of mid-fourteenth century Europe. What on earth prompted her to identify the kingdom as an area “partiellement ou totalement épargnées par la peste” – partially or totally spared by the plague? What evidence did she cite, and how much detail did she go into? Could it be we’re overlooking some crucial bit of evidence that she dug up half a century ago?
Well, the answer to that final question is a resounding “no”. Carpentier’s paper mentions Poland only once, and pretty much in passing. She asserts that the country was “only affected – weakly – in its northern part”, and urges further study, noting in passing that the one Polish chronicle account familiar to her deals solely with Torun, a small town on the Vistula, and is in any case quite useless, being copied word for word from a French source. The problem requires further study, she suggests. Worse still, her brief passage is not footnoted or sourced, making it impossible to tell – without engaging in a major act of historiographical archaeology – how she was able to conclude that only northern Poland was visited by the Black Death. The citations for the rest of the article are all to secondary sources, though – this is a survey article, not a paper based on any primary source research.
All in all, it’s staggering that this short, casually-composed passage – and the map that she drew based on it – has had so massive an impact on plague studies. And it is, to put it as politely as I can, more than a little bit unfortunate that it unleashed a myth that’s only getting ever more entrenched with every general survey of Polish history that’s published, and every bit of internet clickbait written about the Black Death.
This has necessarily been a long post, so a tl;dr seems sensible. I conclude:
• There is currently no detailed, accurate demographic data for Poland in the period up to and after the Black Death that would allow us to extrapolate the number of deaths caused by the plague in this region, even very approximately, with confidence. Data for prices and wages from one major Polish city suggest an impact similar to that experienced in western Europe.
• Poland was not sufficiently isolated from the rest of Europe for isolation to explain its apparent “escape” from plague. And it seems to be the case that it experienced a significant number of deaths, though – perhaps as a consequence of population densities – possibly fewer, in proportion, than more populous states did.
• However, the difficulty of assessing the impact of the Black Death in the kingdom is increased by its integration into the eastern European trading economy of the 14th century. The flow of people and cash eastwards from Germany was sufficiently significant to obscure and confuse any attempt to measure the impact of the plague in Poland, both economically and demographically.
• English-language studies draw on only a couple of contemporary chronicle accounts from the region, not enough to base any proper sort of study on – and these suggest that the impact of the Black Death in Poland was, if anything, at least as catastrophic as it was elsewhere in Europe. More detailed local records may be largely or wholly lacking; if they exist, they have not been the subject of studies that have had an impact in the English-speaking world.
• Nonetheless, no peer-reviewed books and papers written by academic historians, at least in western European languages, suppose there was anything extraordinary about the passage of the plague through Poland.
More modern studies generally suppose that the country escaped relatively lightly in 1347-51, though they acknowledge that it was not unaffected by the plague, nor was it necessarily invulnerable to later outbreaks of epidemic. Since I have not yet come across any such work that cites more detailed surveys of the impact of the Black Death in the region, it may well be that even the writers of these studies are basing their ideas about Poland an the plague on Carpentier and her work.
• Mention of the actions of Casimir the Great in blocking the borders of Poland, or of the idea that the reluctance of Poles to kill cats helped to retard the spread of disease there, exist only in popular books and on the internet; such suggestions only began to appear after 1995. They do appear not to have been made by specialists in Polish history, nor does there seem to be any evidence at all that they are true. It seems more likely they are post-hoc rationalisations, brainwaves dreamed up to explain Poland’s supposed escape from the ravages of the Black Death.
• The idea that areas of Europe (including Poland and Milan) “escaped” or almost escaped the impact of the epidemic can be traced to incautious reading and recopying of a map showing preliminary conclusions only regarding the spread of the disease first published by Carpentier in 1962, and widely republished in English-language popular works from 1969.
[General note: there is a large void in studies of medieval Poland. The literature is relatively abundant up to c.1250 and after the Union of Krewo in 1385, but I have struggled to find a single volume written in the past 50 years, in any language, devoted to the history of Poland after 1250 and before its union with Lithuania, much less a study of the impact of the Black Death there. Benedictow – who devotes a chapter to the question of “Did Some Countries or Regions Escape?” – acknowledges that the dearth of studies of Poland makes it difficult to draw conclusions about the impact of the epidemic there.]
Hollee Abbee, “Cats and the Black Plague,” Owlcation 4 February 2010, accessed 29 October 2017; Wilhelm Abel, Agrarkrisen und Agrarkonjunktur: Eine Geschichte der Land- und Ernährungswirtschaft Mitteleuropas seit dem hohen Mittelalter (1966); Perry Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State (1974); Ole J Benedictow, The Black Death, 1346–1353: The Complete History (2004); Henry Buckle, Miscellaneous and Posthumous Works (1872); Norman Cantor, The Black Death and the World It Made (2001); Élisabeth Carpentier, “Autour de la Peste Noire: Famines et épidémies dans la histoire du XIVe siècle,” Annales, XVII (1962); Alice Creviston, “Economic, social and geographical explanations of how Poland avoided the Black Death,” Rutgers undergraduate paper 2015; Norman Davies, God’s Playground: A History of Poland (1982); George Deaux, The Black Death, 1347 (1969); JM Doll et al, “Cat transmitted fatal pneumonic plague in a person who travelled from Colorado to Arizona.” American Journal of Tropical Medicine & Hygiene 51 (1994); Christopher Dyer, ‘Rural Europe.’ In The New Cambridge Medieval History: Volume 7, c.1415-c.1500 (1998); Robert Frost, The Oxford History of Poland-Lithuania I: The Making of the Polish-Lithuanian Union, 1385-1569 (2015); Alexsander Gieysztor, ‘The Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, 1370-1506.’ In The New Cambridge Medieval History: Volume 7, c.1415-c.1500 (1998); Robert S. Gottfried, The Black Death: Natural and Human Disaster in Medieval Europe (1983); Frantisek Graus, “Autour de la peste noire au XIVe siècle en Bohème,” Annales ESC (1963); J. F. C. Hecker, Der Schwarze Tod im Vierzehnten Jahrhundert (1832); Fred Hoyle and Chandra Wickramasinghe, Diseases from Space (1979); AF Kaufmann et al, “Public health implications of plague in domestic cats.” Journal of the American Veterinary Medical Association 179 (1981); Alan Kors and Edward Peters, Witchcraft in Europe, 400-1700: A Documentary History (2001); Dionysius Lardner, The Cabinet Cyclopædia… History, Poland (1831); Jerzy Lukowski & Hubert Zawadzki, A Concise History of Poland (2005); David C. Mengel, “A plague on Bohemia?” Past & Present (2011); Julian Pelc, Ceny w Krakowie w latach 1369-1600 (1935); National Polish Committee of America, The Polish Encyclopædia (1921); Georg Sticker, Abhandlungen aus der Seuchengeschichte und Seuchenlehre I: Die Pest (1908-10); Joseph Strayer, Dictionary of the Middle Ages (1982); Helen Taylor [ed.], The Miscellaneous and Posthumous Works of Henry Thomas Buckle (1872); Bruce Weiniger et al, “Human bubonic plague transmitted by a domestic cat scratch,” Journal of the American Medical Association 1984; Adam Zamoyski, Poland: A History (2009); Philip Ziegler, The Black Death (1969)
UPDATE [December 2017]
When I first wrote on the Black Death in Poland [October 2017], I pointed out that it was hard to trace the assertions made in Élisabeth Carpentier’s influential paper to their source(s), since the brief passage she devotes to Poland “is not footnoted or sourced, making it impossible to tell – without engaging in a major act of historiographical archaeology – how she was able to conclude that only northern Poland was visited by the Black Death.”
Given the positive reception of this post, and the significance of the problem itself, I’ve found myself unable to leave it at that. Instead, I devoted some additional time over the Christmas holiday to attempting to understand the question in more depth. I now think that I’ve identified the source that Carpentier used, and I’ve also got hold of a copy of Knoll’s book on Piast Poland from 1320-1370. As a result of these investigations, I can add the following comments to my preliminary conclusions:
 The source that Carpentier used for Poland in her Annales paper appears to be f’s Der Schwarze Tod in Deutschland: Ein Beitrag sur Geschichte des Vierzehnten Jahrhunderts (Berlin, 1882), or perhaps some other later work based on it. Carpentier does not list Hoeniger’s book in her footnotes, but it is by far the best researched earlier account of the plague in Germany and Eastern Europe; its discussion of the evidence of contemporary chronicles matches hers; and the book is frequently referenced in other older academic histories of the Black Death.
Hoeniger discusses Poland twice (pp.10-11 and 31-38) and argues that the plague did not visit East Franconia, Bohemia, Silesia and Poland in 1348, though he concedes there was a significant outbreak of the disease in eastern Europe in 1360. The evidences he advances is based not on accounts from Poland in the period 1347-51, however, but on the lack of such accounts. To go through the points made in Der Schwarze Tod one by one, Hoeniger argues:
• That an account by the Italian chronicler Matteo Villani (1283-1363), which notes that plague “raged in the part of Poland which bordered on the German reich” and that this epidemic coincided with an immigration of persecuted Jews into Poland, should be dated to 1360 and not to 1348, as has sometimes been supposed.
• That the itinerary of the Holy Roman Emperor Charles IV shows he stayed in the eastern parts of his dominions between 1349 and 1351, suggesting these provinces were a refuge from the ravages of the Black Death further to the west.
• That the archives of Breslau (now Wroclaw), in Silesia – which had been Polish until 1335 but was in 1348 on the Bohemian side of the Polish-Bohemian border – fail to reveal “any trace of the the ravages of an epidemic.” These archives included correspondence from Charles IV “in which every important event is scrupulously recorded,” but which make no mention of plague, and city accounts that “show no fluctuation that would suggest the impact of the plague on local economic activity until 1358.” I now believe that this passage is the ultimate source for Norman Davies’s suggestion (noted above) that Poland’s “economic life was not disrupted”, even though it actually describes the position in a town that was not then part of Poland.
• That notes in two other contemporary chronicles which have been interpreted as evidence for the appearance of the Black Death in the region in the 1340s are “so vague that they cannot be dated with any certainty.”
• That Stenzel [who was secretary to the Historical and Geographical Section of the Silesian Patriotic Society during the 1830s and who edited Scriptores rerum Silesiacarum, a set of four Polish and Silesian chronicles, for the society] finds no mention of plague in Silesia in the 1340s, “an argumentum ex silentio… which I gladly use for my argument.”
• That evidence for an epidemic of the Black Death that killed a third of the population of Poland given in Długosz’s Historia Poloniae (a significantly later work, as we have seen above) “is certainly of dubious value.” Hoeniger argues that Długosz had no evidence of any visitation of plague, and merely assumed, from his knowledge of the epidemic in southern Europe, that it proved equally virulent to the east. Hoeniger concludes that “the Polish historian has found a gaping gulf in his native tradition, and has arbitrarily supplemented it with foreign reports from other countries.” [Carpentier concurs with this assessment.]
• That two charters of Charles IV (1350 and 1352), dealing with commerce between the towns of Bohemia and Poland and ordering the expulsion of Polish merchants from imperial towns, “would have been superfluous in the event of the rule of the plague in the area”. In other words, Hoeniger is suggesting that the Black Death was so severe that it caused the almost total cessation of ordinary economic activity in Europe in the 1340s and early 1350s.
Hoeniger’s suggestion that the plague essentially spared Bohemia and Poland in 1347-51 is thus based on a fairly impressive array of documentation – chronicles, charter evidence, and royal correspondence – but one that is, collectively, identifiably nineteenth century in character. By this I mean that the author makes no real use of economic evidence; nor does he commit to the sort of painstaking, comparative, line-by-line examination of manorial records and ecclesiastical appointments that underpin much modern research aimed at establishing the demographic impact of the Black Death, and makes broad assumptions – not least the idea that the Black Death caused an almost complete halt in trade and commerce – that modern histories of the period do not support. So, while we can agree with Hoeniger’s criticism of the way in which Villani’s passage has been interpreted, and concede that his arguments concerning the charters of Charles IV deserve consideration, this does not mean that his history is the last word on the impact of the plague in Poland, much less that it is not in need of significant revision in the light of later findings.
Two points are well worth making here. One is that, as the old saw has it, “absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.” The sources Hoeniger quotes may well suggest that the initial outbreak of the Black Death was probably neither as severe nor as widespread in its passage through Poland as it was in France or Italy or England – but it’s scarcely possible to say, at this remove, that the plague did not visit Poland at all during this period. We would do well to remember that the almost complete absence of detailed contemporary records from Eastern Europe, certainly relative to those available for the major nations of the west, may conceal all manner of horrors.
In this respect, secondly, let’s also remember that Hoeniger’s verdict that the Black Death had minimal impact on Poland also extended to the visitation of the disease over the border in Bohemia – a judgement that Graus’s paper “Autour de la peste noire au XIVe siècle en Bohème” and Mengel’s “A Plague on Bohemia?” go a long way to undermine.
All of this suggests to me that detailed investigation of surviving evidence, using the latest historical techniques, would probably reveal that plague did make significant inroads into Poland in the 1340s. Certainly there seems to be no obvious reason to suppose that the situation in Casimir’s territories was significantly different to that in Charles IV’s Bohemia; the two territories were neighbours, trading partners and, quite frequently, enemies throughout this period. As such, the uncovering of Hoeniger as Carpentier’s ur source for the history of the plague in Poland does almost nothing to revise the verdicts I offered when I first tackled the subject two months ago.
 It’s also well worth noting that Hoeniger’s book also appears be the source of the suggestion that Casimir instituted a quarantine of Poland while the Black Death raged, a modern interpretation that I was not able to track down to its source when I first wrote. (I now note that the idea that a strict quarantine saved Poland was also accepted by Barbara Tuchman in her widely read pop history A Distant Mirror – also without formal attribution to a source, though she had definitely read Hecker. Given the considerable popularity of Tuchman’s work, this may well be how the quarantine story originally crossed over onto the net.)
If that is the case, however, Hoeniger’s conclusions seem questionable. Translated, the relevant passage in Der Schwarze Tod reads as follows [pp.37-8].
A certificate dated 30 March 1349, (Monum medii aevi res gestas Poloniae, III, p. 270), in which the King of the Poles abolishes [aufhebt] the customs barriers [Verkehrssperre] at Zmigrod [in Lower Silesia] with Hungary for his merchants and travellers, shows our extremely uncertain knowledge of the situation. We see from this that border barriers [Grenzsperre] were set up not only to the west, but also in the south of Poland. I thus suggest a similar interruption of traffic with the Baltic Sea areas; it is otherwise inexplicable that the infection was not brought to the open plains of Danzig [Gdansk], where there were numerous trade links with Poland. Only an energetic quarantine could afford the same protection as natural barriers for the remaining unpolluted areas, for they were not arbitrarily divided from their infected neighbours.
And Hoeniger adds, in a footnote:
The fact that ten years later, at a time when the plague was reappearing and threatening Austria, Hungary and Poland, these severe measures were imitated in Vienna clearly identifies its character as a quarantining measure. [“sanitätspolizeiliche Massnahme“, literally “sanitary police measure”].
It’s worth tracing Hoeniger’s thinking here. He starts from the position that a customs barrier was known to exist between Germany territories and Poland, then assumes that a decree abolishing a similar barrier at one town on the border with Hungary indicates the existence of customs points across the whole of the southern Polish border. From there, he uses the assumption (which, as we have seen, is essentially unevidenced) that the plague did not appear in the central plains south of Gdansk to suggest there must also have been effective customs barriers in place along the northern borders of the kingdom. Evidence that this “quarantine” was not only complete but also “energetic” likewise comes not from any specific evidence, but from the assumption that its effectiveness is proven by the apparent inability of the plague to penetrate Polish territory.
It seems clear, therefore, that there is practically no evidence that there were even customs barriers around the Polish kingdom in the late 1340s, and none whatsoever – other than “absence of evidence” – that such barriers were effective in imposing an actual “quarantine” on Casimir’s territories. In addition, the only evidence that Hoeniger cites to show that such barriers existed anywhere other than to the west is an edict abolishing a customs post at Zmigrod in March 1349, at a time when the Black Death was advancing rapidly across other areas of Europe. Hoeniger does not comment on this, but it seems utterly impossible to square his faith in the effectiveness of the Polish customs “quarantine” with the idea that Casimir would abolish a key border post at the very point when it would be most needed to protect the country.
I conclude that the idea that Casimir the Great saved his kingdom by instituting a strict “border quarantine” around Poland in the 1340s stems from a single edict actually abolishing one customs post on the border with Hungary beforethe Black Death appeared in the region, and hence that whatever steps the Polish king was taking in reordering his customs posts in the spring of 1349, they likely had nothing to do with any attempt to keep the Black Death out of Poland.
 As an addendum, I can also report that Knoll’s The Rise of the Polish Monarchy, while covering precisely the right period, is disappointingly completely devoid of any coverage of Polish demographic or economic history and also makes no mention at all of the country’s medical history.
 In my opinion, a fair summary of the state of play with regard to our understanding of the visitation of the Black Death in Poland in the period 1347-51 would be that
[a] There is insufficient evidence to be certain as to how badly the country was affected by the plague during these years. There is certainly no evidence that Poland was as badly affected by the epidemic as were the nations of western Europe, and some suggestion (mainly in the form of negative evidence from the archives of Breslau) that some parts of Polish and former Polish territory were less severely hit.
[b] Nonetheless, there is also no reason to suppose that the kingdom was entirely spared during the first wave of plague. The severe impact of the Black Death immediately to the west and east of Polish territory during these years is a matter of record, and while we simply lack evidence to assess the situation to the north and south, there is every reason to suppose that the disease would have been able to cross Poland’s borders, and almost none – given its incredible virulence and rapid spread during its first sweep across Europe – that it would not have done so.
[c] Evidence from elsewhere in Europe – and from modern studies of Poland itself – suggests that Hoeniger overstates his case in arguing for Polish exceptionalism, especially in imagining that the Black Death would have caused an almost complete cessation of trade in the region, and that surviving records of Polish trade in the late 1340s and early 1350s suggest that the country was spared the plague. Certainly it would be dangerous, without significant additional research, to argue that Poland escaped because it was less heavily populated than western Europe or because less trade flowed through the country.
[d] Contemporary historians of Poland tend to assume the apparently relatively limited impact of the Black Death there in the period 1347-51 was a product of low population density. This could be true. Nonetheless, I believe this verdict is a product of post-hoc rationalisation, and should be challenged for three reasons.
First, we don’t have proper studies of the population of Poland before, during or after the ravages of the Black Death. This means that any suggestion that Poland was “sparsely populated” in the middle of the 14th century is little better than a product of assumptions and guesswork; moreover, the kingdom was not entirely rural and certainly did possess several quite substantial towns and active trade routes, so talk of “low population density” needs to be qualified in any case.
Second, there is conflicting evidence from elsewhere in Europe regarding the impact of population density on the spread of the epidemic. Benedictow accepts that the lack of any evidence that the Black Death struck Finland in these years probably does suggest that population density was a factor there. But the plague nonetheless did have a major impact on other sparsely-populated areas of Europe, such as Norway and Sweden. This means that we certainly can’t say with any confidence that Poland was more sparsely populated than other mainly rural territories that clearly were devastated by the epidemic, and hence it would be unsafe to conclude that relative population density is a sure indicator of the likelihood that the epidemic would devastate a given area.
Third, evidence from Breslau/Wroclaw shows that population density cannot be the sole determining factor controlling whether or not the Black Death struck a region. Other factors, such as local conditions, and simply luck, along the routes along which the disease was transmitted, must have also been very significant.
[e] Much of the evidence for all this that does exist has been discussed only in older works, which lack the methodological and historiographical sophistication of more recent studies. This evidence is largely drawn from chronicles and contemporary correspondence; there is a real need for it to be reassessed and expanded on by scholars trained in demography and comfortable with handling medieval sources written in Latin and German, and secondary studies written in Polish and German.
[f] Whatever we make of the situation in 1347-51, Poland was not in some way “immune” to the plague; the country indisputably suffered a significant epidemic in 1360, during the second visitation of the Black Death in Europe, and there is reason to suggest that, overall, it suffered about as badly from plague as most other areas in Europe during the 14th century. This, in itself, is sufficient to render much of the special pleading that appears in non-scholarly sources in an attempt to explain supposed “Polish exceptionalism” pointless and misleading.
[g] Finally, there is no evidence whatsoever that the reasons commonly given online for the inability of the plague to penetrate Polish territory – the quarantining efforts of Casimir the Great and the existence of larger numbers of cats in Poland than elsewhere – have any basis in truth.
Robert Hoeniger, Der Schwarze Tod in Deutschland: Ein Beitrag sur Geschichte des Vierzehnten Jahrhunderts (1882)
Barbara Tuchman, A Distant Mirror: The Calamitous 14th Century (1978)
Paul W. Knoll, The Rise of the Polish Monarchy: Piast Poland in East Central Europe, 1320-1370 (1972)
Q: What is the truth about “getting shanghaied”?
A: There’s no doubt that San Francisco earned its reputation as a place where unwary or unlucky sailors risked being pressed into service on board ships departing for long voyages across the Pacific. Forced labour of this sort was relatively commonplace in the years roughly from the 1840s until about 1915; certainly there must have been many thousands of cases in this period, and an entire group of procurers, known as “crimps,” sprang up on the Barbary Coast to supply this need.
There were a couple of reasons why shanghaiing was a relatively common practice and why it was specifically associated with San Francisco. Merchant seamen were itinerants in this period. Rather than serving as part of one ship’s crew for relatively lengthy periods that covered several different voyages and deployments, as was the case in the navy, they signed up for only single voyages and had the option of leaving a ship at the end of that voyage if they were not happy with the master, the conditions, the pay, or indeed the next planned port of call. They might also choose to leave a ship out of the necessity of requiring paid employment, since they were paid only while they were actually at sea; a ship that stayed in port for a few weeks or months, awaiting her next cargo, was costing these men money. Thus, while a competent ships’ captain would do everything in his power to retain a core of trusted, skilled men around him, he would also typically lose some members of his crew, and hence need to recruit ordinary seamen every time he was in port. In the 19th century, these men were supplied via a largely informal system focused on boarding houses along the waterfront. Sailors looking for work could find it by applying to the well-connected men and women who ran the major seamen’s flophouses; masters looking to top up their crews passed out their requirements lists to the boarding house keepers known to supply men, who not infrequently had a reputation for providing these bodies by less than above-board means. A bad master, or a poor or unsafe ship, would always struggle to attract sufficient men, and it was in cases such as these that the crimps turned to illegal methods of forcing unwilling recruits on board.
The problem was particularly associated with San Francisco both because it was the main US Pacific port, and so a starting point for many very long trans-oceanic voyages of the sort no man would want to undertake on a “hell-ship,” and because at the very start of the period, in 1849, the California gold rush created such an hysteria that it was common for seamen to desert their ships in large numbers in order to join the rush to the goldfields, creating a major manning problem for the ships arriving at the port that could only be solved by kidnapping unwilling crewmen from the bars and flophouses along what became known, for its lawlessness, as the “Barbary Coast.”
Getting the hapless men who became victims of “shanghaiing” (a phrase that dates to 1872) onto ships was one of the riskiest parts of the job, and a considerable folklore has sprung up around it. This lore incorporates not only trick chairs positioned over trap doors (an idea that can be traced back at least as far as the legend of Sweeney Todd, the “demon barber of Fleet Street”, which in turn has its origins in the Paris of the early 17th century), but also secret tunnels running down to the shore. And certainly rendering these men insensible, through drink or drugs, was a technique occasionally used by crimps such as the infamous ‘Scar-Face’ Johnson, Michael Connor – a terror of the 1880s – Paddy West and ‘The Shanghai Chicken,’ John Devine, the last of whom went to the gallows for murder in 1873.
Hiram P. Bailey – who quite literally wrote the book (albeit a semi-fictional one) on being shanghaied out of ‘Frisco in the ’90s, spoke of being slipped mickey finns in a seafront bar and waking up on board a hell-ship that he calls the *Washington*, notorious for her vicious master, which was “putting to sea with two clergymen, three bar-tenders, four agricultural labourers – all shanghaied – among a more or less nautical crew of thirty men.” Davidson describes the “standard concoction” served by crimps to men they planned to shanghai as a mix of “whiskey, brandy, gin, and opium,” capable of knocking a man out for days; this was the “Miss Piggott Special,” so named after a Barbary Coast landlady rumoured to serve the drink to unwary custmers. A notice in the *California Police Gazette,* similarly, warned of “strychnine whiskey,” served in San Francisco in South of Market bars, which had an almost identical effect.
Shanghaiing occurred worldwide, of course – not just in San Francisco. A typical case from Rio de Janeiro involved a Swedish sailor, Gustav Johnson, who had gone ashore from his ship to purchase medicine:
As he was leaving the chandler’s shop he was set upon by four negroes, directed by a short, thick-set white man. They “knocked him down and bound him, carried him to a wharf, threw him into a small boat [and] rowed him” back to their barque, the Canvas-Down. On the Filipino island of Cebu, Johnson tried to go ashore, but his captain prevented him from doing so. He protested. The captain took him to the British consulate and had him locked up until departure, then audaciously deducted this cost from Johnson’s pay. The Swede secured his release in New York and used that city’s courts to successfully sue the captain for $150 in damages.
We get some clues here as to the interconnectedness of the elements of the shanghai trade, which required collaboration between masters, crimps, and often the authorities. An especially blatant example of the latter comes from the Great Lakes, where in the 1880s much of the Chicago trade was in the hands of a shipping agent called “Big Jack” McQuade, whose position was immeasurably strengthened by his connections to the city’s infamously corrupt municipal government:
>A few days before Christmas 1888… when the 1,000 ton schooner C.C. Barnes broke free of her icy imprisonment in the Chicago River with the help of a tug, she needed extra hands before getting underway to Buffalo with a cargo of 38,000 bushels of grain. McQuade headed to the Sans Souci Bar and told its owner, Olaf the Swede, to give him six men. Olaf protested that he could not find mariners right before Christmas. McQuade threatened to arrange for the rescinding of the saloon’s license. That night, Olaf rolled up with a wagon carrying six unconscious men.
This said, there is absolutely no credible evidence for the use of trapdoors to secure victims, either in San Francisco or anywhere else; ditto for secret tunnels, in San Francisco at least (there is some evidence they were used in Portland). Bill Pickelhaupt, author of one of the key studies of crimping and shanghaiing, studied oral and written accounts for years without coming upon a verifiable case, and there are a couple of good reasons why this should be so: first, the practice would have risked injury to a man who needed to be able-bodied to be of much use to his new employer, and, second, the law required sailors to sign ship’s articles, something there was no guarantee a man who had been kidnapped or forced aboard would do. It was far easier to target men who, while they might not want to undertake the voyage, grudgingly accepted they had little alternative but to do so.
Mark Strecker comments that while crimps
>used drink, drugs, coercion, and trickery to shanghai men, most preferred to employ financial blackmail. It worked like this: seamen chronically lacked money, so a crimp extended them far more credit than they could possibly repay. The crimp then offered those indebted to him the choices of debtors’ prison – something many American states and territories had – or taking a berth on a ship of the crimp’s choosing. Most did the latter. The crimp took what they owed him from their advance… The loss of this portion of earnings caused the affected to have short wages at the voyage’s end. To make up the difference, they had to get credit from another boardinghouse master, starting the process over.
It would be remiss of me not to mention that there is some evidence that crimps *did* make use of trapdoors at one key point in the shanghaiing process – Davidson mentions “dead-falls” in wharf-front warehouses, “through which shanghaied sailors were shoved into rowboats waiting below.” But Strecker’s book also gives us an interesting example of the consequences of employing the sort of coercive methods you are interested in:
>One Sunday night a seaman named Patrick Grant went carousing along [the Shanghai] waterfront. The next morning he awoke on a strange ship as the newest member of her crew. Feeling ill beyond the effects of a hangover, he informed the second mate he could not work because he had a nasty fever. During the four days [the voyage] lasted he received not a morsel of food. Somehow, his plight caught the attention of Mr Brown, a British vice-consul, who charged Grant’s master, Captain Murphy, with illegally bringing a man on board without first having him sign the ship’s articles, a violation of the Merchant Shipping Act of 1854. For his defense, Murphy produced articles with Grant’s signature, saying he had put it there himself as Grant could not write. Grant proved his literacy and went free. The judge fined the captain a mere £10 for his violation as he felt Murphy had meant no harm.
Shanghaiing continued to flourish until the very early 20th century, in part because, as Davidson points out, “as members of a migratory class unable to vote for protective legislation, sailors formed a classic lost community in a democracy.” It took organisation and unionisation to force the legislative changes that outlawed crimping and made shanghaiing a thing of the past. The Dingley Act (1884), a Federal law that prohibited payment of advance wages by masters to crimps, was one significant blow to the shanghaiing system, as was the formation of the Seaman’s Union in 1885 and the agitation that led to the Maguire Act (1885) and the outlawing of the crimps’ other major stand-by, the attachment of sailors’ clothing. This was followed by the White Act (1898), which limited the amount a sailor could be required to pay to any “original creditor”.
Between them, these three acts – and the end of the sailing ship era, which had required a large number of semi-skilled crewmen used largely as muscle – pretty much finished off the crimps of San Francisco – but that does not mean that sailors did not continue to risk shanghaiing elsewhere in the world for many years to come.
Hiram P. Bailey, Shanghaied Out of ‘Frisco in the Nineties(1925)
Lance S. Davidson, “Shanghaied: the systematic kidnapping of sailors in early San Francisco.” California History 64 (1985)
Bill Pickelhaupt, Shanghaied in San Francisco: Politics and Personalities (1996)
Mark Strecker, Shanghaiing Sailors: A Maritime History of Forced Labor, 1849 to 1915 (2014)
Q: During the New York Draft Riots (1863), supposedly the New York Times defended their office from the mob with 2 Gatling guns. Where did they obtain these guns and ammunition and how did they turn away the mob?
Did the Times staff kill members of the mob? I’ve attempted to find more information about this incident but have been unable to. The NYT makes the claim itself on this site.
A: The most authoritative version of this story – which itself is based on no more than late recollection and “tradition” – suggests that none of the guns were fired. The Gatling was a complicated bit of machinery even though it was designed to be used with minimal training, and it would have been hard for ordinary members of the paper’s staff to use it effectively in any case.
From the History of the New York Times by Elmer Davis (1921):
Warned by the misfortune of The Tribune, which had actually been attacked by rioters and saved only by the opportune arrival of a detachment of the overworked police, The Times fortified itself.
The Gatling gun had lately been invented and offered to the War Department, though it was not used either widely or successfully in the war. Two specimens of the gun had been obtained by The Times, according to tradition through the President’s friendship for [Henry J.] Raymond [one of the partners who owned the paper], and were mounted just inside the business office under the command of Leonard W. Jerome. If the mob had not been more interested in attacking those who were unable to defend themselves, it would have found some trouble waiting for it at the Times office, for the entire staff had been armed with rifles; and there was a third Gatling gun on the roof mounted so that it could sweep the streets in any direction. It is only a malicious invention of jealous rivals that this gun was kept trained on the window of Horace Greeley’s office in the near-by Tribune Building.
The question of where these weapons may have come from, if they ever existed, is an interesting one. The Gatling gun had not been accepted or purchased by the US Army at this time. So – while I have read numerous histories of New York and of the riots which state unequivocally that the guns were obtained from the army, one writer even specifying that they were “appropriated from one of New York’s armouries” – it would seem that the only way the Times could have obtained them, with or without the assistance of Abraham Lincoln, is if it got them from the Gatling company itself.
This is more than a little problematic, since Gatling was based in Indianapolis, with manufacturing located in Cincinnati. At the time that the Draft Riots took place in the summer of 1863, it would appear there may have been as few as 12 actual Gatling guns in existence and there had only been one formal trial of the weapon; another took place in Washington Naval Yard that summer. Certainly they were not available, and had not been sold, in any quantity.
Of course it’s possible that the manufacturer had a few examples in a sales room somewhere in New York, but I’ve never read any such claim, and it’s not clear why it would have done so. Although individual army officers did purchase samples of the gun for their own use later in the war, the sole customer for the gun at this point in time was the Army; by the summer of 1863, Major General Horatio C. Wright, commander of the Department of Ohio, was the sole officer to have taken an active interest in the weapon, and he had gone to Cincinnati to witness trials. The first sales to foreign powers did not occur till 1867, when Russia bought the weapon.
The rioting lasted for four days, but the current New York Times site you link to suggests the mob threatened its building on the first day, 13 July. That would rule out any attempt to source guns from any distance. Even if that account is wrong, is it really plausible that the NYT not only anticipated the unprecedented duration of the rioting, but also telegraphed to Ohio for help and received a rail shipment while the disorder was actually in progress? And then there’s the multiplying number of guns involved; Davis’s account raises the number from two to three, without explanation, in the space of a few lines.
As for the idea that the guns were provided courtesy of Lincoln’s personal intervention, this seems highly implausible; we know that Lincoln had tried to press another early machine gun, the Ager “coffee mill”, onto his generals in 1861, but when Gatling approached the President direct in an attempt to sell his invention in 1864, he was ignored – which does not suggest that Lincoln was either familiar with Gatling’s gun, or much of an enthusiast for it, one year after the Draft Riots occurred.
For these reasons – and since, despite the numerous anecdotal accounts of the story that have appeared in print since 1921, I have not been able to locate any contemporary or even near-contemporary source for the story – I have significant doubts as to whether the incident ever actually occurred.
For exactly how far Gatling had got in selling his gun by July 1863:
David Armstrong, Bullets and Bureaucrats: The Machine Gun and the United States Army, 1861-1916 (1982)
For accounts of the NYT’s Gatling guns:
Ric Burns et al, New York: An Illustrated History (2001); Elmer Davis, History of the New York Times (1921); James M. McPherson, The Illustrated Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era (2003); John Strasbaugh, City of Sedition: The History of New York City During the Civil War (2016)
For a – very slightly – more sceptical account:
Paul Wahl & Donald Topol, The Gatling Gun (1965)
For the book that explicitly claims the guns were “appropriated from one of New York’s armouries”:
Clint Johnson, A Vast and Fiendish Plot: The Confederate Attack on New York City (2010)
Q: Is it true that Henry VIII feared being attacked so much he had himself bricked into his bedroom every night?
I just heard on Horrible Histories that towards the end of Henry VIII’s life, he would be bricked into his bedroom every night then broken out the following morning. I’ve never heard this before and it sounds really implausible…
A: There is certainly no truth to the story, which is not mentioned by any of Henry’s major biographers. Furthermore, even had such an action been suggested or required, for some unfathomable reason, the actual process would have been impracticable in the sixteenth century, well before the introduction of quick-drying mortar and cement.
The story beaome “live” again in September 2017, presumably owing to the transmission of an episode from series 7 of the show entitled “Ruthless Rulers”, the programme notes for which read:
Get ready for some serious bad behaviour, as Horrible Histories brings you the most ruthless rulers of all time. Henry VIII is so demanding he has a brick wall built at his bedroom door every night, those vicious Vikings find that sorry seems to be the hardest word, hold your nose in Versailles because Louis XIV hasn’t got any loos, and rock out with the Warlords from Hell – take it away Genghis and Vlad.
This in turn has prompted others to question the rumour. As a result, there was an interesting exchange on Twitter between a couple of sceptics and Greg Jenner, who teaches an MA seminar in public history at York, is an historical consultant to the “Horrible Histories” TV show – and, somewhat incredibly, claims to be “both a passionate defender and careful critic of the way in which the past is exploited by our society for entertainment.”
While Twitter is not normally a good source, it’s worth giving the exchange here as it does illuminate the sort of standards a children’s TV history show produced for the BBC feels it needs to stick to these days – the short answer being that the standards are quite unbelievably low.
The question was first posed on History Stack Exchange:
I was just watching some TV with my kids, and we were enjoying the (normally reliable) Horrible Histories TV show.
It claimed that Henry VIII had a long series of bedtime preparations to ensure his nightly slumber was safe. Fair enough. The final step, though, was to brick up his doorway each and every night, taking the wall down in the morning.
This seems pretty crazy. If Henry could get out in the morning, intruders would surely have been able to get in fairly easily. If the wall was mortared, it would take too long to dry. Not to mention the level of skill involved by artisans to do the brickwork.
So I searched on it and found nothing except a bunch of other amateur historians also ridiculing the idea.
I posted about this on social media and, to my surprise, the historical adviser to the series replied to say he’d heard the story from the owners of Allington Castle. That seems a bit of a flimsy basis to me. And even with the extra information I couldn’t track down any evidence.
Is there any truth to this story? Is it as unlikely as it sounds?
One for Greg Jenner I think.
And Jenner responded:
Haha thanks, it’s one of those half dubious stories which circulate and we thought it would be fun to run with it.
A Twitter user called Matt Thrower then asked:
Sorry it’s me again, wondering if I can find any evidence 🙂
To which Jenner replied:
Feel free to ask around, we are well aware many facts are possibly myths but until they are disproved they remain usable on a comedy show.
these stories come from somewhere, but where… and why
I suppose a TV show is free to set its own rules in this regard, and though I find it regrettable that such a popular series plays so fast and loose with the facts, I can at least see some spin off benefit in the form of more kids finding history more fascinating.
But I find it unfortunate, in fact unforgivable, that anyone who calls himself an historian could take such a cavalier approach to evidence and sources. After all, if HH requires that someone “disprove the myth” in order that some check be placed on its content, that’s something its “historical consultant” ought to be responsible for, and could quite easily have done. Clearly he didn’t feel it necessary to try.
In this context, it’s worth mentioning that a response to the initial query was posted on History Stack Exchange, where a user called Patricia Shanahan observed:
In this case, I think the absence of evidence does very, very strongly suggest it didn’t happen. For example, the Eltham Ordinance lists many types of royal household workers and their duties, but never mentions the Privy Chamber Bricklayer, who would have had to be close to the King twice a day. It discusses the handling of left over torches and wax, but not the handling of the bricks for the King’s chamber. It specifies when the pages and squires have to get up in order to be ready to attend the King at eight in the morning, without saying what time the bricklayer should dismantle the wall.
It strikes me that this is a useful way of approaching the problem, although hardly a definitive one – the Eltham Ordinance dates to 1526, which is more than two decades before Henry’s death.
This still leaves unresolved the question of where the original rumour originated. We have Jenner’s claim that he heard it from “the owners of Allington Castle”, which is privately owned, in Kent, and does have associations with Henry VIII. This is quite plausible, as the castle website reveals that several series of Horrible Histories have shot at this location. The current owners are Sir Robert Worcester, the founder of the MORI polling organisation, and his wife. Other than that, the earliest account I have been able to trace dates to November 2013, when the question was debated on the forum of a website called The Anne Boleyn Files. The original questioner sourced it as follows – adding an alternate supposed reason for the practice:
It cropped up during a conversation I had with a friend some time ago. She said to me…
“Did you know that Henry (towards the end of his life) used to be bricked up inside his lodgings every night, and the bricks taken down every morning, due to his fear of getting sick”
I know he had a fear of getting poorly… but did he take it this far!?
That’s pretty vague. But perhaps further investigation will reveal if the rumour can be traced further back than that.
One closing comment: I think there’s really no excuse for HH not to make an effort to look into stories it knows are dubious.
I can only imagine they don’t because they don’t want to rule out stuff they think would make good TV. But however entertaining, this is also the stuff that sticks, and it has an impact on perceptions more generally.
In this case, if kids are being told Henry was frightened of being killed in his bed, that affects how they will think about him as a ruler, and think about how dangerous it was to be a king in Tudor England – all in ways that won’t be helpful if they come to study the period at A level or at university. So it’s not just a harmless bit of fun.
Q: When Ferdinand Magellan circumnavigated the Earth, he came across supposed “Giants of Patagonia”. Who were these giants and why were they so tall?
A: Reports of a race of giants who inhabited the southernmost reaches of South America date back to the very earliest European visitors to the continent. The place-name “Patagonia” itself probably derives from the Portuguese “Patagão” – translating to “big feet” – and expeditions that reached the area between Magellan’s voyage in 1520 and 1764 sporadically claimed to have encountered groups of men of abnormally gigantic stature. Far from every visitor to Patagonia reported such meetings, however, and the idea gradually developed that it was only the members of one particular tribe, the Tehuelche, who attained such remarkable heights. This latter theory remained popular into the 19th century, and Rupert Gould, author of the first detailed investigation into the rumours, divides reports into three periods: “roughly, into a century of credulity, a century of incredulity, and a century during which it became apparent that the story of the Patagonian giants had a real, if slender, basis of truth.”
To begin the tale at the beginning, the first recorded mention of Patagonian giants dates to June 1520 and the arrival of Magellan’s expedition off the coast of South America, making landfall on the east coast at the spot now occupied by Puerto St Julián. There, according to an account written by Antonio Pigafetta, a Venetian scholar who had joined the voyage, they saw a gigantic native standing on the beach.
“This man,” Pigafetta wrote, “was so tall that our heads scarcely came up to his waist, and his voice was like that of a bull… The least is taller than the tallest man in Castile.” The Spaniards landed and were able to approach the man, who proved friendly; soon other members of his tribe joined them on the beach. According to Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas, the 16th century Spanish historian (who was not present on the voyage, but collated accounts of it later), the smallest of these men was taller and bulkier than the largest of Magellan’s men.
The second voyager to report an encounter with Patagonia’s giants was Sir Francis Drake, who visited the same area in June 1578. Things went badly for the English, who lost two men in a skirmish with the natives. They reported that the giants stood a little under 7 feet 6 inches (2.29m) in height. Anthony Knyvet, who called in April 1592, claimed to have enountered Patagonians who stood 14 to 16 spans (10½ to 12 feet) and have actually measured the corpses of several who proved to be of equal stature. Two Dutch explorers, Sebald de Weert and Joris Spilbergen, who separately visited Patagonia in 1615, likewise claimed to have seen the giants: De Weert placed their height at 10-11 feet, while Spilbergen said he had seen two men, one of normal height and the other two and a half feet taller, which would place the latter at around the same height claimed by Pigafetta and Herrera. The second edition of the Journal of the Voyage of Wilhelm Schouten (Amsterdam, 1619) mentions the discovery of skeletons 10 or 11 feet long at Puerto Deseado (Port Desire) , but this claim does not appear in the earliest account of Schouten’s voyage. Captains Harrington and Carmen, who commanded a pair of French ships on the South American coast, repeatedly saw giants at Possession Bay, in the Straits of Magellan, and in 1712 the Spanish authorities in southern Chile informed the Frenchman Amadee Frezier that a tribe of natives averaging 9 to 10 feet in height lived in the Paragonian interior.
Finally, Commodore “Foulweather Jack” Byron (grandfather of the poet), who sailed the Straits of Magellan in 1764, met a native chief whom he described as a “frightful colossus” nearly seven feet tall, and – what was even more impressive – broad and muscular in proportion to his height. Midshipman Charles Clerke, who accompanied Byron and later sailed on three of Captain Cook’s voyages, wrote a separate account suggesting that
some of them are certainly nine feet, if they do not exceed it, The commodore, who is very near six feet, could but just reach the top of one of their heads, which he attempted, on tip-toe…. There was hardly a man there less than eight feet, most of them considerably more; the women, I believe, run from 7½ to 8.
A somewhat less dramatic claim was made by an American whaler (and tall-tale-teller), Benjamin Bourne, who was in Patagonia in 1849. He observed:
In person they are large; on first sight they appear absolutely gigantic. They are taller than any other race I have seen, though it is impossible to give any accurate description. The only standard of measurement I had was my own height. Which is about five feet ten inches. I could stand very easily under the arms of many of them, and all the men were at least a head taller than myself; their average height I should think is nearly six and a half feet, and there were specimens that could have been a little less than seven feet high.
Against all this, however, we need to rank the evidence of other visitors whose accounts went out of their way to stress that the Patagonians they encountered were of entirely normal height. These men include John Winter, Drake’s second-in-command, who believed the stories of giants were a Spanish invention; Sir John Narborough (who spent 10 months on the Patagonian coast in 1670); and Wallis and Carteret, who measured a selection of the men they encountered with rods and found them to be tall, certainly, but certainly not gigantic:
one was six feet seven inches high, several more were six feet five and six feet six inches, but the stature of the greater part of them was from five feet ten to six feet.
By the time this latter account appeared, attempts were already being made to explain the wide variations that had been reported in the height of the Patagonians. Byron, in 1766, and John Hawkesworth, writing in 1773, seems to have been the first to suggest that the giants were members of a distinct tribe who lived somewhere in the Patagonian interior and only visited the coast sporadically. Charles Darwin, who landed in the Straits of Magellan with the men of HMS Beagle, met with one of the supposed “giants,” who he thought was only about six feet tall, and subsequently proposed an alternative theory:
Their height appears greater than it really is, from their large guanaco [ie animal skin] mantles, their long flowing hair, and general figure.
Robert FitzRoy, who captained the Beagle, backed Darwin up in this respect, Curious to know the truth about Patagonia’s “giants,” he made close observations and estimated that they men he met were mostly between 5 feet 10 and six feet tall, still above the average for Europeans of the day. Titus Coan, a Protestant missionary who worked in Patagonia in the 1830s, similarly recorded that he met no natives who stood taller than six foot six.
Overall, then, the evidence for Patagonian giants is mixed. Early accounts are often dismissed as travellers’ tales – Pero describes Pigafetta’s claims as “pregnant with exaggeration and magical stories” – but a scattering of claims of encounters with individuals of truly exceptional stature, the product either of measurement or of side-by-side comparisons, do exist. These accounts take us beyond the lazier types of debunking – the suggestion, for example, that the “giants” were simply the invention of map-makers who decorated the unexplored portions of their globes with images of strange, imagined monsters.
Broadly speaking, explanations that attempt to account for the evidence for giants can be split into two broad categories. Davis, and several earlier authors, accept that the members of one Patagonian tribe were of unusually tall stature, perhaps averaging as much as six feet, and/or that they had unusually long torsos, and so looked taller than they were when mounted or when sitting down, all while pointing out that – because the average Spaniard of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries stood about 5 feet 3 inches – even a six footer might look gigantic. Others follow Darwin in suggesting that the natives’ height was always exaggerated as a result of their clothing and their appearance.
Since no reliable survey of the average height of any Patagonian tribe seems to exist to back up the former theory, no reliable evidence of “giant skeletons” has ever been found, and since average heights in any population of above six feet have not been attained even today, with the help of considerably better diets than we can reasonably assume were enjoyed by the indigenous peoples of the far south of the Americas in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, my own suspicion is that Darwin probably got it right. It does seem possible that one or two explorers encountered one or two native Patagonians of significantly above average height, but there is certainly no good evidence for whole tribes of giants, or of groups whose average height was significantly above six feet.
Benjamin Franklin Bourne, The Captive in Patagonia, Or Life Among the Giants: A Personal Narrative (1853); Surekha Davis, “Monstrous ontology and environmental thinking,” in Renaissance Ethnography and the Invention of the Human: Worlds, Maps and Monsters (2016); Rupert Gould, “There were giants in those days,” in Enigmas: Another Book of Unexplained Facts (1929); Alejandro Pero, “The Tehuelche of Patagonia as Chronicled by Travelers and Explorers in the Nineteenth Century,” in Briones and Lanata (eds), Archaeological and Anthropological Perspectives on the Native Peoples of Pampa, Patagonia, and Tierra del Fuego in the Nineteenth Century. (2002); Helen Wallis, “The Patagonian giants,” in Robert E. Gallagher (ed.), Byron’s Journal of His Circumnavigation, 1764-1766 (1964)
Q: Whatever happened to the hotel detective?
I read a lot of old pulp fiction, and hotel detectives are in a lot of the stories. But I also travel a lot and have never noticed one.
A: Hotel detectives were indeed once extremely ubiquitous, and are now indeed much less commonly encountered. They were men who did a very distinct type of job. They were responsible for ensuring that the hotel the detective worked for was safe and secure – memoirs describe regular rounds of the building and endless testing of locks – but they were, for the most part, far more concerned with protecting their employer than their guests. Their job certainly did involve preventing crimes from taking place on the premises, and solving, where possible, those that did occur – but mostly this was done to ensure that the business they worked for was not being ripped off. Only occasionally, and at the very best hotels, would their work extend to more customer-focused activities, such as offering protection to distinguished guests.
A large proportion of these “house officers” were former policemen who took hotel posts after retiring from the force. Such men made ideal employees. The skills required of a hotel detective included a good understanding of human nature, a talent for conflict resolution, and a good working knowledge of the local criminal element – all things that were readily picked up in the course of a career in law enforcement. Ample experience of dealing with crooks and crime was important not least because, in taking up a house position, a former policeman forfeited a good deal of the powers he’d had as a cop. “The hotel detective is the world’s most fenced-in man,” the journalist Frederick Laurens observed in 1946. “He has no badge, can carry no weapon, has no authority to push people around, as have the regular police, and must either rely on tact or threats and ugly looks to get his way.”
Experience was the most important attribute of a hotel detective, since, for the most part, such men had three main functions to perform. The first was to protect the hotel’s reputation and prevent it from unwittingly breaking any laws, which, especially in earlier periods, often involved preventing an establishment from acquiring a reputation as the sort of place that allowed unmarried couples to have sex on the premises – very often an offence at the time under laws relating to “unlawful cohabitation”. A 1979 article in Texas Monthly notes that in earlier times a house officer would, as part of his routine, challenge male guests with the line “Is there a woman in your room?” Dev Collans, in his pulpy exposé I Was A House Detective (1954), describes enlisting bellboys to report on “couples who wouldn’t open their suitcases while the bellboy was still in the room; married couples didn’t hesitate to. A man in sleek clothes with a woman whose shoes were run down at the heels is another giveaway.”
The detective’s second major task was to screen new employees and know as much as possible about those who made it onto the staff, in order to prevent them from robbing both the hotel (of food, silverware, bedlinen and pretty much everything else) and the guests. In this respect, a New York Times article dating to 1902 recounted how “Detective Sergeant ‘Sam’ Davis, who has for twenty years been responsible to Police Headquarters for all the hotel detective work between Fourteenth and Fifty-ninth Streets” in Manhattan, fingered “one chef, three cooks, two porters, half a dozen chambermaids, and a woman in charge of the linen room” as thieves in a single hotel. As soon as the 13 malefactors had been fired, “the robberies stopped [and] the proprietor found his receipts growing larger.”
Thirdly, a house officer would be expected to keep criminal elements from causing trouble in his hotel. This involved recognising known crooks and prostitutes – another reason why retired police officers from the district were highly favoured as hotel detectives. A detective might, for example, agree on a signal with the desk clerk to warn of a known criminal attempting to check in; since the crook would be highly likely to leave without paying his bill, he would be told the establishment was full and there were no vacancies.
Of course, an especially large proportion of their work involved spotting when guests were taking prostitutes into their rooms, and either stopping them or, more usually – since active intervention embarrassed and angered guests, and tended to cause scenes – logging the girls’ locations, and dealing later with any problems that occurred as a result of their visits to the hotel. These only rarely had anything to do with sex; as Charley Coyle, a house detective at the Adolphus Hotel in Dallas, noted in 1979, “These girls aren’t there just to have sex and get paid. It would be different if they were. Not so much trouble for us. They’re there to steal.” According to Gregory Curtis of Texas Monthly, keeping track of prostitutes was by far the most time-consuming aspect of the house detective’s job: “Every hotel detective I talked with, from those in the plainest hotels to those in the fanciest, said prostitution was still their main problem.” One reason for this was that sex workers favoured working in hotels, not least because of the advantage that a prostitute had over her clients when they were in a public space. Lou Speer of the Adolphus explained that
A clever working girl can get the money she’s been promised, then clean out her client’s wallet and possibly his luggage, and escape from the room with her virtue, at least the sexual part of it, intact.
No, they don’t usually carry guns or nothing. They don’t really have to. A lot of times they’ll get out of the rooms just by saying they’re going down the hall for some ice to put in their drinks…. Usually what they do is make sure the mark takes his clothes off first. Hell, he’s got his own ideas about what she’s there for, so all he has to do is just heat him up a little bit, and he’s not going to think twice about stripping down. Then, with him naked as a jaybird, she can grab his wallet and run out the door and there’s no way he’s going to come running after her.”
Interestingly – in Speer’s experience, at least – the hotel detective’s main role in cases such as this was not to catch the girl, but to prevent the guest from attempting to bring a claim of theft against the staff. Few men would admit to bringing a prostitute into the establishment, much less to being stupid enough to allow themselves to be robbed by her, but many would attempt to lodge a complaint that their wallet had been stolen while they were in the hotel. In such circumstances, Speer and his men had recourse to their “hooker reports” – a log they kept of single guests who entered the premises with women on their arms.
“If a guest comes down in the morning and says his wallet was stolen, the first thing I do is look up my hooker reports to see if he had a girl up there. The guest is trying to say that the hotel is responsible for the loss. You ought to see the expression on some of their faces when I say, ‘But what about the girl you took up to your room at twelve-eleven last night?'”
As to why hotel detectives are now a dying breed: two key developments have combined to do away with them. One is changes in morals; no modern hotel is likely to acquire a dubious reputation simply because it allows clearly unmarried couples to share a room, and it’s no longer against the law for guests of this sort to “unlawfully cohabit” – so house detectives are no longer required to police the guests. The second is the ubiquity of close-circuit television. When it comes to deterring and detecting theft, it’s cheaper and probably more effective to outfit a hotel with multiple CCTV cameras than it is to pay a roster of former detectives to work often unsociable hours to try to solve such crimes after they have taken place. The problems of staff theft and of prostitutes stealing from guest rooms can both fairly readily be investigated now – and evidence handed over to the local police – without recourse to a house detective.
“Hotel detectives and their experiences“, New York Times, 1 June 1902
Dev Collans, I Was a House Detective (1954)
Gregory Curtis, “Hotel detective,” Texas Monthly February 1979
Norman Hayner, Hotel Life (1936)
Frederick V. Laurens, “Hotel detective – 1946” in Best: the Popular Digest
Frank O’Sullivan & Walter Wright, Practical Instruction in Police Work and Detective Science (1940)
Horace Herbert Smith, Crooks of the Waldorf: Being the Story of Joe Smith, Master Detective (1930)
Q: At any point between the end of WWI and the end of WWII was there ever a rise of supernatural beliefs in Japan?
A: In fact there was – though the “interwar” period has much less meaning in Japan than it does in the west, and the spike in interest and belief can be more accurately dated to c.1910-35. This rise and fall had more to do with the history of Japan’s engagement with western ideas than it did with the impact of the two World Wars.
I would point you towards four figures in particular who played a key part in this spike, and who influenced the way in which Japan thought about the subjects you are interested in: Asano Wasaburō (1847-1937), a teacher at the Naval War College who imported a version of western spiritualism into Japan; Deguchi Nao (1837-1918), who was a sort of trance medium who claimed to have visions of the deity Ushitora-no-Konjin; her son-in-law Deguchi Onisaburô (1871-1946), a flamboyant Shintoist-spiritualist who blended existing folk belief with new concepts of divination, exorcism and millennarianism to create a new religion, Oomoto, which eventually took on an unusual anti-state flavour that resulted in its persecution in the 1920s; and Inoue Enryo (1858-1919).
To deal with Enryo first: he was an academic philosopher who attempted to fuse Buddhism with western science and founded, first the Enigma Research Society, and then the more successful Fushigi Kenkyukai, or “Society for Research on the Mysterious” in 1886 – pretty much at the same time as the rough-equivalent Society for Psychical Research was founded in the UK (1882). He became popularly known as “Dr Ghost” and was the creator of what Japanese call yokaigaku, literally “monsterology” but more usually translated as “mystery studies”.
Enryo was an active Buddhist (in fact at one point in his life, a Buddhist priest) and as such found it easier than many of his fellow academics to accept the reality of some psychical phenomena. One of his key concepts was that the distinction between the “false mystery” and “true mystery” was key to understanding superstitious belief. His society studied “Ghosts, foxes and tanukis [狐狸], strange dreams, reincarnations, coincidences [偶合], prophesies [予言], monsters [怪物], witchcraft [幻術], insanity, and so on.”
There’s an English paper on “Inoue Enryo’s Mystery Studies” in the journal International Inoue Enryo Research, 2 (2014), 119-55, and a full bibliography of western language materials about him can be seen here.
The other three were significantly more influential than Enryo, and they have been quite extensively studied. See Nancy Stalker, Prophet Motive: Deguchi Onisaburo, Oomoto and the Rise of New Religion in Imperial Japan; Emily Groszos Ooms, Women and Millenarian Protest in Meiji Japan: Deguchi Nao and Omotokyo; Birgit Staemmler, “The chinkon kishin: divine help in times of national crisis.” In Kubota et al [eds], Religion and National Identity in the Japanese Context and Kenta Kasai. “Theosophy and related movements in Japan.” In Prohl & Nelson [eds], Handbook of Contemporary Japanese Religions
In addition, Helen Hardacre, the great authority on Shintoism, has a useful introductory chapter on their movement in Sharon A Minichello (ed.), Japan’s Competing Modernities: Issues in Culture and Democracy, 1900-1930 entitled “Asano Wasaburō and Japanese Spiritualism in Early Twentieth-Century Japan.” This paper is a good English language intro that explains how western spiritualist concepts entered Japan and were adapted to relate to pre-existing religious, nationalist and especially shamanic concepts – bringing the new movement inevitably into conflict with state-sponsored Shintoism. Hardacre concedes that throughout this period such beliefs were marginal to the mainstream of Japanese culture. However,
nineteenth-century spiritualism from the West was a subject of great interest in early twentieth-century Japan. Situated on a border between mass culture and the more rarefied pursuits of Westernized, bourgeois salon culture, Japanese spiritualism represented, in part, the importation of Western cultural fads for seances, telekinesis, clairvoyance, and hypnosis. As such, it was [initially] romantic and escapist in a larger cultural context of empire, industrialization, and the expansion of state powers.
Trouble really started when Asano’s ideas ideas became fused with the apolocalyptic preaching of Deguchi Omisaburo, who caused considerable official alarm by attempting to spread his ideas in military and university circles. Hardacre, Ooms and Stalker all also discuss the ways in which western-influenced spiritualism, in the form of the Omotokyo movement founded by Deguchi Nao but later run by Asano, was heavily suppressed in Japan in two campaigns dating to 1921 and 1935.
Finally, a quick summary of other English-language resources:
- Michael Dylan Foster’s Pandemonium and Parade: Japanese Monsters and the Culture of Yokai looks at the evolution of the Japanese concept of ‘monster’ – specifically the variety known as yôkai from 1700-2000. It covers the way in which ghost and monster stories evolved over this period, but it’s not a chronological study.
- Noriko T. Reider’s Japanese Demon Lore: Oni from Ancient Times to the Present includes a couple of chapters on the changing conceptions of demons in Tokyo in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, with a focus on the increasing commercialisation of demons in the media.
- Suzuki Kentaro’s paper “Divination in contemporary Japan” is an analysis of a detailed survey of contemporary divination practices. Although focused on the present, it is very useful in presenting a breakdown of the types of belief in divination that exist in Japan, and as such it would be a useful jumping off point for more more detailed research in the period that interests you. Incidentally, Suzuki comments that this is “a subject upon which there is at present almost no academic research.” In Japanese Journal of Religious Studies 22 (1995), 249-66.
- A popular account of palmistry in Japan just before the period you are interested in is S. Culin, “Palmistry in China and Japan,” Overland and Out West 23 (1894). This one is available online from the University of Michigan library.
- Curran et al, in Multiple Translation Communities in Contemporary Japan, mention that the vampire story became popular in Japan in the period 1915-30, as a result of the influx of translated western works of all sorts that peaked in the early 1900s. The Japanese term for vampire, kyuketsuki, was coined in 1915. It seems this new interest was literary and academic, however, rather than resulting in the appearance of actual supposed cases of vampiric activity.
Q: Did Ramses II try to erase Queen Hatshepsut from the record books because she was a successful ruler or because she was a woman (who depicted herself as male)?
A: At its simplest, the answer to your question is that the destruction wrought on Hatshepsut’s monuments and memory seems to have occurred explicitly because she was a women – for reasons that I will try to set out for you below.
We do need to be honest about the problem here: we have no histories, no chronicles from Hatshepsut’s time (c.1507-1457 B.C.). The evidence we have is – bar a few late king lists – archaeological, and while it can tell us something of what happened during her reign as pharaoh, and after her death, it tells us little – directly at least – about why things happened as they did: why so many examples of her cartouche were shaved down and recut in order to ascribe them to some other pharaoh, and why elsewhere “her entire figure and accompanying inscription were effected and replaced with the image of some innocuous ritual object such as an offering table.” [Dorman] All answers are speculation; the distinction that we need to draw is that between informed and ill-informed guesswork.
But, with that said, the following is broadly agreed, by most Egyptologists, to be true: that Hatshepsut was a powerful member of the Egyptian royal family of the 18th dynasty, being the eldest daughter of one of Egypt’s greatest warrior-kings, the pharaoh Thuthmosis I (her very name means ‘Foremost of Noble Women’); that she was fortunate, in that her parents had no surviving male child, which eventually led her to move close to a position of power – as was commonly the case in ancient Egypt, she was married to a close relative, her half-brother, also Thuthmosis, the son of a high-ranking woman in the royal harem who eventually succeeded to the throne; and that she was also, very probably, ambitious, for when her husband died, leaving her to rule as regent for his infant heir by another woman from the royal harem – her step-son and nephew, the future Tuthmosis III – she was able to manouevre herself (in ways that have, unfortunately, left no clear traces in the archaeological record) into a position of absolute power. Hatshepsut the king’s-woman (which is the literal translation of the ancient Egyptian word for ‘queen’ – rank in this period, even for a woman of Hatshepsut’s lineage, was entirely the product of a husband’s or a father’s status) became Hatshepsut the pharaoh, ruling alone and portraying herself in masculine terms, most famously by overseeing the production of statues that showed hear sporting a full beard.
It’s worth pausing briefly to look at the reign before we consider what happened to Hatshepsut’s monuments and to her reputation after she died. One key point to make is that, while she was not actually the first woman to take absolute power in Egypt, she was the first one to do so in a time of peace; the only previous female pharaoh, Sobekneferu of the 12th dynasty (r. c.1800 B.C., at the tail end of the Middle Kingdom period), had taken power at a time of national crisis, and apparently out of necessity, there being no other senior royal males available to rule. Another is that Hatshepsut was apparently not, as she is sometimes portrayed, a ruler with a distinctively “feminine” agenda, preferring peace to war. It is true that one of the more notable achievements of her reign was a trading voyage to the land of Punt (far to the south, sometimes identified with modern Somalia), but Egypt did wage war – successfully – in Hatshepsut’s time. This, together with her use of standard Egyptian iconography, and her entirely conventional determination to divert vast state resources to the construction of funerary monuments for herself (her magnificent mortuary temple, which survives, is one of the most iconic tourist attractions on the Nile) tend to argue that, whatever the reason for the post-mortem destruction that partially obliterated her name, it was not because she forced through policies or ordered actions that were outrageous or reviled. She was no Akhenaten – the 18th dynasty pharaoh notorious for neglecting the old gods in favour of a quasi-monotheistic new cult focused on the sun god, Aten, whose name was also wiped from Egyptian records after his death.It is also very helpful to look at what we know of Hatshepsut’s relationship with her stepson, Tuthmosis III, since it was in his reign that much of the destruction wrought on her monuments took place. Two points emerge most clearly here. The first is that there is no direct evidence that Hatshepsut ever did anything to suggest that Tuthmosis was not the rightful heir to the throne. Dating the monuments that survive, it would appear that she ruled in her stepson’s stead, as regent, for at least two years before claiming power for herself; thereafter, Tuthmosis was not only allowed to live, but was actually given a solid training for taking power, being not only highly educated by the standards of the time, but also allowed to rise within the ranks of the Egyptian army until he became its commander-in-chief.
It seems inconceivable that the stepson would have been permitted a distinguished military career, and command over a powerful army, had Hatshepsut viewed him as a direct threat to her rule. Tuthmosis must have accepted – at least on some level – Hatshepsut’s right to rule, and we have no evidence that he made any attempt to seize power or prepare any sort of coup while she was still alive. Similarly, it is almost impossible to believe that a woman, who long custom and Egyptian political philosophy alike conceived as having no divine right to rule, could have held onto power for 22 years without the active support of a large portion of the country’s elite. There are other examples in Egyptian history of inconvenient heirs meeting suspicious ends, and of elites rising up against unpopular rulers; it has to be significant that neither of these things occurred during Hatshepsut’s reign.
Several alternatives have been advanced to explain how power may have been wielded during this period. We know that Hatshepsut made an effort to stress the legitimacy she had acquired via her royal parentage, emphasising not only that she was the rightful heir to a powerful king, but also divine, as the product of her father’s union with a royal mother from the same family. In this sense, importantly, she was actually more “royal” than her half-brother and husband, who was the son of a much lower-status woman. We also know that Hatshepsut was depicted far more commonly than was her stepson, and nominal co-ruler, on monuments constructed during her regency and then reign; surveying her mortuary complex, Vanessa Davies counts 87 occurrences of Hatshepsut’s name and figure, compared to 37 of Thuthmosis III. All this suggests that her efforts to portray herself as a worthy ruler, and as a divine monarch, were successful, and perhaps this best explains why she did not feel threatened by her stepson, and why she not only allowed him his army career, but also permitted him to be represented, during her reign, as a figure of considerable power and potency. Davies concludes that he “was represented as a multi-faceted and powerful figure; thus one might infer that he actually behaved and functioned in this manner, or, at the very least, that Hatshepsut intended for him to be viewed in this light.”
So while the Egyptian state may have expected and prefered to be ruled over by a male pharaoh, it seems there was no absolute proscription on female rule; it was highly unusual, but neither blasphemous nor “impossible.” Joyce Tyldesley concludes that
Legally, there was no prohibition on a woman ruling Egypt. Although the ideal pharaoh was male – a handsome, athletic, brave, pious and wise male – it was recognised that occasionally a woman might need to act to preserve the dynastic line. When Sobeknofru ruled as king at the end of the troubled 12th Dynasty she was applauded as a national heroine. Mothers who deputised for their infant sons, and queens who substituted for husbands absent on the battlefield, were totally acceptable. What was never anticipated was that a regent would promote herself to a permanent position of power.
Yet this is not to say that Hatshepsut was not aware of the underlying weakness of her position. There are two points to make in this respect. First, let’s hear again from Tyldesley:
Morally Hatshepsut must have known that Tuthmosis was the rightful king. She had, after all, accepted him as such for the first two years of his reign. We must therefore deduce that something happened in year three to upset the status quo and to encourage her to take power. Unfortunately, Hatshepsut never apologises and never explains… Indeed, seen from her own point of view, her actions were entirely acceptable. She had not deposed her stepson, merely created an old fashioned co-regency, possibly in response to some national emergency. The co-regency, or joint reign, had been a feature of Middle Kingdom royal life, when an older king would associate himself with the more junior partner who would share the state rituals and learn his trade. As her intended successor, Tuthmosis had only to wait for his throne; no one could have foreseen that she would reign for over two decades.
It is interesting, in this context, to consider how Hatshepsut portrayed herself over the course of her reign. Early statuary from her regency period clearly depicts a woman wearing male regalia, breasts visible on a naked upper body. Later, after her coronation as pharaoh, depictions change; Hatshepsut is now portrayed as a man, with wider shoulders and no breasts. And she was buried as a man, as well, in a king’s sarcophagus. As Kara Cooney points out, this can be seen as a matter of convention, not deception; Hatshepsut never changed her – very clearly feminine – name, so it seems unlikely she was trying to pretend to be something she was not. Yet it is difficult to imagine that female rule was simply accepted without any question in the Egypt of her day; its consequences were too stark a departure from religiously-rooted norms. The problem here was one of political philosophy, not simply politics. But, as Cooney notes:
Given that the king on earth was nothing less than the human embodiment of the creator god’s potentiality, Hatshepsut must have been all too aware that her rule posed a serious existential problem: she could not populate a harem, spread her seed, and fill the royal nurseries with potential heirs; she could not claim to be the strong bull of Egypt.
Perhaps, then, it is better to see “male” images of Hatshepsut as nods to a conventional iconography that applied equally to any Egyptian ruler, of whatever sex, than it is to imagine them as admissions of serious political weakness.
So, with all this said, we can turn at last to answering the question posed: why were Hatshepsut’s images destroyed after her death, and why was her name removed from so many of the monuments she made?
It’s important, first, to recognise that the new regime was not a complete break with the past. Thuthmosis continued to employ a large proportion of the royal servants who had served his stepmother. And the desecration he ordered – which Cooney estimates accounted for “hundreds, if not thousands” of images and inscriptions – was not a campaign of attempted absolute obliteration, as the campaign against Akhenaten seems to have been. Not all of Hatshepsut’s statues were destroyed, and not all of her cartouches were hacked away; a significant number survived, not least those representing her as queen, including some that were quite prominently displayed on her tomb, which would surely have been a prime target for any Roman-style campaign of damnatio memoriae. The same is true of the desecration that seems to have occurred to the monuments of her prime supporter, her steward Senenmut – whose name was removed from only 9 of his surviving 25 statues. Cooney summarises by saying that the statues that were removed or desecrated were those in public places – the aim, therefore, may have been to “prevent people from seeing and interacting with her as king.” The archaeological record, moreover, strongly suggests that the campaign did not begin immediately on Thuthmosis’s accession – Hatshepsut was buried with all honour, for one thing, and works underway at the time of her death were completed, which can only imply that her heir ordered work on them to continue. Something happened later to change this, something that Cooney concludes was probably a shift that took place in the mind of an ageing ruler considering his legacy.
Modern consensus is that the desecration of Hatshepsut’s monuments cannot have begun earlier than the 42nd year of Thuthmosis’s reign, which is 20 years after his aunt’s death. We also know that it continued into the reign of his son, Amenhotep II – to a period when few of those responsible would have had any memory of the female pharaoh. Finally, where Hatshepsut’s name was obliterated, it was rarely replaced with her stepson-nephew’s; more usually, the new name carved was that of her father, his grandfather, Thuthmosis I.
All of this suggests that the campaign was neither wildly aggressive, nor “personal”. It seems unlikely to have been carried out on the orders of a man who had spent the 20 years of Hatshepsut’s reign boiling with anger at being usurped.
Most modern archaeological interpretations of Hatshepsut’s reign, including those of Dorman, Tyldesley and Cooney, prefer instead to see the destruction of her name as a form of reassertion of what would have been seen as the the natural political and theological order – “an impersonal attempt at retrospective political correctness” (Tyldesley) aimed at stressing the male prerogative to rule. This would explain why Thuthmosis seems to have ordered the adoption of distinctive artistic style in sculptures and paintings showing him – one that was very much a break from the old style that had existed in Hatshepsut’s style, and which harked back, more importantly, to the styles adopted by his grandfather. Dorman argues that the key intention was to stress Thuthmosis III’s royal lineage (and hence legitimacy) while removing signs of female disruption to the approved order, most probably because “the recently invented phenomenon of a female king had created such conceptual and practical complications that the evidence of it was best erased.”
For Cooney, meanwhile,
“the Egyptian system of political-religious power simply continued to work for the benefit of male dynasty. Hatshepsut’s kingship was a fantastic and unbelievable aberration. Ancient civilization didn’t suffer a woman to rule, no matter how much she conformed to religious and political systems; no matter how much she ascribed her rule to the will of the gods themselves; no matter how much she changed her womanly form into masculine ideals. Her rule was perceived as a complication by later rulers—praiseworthy yet blameworthy, conservatively pious and yet audaciously innovative—nuances that the two kings who ruled after her reconciled only through the destruction of her public monuments.
Kara Cooney, The Woman Who Would Be King: Hatshepsut’s Rise to Power in Ancient Egypt (Broadway Books, 2015); Vanessa Davies, ‘Hatshepsut’s use of Tuthmosis III in Her Program of Legitimation,’ Journal of the American Research Center in Egypt 41 (2004); Peter F. Dorman, ‘The proscription of Hatshepsut,’ in Roehrig, Dreyfus & Keller, Hatshepsut from Queen to Pharaoh (Yale, 2005); Joyce Tyldesley, ‘Hatshepsut and Tuthmosis: a royal feud?’ BBC History, 2011
Q: This article in The Atlantic mentions that the murder rate in the Medieval period was 12%. That seems absurdly high. Is there any truth to it?
It just seems absurd. Like, just estimating, half the world’s population or more was in India and China. China and south India both had long periods of political stability – does that mean a European had something like a 25% chance of dying due to violence? Are they counting people who die to due to war-caused famines as being murdered?
A: Tracking this claim to its source is a good example of heading down an Alice in Wonderland-style rabbit hole.
Checking back to the article you cite, it’s clear that the claim is based on a new and really quite exceptionally broad survey of violence among all mammal populations. This was published in Nature this week as Gomez et al, “The phylogenetic roots of human lethal violence.” Superficially this means the source is an impressive one, since Nature is certainly one of the most prestigious scientific journals in the world. However, it’s worth noting that the paper appears as a “Letter” rather than as a full fledged article, and that Nature has a surprising history of publishing high-profile but what can politely be termed “controversial” articles, such as one offering a scientific name for the Loch Ness Monster based on underwater photographs of what later turned out to be almost certainly a tree stump.
In this case The Atlantic itself sounds some cautionary notes about the evidential basis of the violence survey. It is a meta-analysis, and by its nature not a very comprehensive one (that is, it does not include any original research, but collates the results of earlier surveys) that attempts to compare the levels of violence among a huge variety of different mammal populations across the whole of the archaeological record. A total of 1024 species are surveyed, humans being just one of them. So it’s reasonable to wonder exactly how much effort was put into making sure the human sample was comprehensive and representative, and problems associated with the data had been completely thought through.
The Atlantic has a few pertinent comments about the team’s methodology:
- “First, he and his team compiled everything they could find on causes of death for various mammals, accumulating some 3,000 studies over two years.”
- As for the sources of information for the human sample: they did this “by poring through statistical yearbooks, archaeological sites, and more, to work out causes of death in 600 human populations between 50,000 BC to the present day.”
As for the way in which the data has been handled: “Polly Wiessner, an anthropologist from the University of Utah … is unimpressed with the study’s human half. “They have created a real soup of figures, throwing in individual conflicts with socially organized aggression, ritualized cannibalism, and more. The sources of data used for prehistoric violence are highly variable in reliability. When taken out of context, they are even more so.”
“Richard Wrangham from Harvard University has similar concerns about the mammalian data, noting that Gómez have folded a lot of different kinds of killing—infanticide, adult deaths, and more—into a single analysis. And from an evolutionary standpoint, it matters less whether two related species kill their own kind at a similar rate, but whether they do so in a similar way.”
To go further into this requires a close reading of the original article, which is available online here. It’s worth noting that the article itself gives very inadequate sources for most of the information it contains, which is not surprising when it is based on such a vast meta-analysis. To find out what the actual sources are we have to go to the “Supplementary material” section which is separately available here.
Let’s summarise what we can discover about the sources used and their comprehensiveness and reliability by reading through these two sources.
First, the Letter itself.
This points out that the human violence figures available were divided into four categories by socio-political organisation: bands, tribes, chiefdoms and states. This is a categorisation widely used in the social sciences (eg anthropology) but one that I’d say a lot of historians find unhelpful. After all, there’s a vast historical literature devoted entirely to trying to define what a “state” actually is.